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Abstract
Fung and Olin-Wright argue for small scale politico-economic institutions as a means of
facilitating greater participatory governance.  Similarly, Polanyi emphasised the distinction
between  large  scale  'General  Purpose  Money'  and  smaller  scale  non-national  ‘Special
Purpose Currencies’ (SPCs).  Non-national currencies, by complementing existing national
currencies, form alternative or Complementary Currencies (CCs).  CC advocates observe
that  while  institutions  which  issue  General  Purpose  Money tend  to  use  closed  (non-
transparent and non-participatory) governance processes, CC institutions, particularly when
sponsored by local communities, may offer potential models for more participatory forms
of monetary governance.  This study applies established governance principles to monetary
decision-making,  highlighting  the  importance  of  regulatory  frameworks,  transparency,
accountability and direct  participatory input  for all  currency users.   It  further  explores
whether national regulations and scale inhibit attempts by monetary institutions to allow
full  stakeholder  access  to  monetary  governance.   To  facilitate  this  exploration,  a
comparative  analytical  framework,  called  “Shared  Monetary  Governance”  (SMG),  is
developed  that  allows  the  evaluation  of  distinct  types  of  currency  institutions.   Its
application  in  the  cases  of  four  currencies from the  USA -  the  US Dollar,  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars, Time Dollars, and Deli Dollars -   aims to enhance our understanding of
how  the  degree  of  SMG  is  affected  by  three  interrelated  factors:  national  regulatory
frameworks,  internal  decision-making  processes,  and  scale.   The  four  currencies  are
therefore  evaluated  across  three  sets  of  criteria:  Regulatory Framework  toleration  (11
indices),  Participatory  Internal  Decision-making  (15  indices),  and  scale  (indexed  by
function and geography).  This methodology empirically compares each set to determine
how each interrelated influence affects  monetary governance and therefore stakeholder
ability to influence priority setting.  It finds that community-based currency institutions,
part of the group of CCs, tend to allow greater SMG.  Such findings imply that a multi-
level  interconnected  monetary  system  including  community-based,  national  and




DUHC: Democracy Unlimited of Humboldt County
ESOP: Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
FOMC: Federal Open Market Committee
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
LETS: Local Exchange Trading System / Scheme
MCS: Mutual Credit System
MoE: Medium of Exchange
MoP: Means of Payment
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PID: Participatory Internal Decision-making
RF: Regulatory Framework
SMG: Shared Monetary Governance
SoV: Store of Value
SPC:  Special Purpose Currency
The Fed: The United States Federal Reserve
UoA: Unit of Account
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
In much of the world there is no alternative to using money.  Market dependence translates
into dependence on money, given that few communities remain self-reliant to a degree that
allows them to meet their own needs without external resources. Furthermore, nearly all
monetary exchanges within communities are regulated by sets of institutions and rules that
are beyond their  control.  In the majority of the world,  monetary governance is  largely
dominated by a market-centred ideology which removes decision-making access from most
affected stakeholders, i.e. those who use or are otherwise affected by money.  Creation of
national  currencies through the banking system remains  largely under  the oversight  of
central banks and forms part of a wider market-oriented monetary regulatory framework
that,  according to the conventional economic orthodoxy, should remain independent of
‘political’ influence. 
The emphasis on the political independence of monetary governance has resulted in very
limited transparency and accountability and nearly always precluded public participation.
However, the financial and monetary crisis that began in autumn 2008 placed in serious
question  the  economic  orthodoxy regarding  the  institutional  frameworks  that  regulate
monetary systems.   Indeed,  the  character,  scope and  degree of  public  participation  in
monetary and financial governance are now at the centre of debates concerning the latter’s
unavoidable restructuring following the crisis.1 
Consequently, researching the governance of money as a special form of a socio-political -
and  not  merely  economic  -  regulation  has  acquired  special  urgency. Transparency,
accountability and public participation are emerging again as desirable principles for the
restructuring of monetary governance if the devastating socio-economic effects of short-
term market-driven decisions are to be avoided.  To a large extent such suggestions renew
earlier proposals, such as those put forward by Nobel laureate  Amartya Sen (1999), who
1 See for example Monbiot, G.(2009). "If the State Can't Save Us, We Need a Licence to Print Our Own
Money" The Guardian Tuesday 20 January 2009. See also: Garten, J.(2008). Global Authority Can Fill
Financial Vacuum Financial Times, September 25 2008.  Regarding the necessity for more transparency and
accountability see also: Aguilar, L.A., (2009). Increasing Accountability and Transparency to Investors. In
U.S.S.A.E.C. Commissioner (ed.) The SEC Speaks in 2009. Washington, D.C. 
1
argues strongly for the right of communities  to have a voice in the governance of key
aspects  of  their  collective  lives  of  which  monetary  governance  is  among  the  most
important.  They also  echo  calls  of  many development  economists  who  ‘believe  that
transparency,  accountability and  participation  in  political  decision-making will  have  a
direct effect on the level of market fairness’ (Ribeiro, 2005).  Last, but by no means least,
such suggestions join the voices of a growing number of authors who see in the so-called
Complementary Currencies  (CCs)  the  seeds  for  more  transparent  and  participatory
monetary governance  (see Lietaer, 2002) in addition to their beneficial effects to financial
stability (see  Kennedy, 2007).2 
Indeed,  for the  last  three decades a  ‘silent  revolution’  has  been taking place with  the
dramatic expansion of CCs, i.e. the wide variety of non-state sponsored forms of money,
issued by different institutions (local and regional authorities,  businesses, communities)
with differing objectives.  Historically, the establishment of CCs represented instances of
monetary institutional innovations during times of financial crisis as Gatch (2006), Greco
(2001) and Douthwaite (1996) have pointed out.  For example, in the case of the Great
Depression,  Gatch  (2006),  echoing  Fisher  (1935),   investigated  the  many varieties  of
Stamp Scrip issued by communities, by private individuals, and by firms during the 1930’s
as a result of the financial crisis. 
More often than not, CCs were community-based initiatives aimed at the re-vitalisation of
local communities’ economic welfare as well as protection from the devastating effects of
their exposure to national and international market forces.  It should be mentioned here that
this  thesis  adopts  the  term  ‘Community-based  Currencies’  for  those  Complementary
Currencies (CCs) that are sponsored by groups of citizens or by non-profit organisations
located in and for the explicit  benefit of local communities in order to distinguish them
from other CCs which may be sponsored by private individuals or by businesses.  While
the economic benefits of CCs of all types have been widely discussed, and are indeed a
strong reason for the uptake within communities of local currencies, North (1997) points
out  that  community solidarity and independence provide other rationales  for their  use.
2 Kennedy Margrit (2007) FINANCIAL STABILITY: A CASE FOR COMPLEMENTARY CURRENCIES
paper prepared for the China-Europa Forum, Tasks and Responsibilities of Institutions of the Financial
Sector Paris and Brussels 4th – 7th of October 2007, accessed 16/6/2009 from http://
www.margritkennedy.de/pdf/PRE_finStab.pdf
2
Further, Cahn (2006), Hutchinson (2002) and Linton (1994) emphasise the importance of
community-based  control  over  the  decision-making  processes  of  money.   Indeed,  the
additional  perspective  of  community governance and social  control  over  the  economic
sphere  emphasised by  Fung  (2001),  North  (2007),  Primavera (2005)  and  others  has
overridden the purely economic benefits of local currencies. 
The  appeal  of  Community-based currencies,  for  many,  is  this  possibility of  enhanced
community-level  governance of  monetary institutions.   However,  the objectives  of  the
institution that sponsors a currency can conflict with this appeal, given that objectives for
currencies  issued  by non-state  institutions  differ  based  on  the  goals  of  the institution.
Advocates  for  Complementary Currencies  such  as  Linton (1994)  and  Lietaer  (20002)
emphasise  local  businesses  as  users  and  potential  sponsors  of  currency,  but  do  not
emphasise the conflicting goals and decision-making processes used by different types of
institutions, such as businesses and non-profit institutions.  Those differences can result in
varying levels  of  transparency  and  accountability  for  different  currency  stakeholders,
particularly with privately issued currencies, as noted by Greco (2001).
Against this background, this study aims to contribute conceptually and empirically to the
body of literature that explores the potential for transparency, accountability and public
participation in different currency governance models.  This is achieved by focusing on
those aspects of currency governance that hinder or facilitate stakeholder access to relevant
decision-making processes. In particular, the study explores conceptually and empirically
the  relationship  between  stakeholders’  influence  and  the  different  functions  of  money
across different regulatory and geographical levels (local, national etc.). 
In particular, conceptually, the study explores the literature around the various processes,
functions  and circulatory ranges of  money.  Further,  it  constructs  a  framework within
which the potential  for stakeholder influence can be  analysed.  This  Shared Monetary
Governance (SMG) framework combines  a  set  of  criteria  that  can  capture  the  overall
capacity of any institution  issuing a  currency to facilitate  full  priority-setting access to
monetary decision-making by all stakeholders; in other words, to provide conditions for
transparent, accountable and participatory monetary governance.  Empirically, the study
operationalises  the  SMG  framework  by  means  of  a  comparative  study  of  different
3
currencies.   A  research  instrument  has  been  especially  developed  to  facilitate  this
comparison which relies upon a composite scoring method to capture the ‘performance’ of
the different currencies across different criteria.  Scope and time limitations required focus
on a small set of currencies.  Thus, a representative set of modern currencies in the USA
was chosen with the expectation of further application to currencies in other countries as
future research. In total four currencies were compared: namely, the US Dollar and three
representative non-national currencies.  Although the research instrument is applied to the
comparison  of  the  aforementioned  four  currencies,  its  design  allows  it  to  be  used  to
evaluate the potential for shared governance of larger sets of  currencies. 
The  structure of  the  thesis  follows a  step-by-step  approach toward the  theoretical  and
empirical  exploration  of  the potential  of  different  currency institutions  for  transparent,
accountable and participatory monetary governance.  Chapter 2 provides a literature review
and  discusses  the  main  approaches  to  understanding  money,  its  scale  and  various
approaches  to  monetary  governance.   This  chapter  identifies  a  number  of  serious
limitations with previous approaches and provides the research questions. In effect, the
chapter  highlights  the  need  for  a  modified  conceptual  and  analytical  framework  for
exploring currency institutional potential for SMG, a task that is undertaken in Chapter 3.
In  this  chapter  an  alternative  framework  is  introduced  where  the  core  criteria  of
transparency, accountability and participatory decision-making are discussed in relation to
the  currency-specific  decision-making  processes  involving  seigniorage,  issuance  and
backing.   In  addition  the  chapter  explains  how  the  links  between  functional  and
geographical ranges are included in the new framework. 
Chapter 4 offers a discussion on the methodology and the research instrument used to
operationalise  this  framework.   This  chapter  describes  in  detail  the  composite  scoring
method used to summarise large quantities of qualitative information for each currency and
provides the necessary justification for the criteria used in the scoring process.  Chapters 5
and 6 are both empirical chapters.  Chapter 5 offers a step-by-step ‘rich description’ of the
data used and explains the scores achieved by each currency.  Chapter 6 is the comparative
(analytical) chapter where, in a dimension-by-dimension mode of presentation, the four
currencies are compared.  Chapter 6 culminates in an overall comparison of the composite
total  potential  of  the  currencies  for  Shared  Monetary  Governance.   The  chapter
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demonstrates how the comparative exploration of currencies as institutionalised processes
and  governance  structures  exposes  their  potential  for  enhancing  transparency,
accountability and the participation of communities and stakeholders.  Finally, Chapter 7
offers the study’s reflections on the contribution of the new theoretical  framework and
empirical findings to the debates on currency governance.  It ends with reflections on the
limitations of the study and the potential for future research.   
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Chapter 2 - Money and its Governance: A Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction 
Governance of money is important for two reasons.  First, Fung and Olin-Wright (2003)
show how  centralisation  of  governance determines  stakeholder  input  into  institutional
decision-making.  Second, Polanyi (1957) has shown how currency governance affects and
is affected by the number of functions fulfilled by a currency.  In this context, this project
approaches currencies not as mere objects fulfilling economic functions but as complex
institutions  that  fulfil multiple  and  interacting  socio-political  and  economic  functions.
There are indeed a variety of literatures and paradigms that explore aspects of the above
but there seems to be very little conceptual cross-fertilisation between them (see also Table
2.1 below).  This chapter does not, and cannot, claim to provide an exhaustive review of all
these literatures.  It is hoped however, that what is provided in this chapter will give the
reader  an  understanding  of  the  different  perspectives,  the  gaps  between  them  and
ultimately, how the proposed analytical framework of Shared Monetary Governance can be
a first  step towards a more holistic  approach to understanding the interaction between
stakeholder input, the function and scale of currencies and their regulation. 
This chapter explores how three major influences on the governance of a currency have
been explained so far, based on a review of the relevant literature.  Those influences are: 
First,  regulatory frameworks  external  to  a  currency (mainly national  but  increasingly
supra-national regulations)
Second, institutional decision-making internal to a currency  
Third, the scale of a currency, here defined by both the number of monetary functions
filled by the currency and its geographical range of circulation. 
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These three influences shape the governance of any currency in general.  The first two
form the decision-making processes which are moderated by the third, defined here as the
functional currency scale.  Section 2.2, discusses key definitions surrounding money and
its governance.  The chapter then explores how the relevant literature approaches the three
influences mentioned above.  Section 2.3 discusses approaches to governance influences
external to any currency, US national RFs in particular, while section 2.4 discusses the
internal decision-making processes focusing on transparency and accountability in internal
decision-making (through seigniorage, issuance and backing of money).  Finally section
2.5 examines the impact of scale on the governance of any currency.
2.2 Understanding Money, Currencies and Monetary Governance 
2.2.1 Understanding money and currencies
In  keeping with  traditional  usage based definitions  of  money, (see for  example  Hume
1977) Polanyi (1977) listed the standard uses or functions of money, which include: 
providing a standard of value or unit of account (UoA), 
a medium of exchange (MoE), 
a store of value (SoV)  
Any currency must function as a unit  of account to track exchanges and equivalencies.
Dalziel (2000) calls a medium of exchange anything generally accepted in payment for
transactions.  Mafi-Kreft (2003) concurs with other economists in defining store of value
as purchasing power, measured by inflation.  Popp (1970) agrees that purchasing power is
critical to storing value, but stresses the importance of distinguishing between currency as
a medium of exchange and as a means of payment.  He differentiates exchange media from
payment  media,  defining  a  means  of  payment  as  that  which  governments  or  local
authorities accept in payment of taxes, fines and fees.  
Polanyi (1977) also asserted that there were two distinct categories of money based on the
number of functions that money fulfils:  
General Purpose money, and 
Special Purpose Currencies  
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Historically, different currencies were used for different purposes.  General Purpose money
refers to money used to fulfil all the three aforementioned functions simultaneously, i.e. as
a Unit of Account (UoA), Medium of Exchange (MoE), and Store of Value (SoV).  By
Polanyi’s  definition,  currencies  which  do  not  perform all  three  of  these  functions  are
Special Purpose Currencies (SPCs) and complementary currencies are of the latter type.  
While  criticising the  function-based definitions  of  money used  by Polanyi  and others,
Codere (1968) agrees on the importance of distinguishing between the monetary functions
of accounting, exchange and  storage of value.  By placing a numerical value on goods and
services, prices allow money to be used as a UoA.  Money functions as a MoE when it is
accepted in  payment for goods or  services.   Money thereby eliminates  barter´s  double
coincidence of needs, in which each party must have something the other party wants3.
Finally,  money  also  provides  a  vehicle  for  SoV  when  purchasing  power,  which
Kocherlakota (1996) defines as the ability of a given amount of money to purchase the
same goods and services, remains stable over time.  
Carruthers (2005) agrees on this functional nature of money, but adds that it is socially
constructed  and  based  on  trust. In  fact  there  are  sociological  and  anthropological
approaches that define money less by function and more by stakeholder influence.  Indeed,
Hart  (2001)  and  Kocherlakota  (1996)  view  money as  a  socially  constructed  form  of
memory.  Such social construction implies a need for transparency, but for Buchan (1997)
paradoxically,  social  desire  gives  money  its  value  through  non-transparent  processes.
Nonetheless,  the  impact  of  such  processes  on  stakeholders  redoubles  the  need  for
transparency.   Simmel (1978)  agrees  that  these  changes in  the  value  of  money affect
stakeholder interests, implying a need for accountability due to the changed value of the
acquired money.  Dodd (1994) however, contends that Simmel is describing the subjective
value of money, but acknowledges the need for social accountability by adding ‘means of
speculation’ to the list of functions of general purpose money.  Zelizer (1997) likewise
holds money accountable to society, asserting that earmarking money for specific purposes
can  change  the  subjective  value  of  that  money.   Such  social  rather  than  functional
approaches to money may manifest  stakeholder desire to  interact more personally with
3 Although Adam Smith´s claim that money evolved out of barter is beyond the scope of this study, both
Keynes and Gesell argued that Smith´s focus on the MoE function neglects crucial conflicts with SoV.  
8
monetary  decision-making  processes.   Furthermore,  Rowbotham (1998)  and  Zarlenga
(2002) cite Marx (1867), del Mar (1895) and Keynes (1930) in asserting that legal tender
status, rather than function, defines money.  
 
This thesis therefore defines currency as any transferable or spendable medium (whether as
physical notes or credit-based) which is accepted by third parties for goods or services.
This definition assumes that currencies are part of complex social institutions (not simply
economic  ones)  vested  with  meaning  which  is  directly  related  to  the  functions  that
currencies are called to perform.  In addition their governance constructs and is affected by
the interests of the stakeholders.  It is to the later that our focus now turns.  While the terms
money and currency are used interchangeably in this thesis, the emphasis is on currency,
which  narrows down  to  more  tangible  considerations  of  governing transferable  media
which can be used to signify value, rather than money, which  synthesises governance,
functional and social aspects involving broader considerations than defining currency.
2.2.2  Relating  Monetary  Governance  to  Currency  Institutions  and
Stakeholder Access 
With  regard  to  the  wider  use  of  the  term,  general  definitions  of  governance are  still
evolving.  There is thus far no formally agreed upon definition, as the term entails both
normative  and  analytical  aspects  depending  upon  the  perspective  within  which  it  is
discussed.4  Broadly speaking, the consensus appears to be close to the view that  Jessop
(1995) and Stoker (1998) argue, namely, that  governance is  a  complex  and integrated
combination  of  state regulatory mechanisms,  markets  and civil  society or 'third sector'
actors.   Jessop asserts  that  in  order to  understand governance processes internal  to  an
institution,  one  must  take  into  account  external  regulatory  frameworks  under  which
institutions must operate.  Stoker’s (1998) inclusion of autonomous self-government in his
governance framework suggests  that exploring monetary governance must include both
external  institutional  oversight  and  community  monetary  institutions.   Further,
Papadopoulos and Carmel (2003) emphasise the influence of state regulatory frameworks
in processes of governing a policy ‘area’ or institutions by regulating what is governed,
how and by whom.  In this context, governance, in the general sense, is used as a term in
4 see for example Kajaer (2004).  Kajaer, Anne M., (2004) Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press
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this thesis to describe the complex socio-political process by which a domain or activity of
social, political or economic life is shaped.  That is, how actors and stakeholders interact in
creating, reproducing or changing a given institution under relevant state regulation which
define acceptable decision-making activities and functions.  
In  the  literature,  monetary  governance is  often  used  interchangeably  with  the  term
monetary  policy to  refer  to  interest  rate  policy set  by central  banks  and  the  broader
discussions  of  monetary governance tend to  focus  on  function,  with  only few authors
focusing on decision-making processes.  From the latter authors, Underhill (2000) points to
cooperation between state regulators and markets,  in contrast  with Strange (1988) who
highlighted the power struggle between them, illustrating the power of actors outside of an
institution to exert influence on institutional  decisions.  Further, Fung and Olin-Wright
(2003)  showed  how  centralisation  of  governance  determines  stakeholder  input  into
institutional  decision-making  which  affect  them  while  Polanyi  (1957)  showed  how
currency governance is  affected by and affects  the  number  of  functions  fulfilled by a
currency. 
Nevertheless,  despite  covering  individual  facets  of  both  monetary  governance  and
economic  functionality,  none  of  these  approaches  integrates  the  impact  of  currency
governance with scale on all stakeholders.  In this context, key questions that arise from
the limitations in the literature include: who are the stakeholders involved in monetary
governance, and what criteria can be used to explore their input into that governance.  This
thesis defines the scope of stake-holder participation as the widest possible social scope,
which includes all users of money.  The nature of stake-holder participation, given such a
wide scope, can ideally be defined as both economic and democratic.  A decision to either
spend or boycott a particular currency is a market and functional use decision.  However,
living in a democratic society which upholds participation as a key principle makes access
to decision-making processes a vital part of the nature of currency governance.  While all
currency users have the ability to affect the functionality of any currency through use or
non-use (i.e. boycott) of the currency, currencies which are either issued through central
banks or which are privately issued do not allow for full user access to the decision-making
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processes  involved  in  issuing  and  maintaining  those  currencies.   It  is  this  access  to
governance processes which is neglected yet vital, together with functionality of money.  
With  regard  to  the  former,  as  mentioned  earlier,  at  least  three  influences  shape  the
governance of money and thus interface with stakeholders: 
First, the regulatory frameworks (RFs) external to currencies, 
Second, the decision-making internal to the currency institution,  
Third, scale, here defined as the functions of money at various geographical ranges.
Table 2.1 below provides a typology of stakeholders vis-à-vis the influences shaping the
governance of money mentioned above.  
Table 2.1: Stakeholders in Monetary Governance
Influences on Monetary Governance 
 
Stakeholders
External currency governance National Regulators as indirect stakeholders
Internal currency governance Institutional decision-makers as direct stakeholders
Monetary Scale
 
Users affected by money as direct stakeholders (often with
no currency institutional decision-making power)
For an alternative view of this table and Venn Diagrams, see Appendix 5.
Furthermore,  regarding  the  (normative)  criteria  used  to  evaluate  stakeholder  input  to
monetary governance,  OECD (2002) sources agree that established governance principles
include  predictability,  or  consistent  use  of  legal  frameworks,  transparency  and
accountability while Johnson (1997) and others add participation, quoting the Canadian
International  Development  Agency  as  using  the  terms  participation  and  equitability
interchangeably.  Honest or predictable legal frameworks imply consistent treatment of
currencies on the part of regulatory bodies.  Transparency refers to access to information
and  to  open  processes,  while  accountability  is  defined  by  Kourtikakis (2004)  as
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commitment by a responsible party to accomplish a given task.  Hunt (1994) on the other
hand, emphasises the link between accountability and responsibility, which implies a need
for  participation.   Definitions of participation vary, as illustrated by contention around
Arnstein’s (1969) widely cited Ladder of Participation.   Henderson (2003) for instance
worries  that  the  Ladder,  frequently used  as  a  measure  of  participation,  may not  show
community consultation as “real” participation.  
To conclude, the premise of this study is that the governance of any currency institution
entails balancing power between those stakeholders who wield decision-making authority
and the  impact  of  currency functions  on  currency users  –  those  stakeholders  with  no
decision-making power.  This thesis  therefore argues that it  is necessary to know what
types and scales of currency institutions most effectively facilitate stakeholder access, thus
permitting further choices and adjustments.  Although debates on monetary governance
involve external  and internal stakeholders to some extent,  these debates largely neglect
interactions between governance and scale related factors (see sections below), resulting in
a gap in the literature which this thesis hopes to narrow somewhat.  Therefore, this study
will  address  a  limited  number  of  decision-making  processes  which  are  specific  to
currencies  within  the  context  of  the  four  established  governance  principles  discussed
previously: 




Table 2.2 summarises those principles as they apply to currency governance with respect to
stakeholder input.  
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Table 2.2: Institutional Governance Principles 
Influences on Monetary Governance Principles for evaluating stakeholder input  
External Governance Consistent Regulatory Frameworks (as influenced by
indirectly affected decision-making stakeholders)
Internal Governance
Transparency – Accountability - Participation
(as influenced by directly affected decision-making
stakeholders)
Monetary Scale
Input of users who are affected by money but are not
included in currency institutional decision-making 
(as influenced by directly affected stakeholders) 
For an alternative view of this table and Venn Diagrams, see Appendix 5.
This summary provides a brief overview of non-national currency institutional governance
vis-à-vis stakeholder access in the relevant literature.  Taylor (2003) contends that non-
national currencies are a manifestation of stakeholder desire for greater input into overall
monetary governance.   Greco  (2001)  agrees,  classifying historical  currencies  in  North
America based on  backing, defined as the commodity for which users can redeem the
currency.   Greco contends that  backing is  a  key factor  in  the ability of  a  currency to
empower  communities.   Ardron  (2006)  enlarges  upon  Greco’s  work  in  defining
complementary currencies, which are designed to exist  alongside national money.  This
definition of complementary currencies includes store loyalty points exchanged between
non-store customers.  Loyalty programs, typically studied from the perspective of boosting
business yield to a store or chain, as by Capizzi and Ferguson (2005), are now coming to
be seen as a type of currency that may increase stakeholder access to monetary institutions.
  
Studies of non-national currencies have investigated them either as functional tools for
local economic development or as attempts at resisting globalisation.  Mercedes Gomez
(2006),  Mascornick (2007), Aldridge and Patterson (2002), and  Collom (2005) explore
currency functions in the context of how geographical circulation limits could strengthen
local business networks.  In contrast to these primarily business oriented studies,  Cascio
(2005), Grover (2006) and Batchelor (2003) primarily focus on local economic outcomes
in communities while  Seyfang (2001) modifies local economic development concerns by
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adding a sustainability perspective. Williams (2005) on the other hand sees local currencies
as potential  ‘bridges into  work’ but  largely neglects governance and sustainability.  In
contrast to these functional perspectives, North (1998) discusses divisions within currency
institutions from a social movement perspective, while Pacione (1999) explores currencies
as  anti-globalization  tools.   Non-national  currencies  may  offer  greater  participatory
decision-making for stakeholders, but there are no metrics to verify this as, for example,
Bini (2008)  and  Cukierman  (1992)  have  done in  measuring  levels  of  central  bank
independence.  Though the functional and geographical impact of money dominates the
discussion of monetary governance, there is little focus on internal currency institutional
decision-making processes, and no way of measuring the level of decision-making input
allowed to currency users.  This thesis attempts to fill part of that gap. 
2.3 External Governance: National Regulatory Treatment of Currencies
This  section  begins  the  exploration  of  the  three  influences  on  monetary  governance
mentioned earlier vis-a-vis the governance principles used to evaluate stakeholder input on
key decisions.  To assist the reader,  Table 2.3 shows the application of these governance
principles to the specific decisions that must be addressed by monetary institutions.  They
are presented by specific monetary governance influence and by type of stakeholder.   
 




























For an alternative view of this table and Venn Diagrams, see Appendix 5.
The first influence is external governance: the national regulatory treatment of different
currency institutions and how consistently they are all treated.  Although national monetary
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regulations exert both decision-making and functional influence on all currencies, national
monetary decision-making processes are closed to most  currency stakeholders.   Lipsey
(2007) acknowledges that conventional economics neglects governance issues.  National
monetary policy indirectly controls issuance by manipulating the supply of money.  Ingham
(1999) asserts that the issuance decisions controlled by central banks affect every monetary
transaction.  Although independent central banking is intended to keep national currencies
stable and free of manipulation,  Iversen (1998) finds that highly centralised RFs prevent
input  from  stakeholders.  National  regulatory  consistency  thus  affects  all  currency
stakeholders.
Furthermore, with regard to US national RFs, Solomon  (1996), Glover (1997) and Shaffer
(1998) point out that US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy of taxing barter value has
discouraged the use of some currencies by generating fear around their legality.  However,
Cezanne (2006) from a Central Banking perspective agrees with Miller (2004) speaking for
Post-Keynesians that  community-based currencies,  which  are sponsored by community
groups for use within their local communities, tend to escape the notice of central banks,
allowing greater freedom for such currencies.  Grover (2006) in contrast believes that these
regulatory uncertainties may particularly affect governance of small scale currencies.  Such
fears and uncertainties in turn can restrict the ability of stakeholders to set local monetary
priorities through viable small scale currencies. 
2.4  Internal  Governance:  Transparency,  Accountability  and
Participation via Seigniorage, Issuance & Backing  
Just  as  inconsistent  external  RFs  affect  access  to  currency  institutional  governance,
likewise,  internal  institutional  processes  which  lack  transparency,  accountability  and
participation similarly hinder such access.  Transparency, accountability and participation
are intrinsic to open governance and essential to monetary institutional decision-making.
Discussions of economic democracy, brought about partly by a perceived lack of accessible
national  monetary  governance,  generally  neglect  these  internal  currency  institutional
decision-making processes in favour of distribution concerns (D’art, 1992, Ringen, 2004,
Fotopoulos, 2005, Blasi and Kruse, 2006). 
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In  general,  the  internal  currency-specific governance processes  most  discussed  in  the
literature involve decisions surrounding:
 
seigniorage distribution, 
currency issuance, and 
currency backing.  
In  particular,  former  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Alan  Greenspan  (1996)  defines
seigniorage as the income obtained  from creating the currency.  Issuing money is  the
process of making currency available to spend either by providing credit or by directly
spending money into the economy, while backing is the commodity or service for which
currency may be redeemed at its face value, which serves to allow currency exchange as a
last resort.  
The aforementioned internal  decision-making processes remain under-investigated from
the perspective of established governance principles, namely transparency, accountability
and  participation.   Monetary  institutions  vary  internally  in  degree  of  transparency.
Although the Federal Reserve, as with most central banks, does make the minutes of its
FOMC meetings public, these decisions are made with very little transparency in terms of
the actors influencing those decisions.  Little accountability to the public is encouraged,
due to the doctrine of independent central banking.  Governments remain accountable to
citizens for mitigating the effects of the economy on daily life, but have limited policy
tools with which to work.  Hutchinson’s (2002) more holistic approach views money as
socially  constructed,  echoing  Dodd’s  view  that  money  promotes  both  freedom  and
inequality,  exploring  monetary  system  accountability  as  an  element  of  economic
democracy.  Yet discussions of economic democracy, as previously mentioned, tend to
neglect  the  internal  currency institutional  governance,  instead  focusing  on  systems of
management  and  distribution  or  profit  sharing  and  Employee  Stock  Ownership  Plans
(ESOPs).   This  thesis  uses  the  more  financially  specific  focus  of  Shared  Monetary
Governance  (SMG)  to  encompass  external  regulatory  influences,  transparency,
accountability  and  participation.   Huber’s (2000)  advocacy of  including  civil  society
representatives  in  seigniorage  distribution  and  currency  issuance  decisions,  though
emphasising distributional aspects of governance, nonetheless also shows how seigniorage,
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issuance  and  backing  decision-making  processes  are  a  key  part  of  monetary  system
accountability.
Seigniorage revenue distribution, along with the issuance of money, and currency backing
is emphasised in monetary governance literature, as these three concerns relate directly to
the  process  of  money creation.   Neumann (1992)  discusses  the  relationship  between
inflation,  inflation-based  seigniorage  revenue  generation,  and  distribution  of  those
revenues, but he neglects the decision-making process for seigniorage distribution which
Huber (2000) stresses.  Neumann and Huber agree on the importance of seigniorage to the
issuance process  in monetary creation based on the effects those seigniorage revenues can
have,  both  on  the  initial  creation  of  money, depending on  how much  income can  be
generated through  currency creation, and on the subsequent value of that money.  Both of
those effects will in turn directly affect the issuance and potentially even the backing of a
currency.   Neumann contends that equity requires all currency users to be given an equal
share in seigniorage revenues.  Huber goes further by arguing that all currency users have
an important stake in  how such decisions are made, particularly in democratic societies.
This concern for equitable and democratic processes is articulated explicitly by Johnson
(1997) as  a crucial  part  of the set  of  governance principles,  making it  imperative that
access  to  seigniorage decision-making  processes  be  taken  into  account.  Seigniorage
decisions form one key part of currency–specific governance, of which currency issuance
decisions form the next key.  
National monetary issuance decisions are made with no direct input from money users,
despite being the most heavily affected stakeholders.  Huber (1999) and Zarlenga (2002)
agree  on  the  need  to  regulate  monetary  issuance,  emphasising  transparency  and
accountability, but neglecting direct user participation.  Hayek (1976), by suggesting the
idea of private bank currency issuance, highlights the importance of creation and issuance
of  money,  discussed  by Fisher  (1935),  Rothbard (2002)  and Rousseau  (2006)  from a
banking perspective and by Kennedy (1995), Gesell (1906)  and  George (1879) from a
money reform perspective.  These discussions of currency governance, however, focus on
economic function and distribution, de-emphasising the processes of currency user access
to  institutional  decision-making.   Although  currency  backing  decision  processes  are
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interrelated with issuance of money, backing, discussed next,  requires a separate set of
decisions with separate consequences for various currency stakeholders.  
Choice of backing is also a key currency decision in which users of national money do not
participate.  Ardron and  Lietaer’s (2006) conception offering currency users a choice of
backing  highlights  this  neglected  aspect  of  internal  monetary governance.   Keynesian
economists argue that fiat money, i.e. currencies that are created from nothing and backed
by faith in the issuing authority, allows more options, for instance, for running deficits
(Miller,  2004).   Yet  fiat  currencies may also limit  stakeholder  ability to  influence the
functioning of money, since currency users have no choices for redeeming fiat  money,
whereas commodity-backed currencies may allow stakeholders more redemption options.
Community-based currency advocates Linton (1994) and Cahn (2006) assert that  small
scale  currencies  allow  greater  stakeholder  decision-making  input  by facilitating  direct
participation in the currencies.  
Table 2.4: Decisions in Currency Institutional Governance
Time frames for




















Literature Institutionalisms Fragmented literatures Conventional economics Community currency
advocates
Table 2.4 summarises key decisions which must be made regarding currencies, as those
decisions are emphasised by the various literatures in discussing monetary governance.
North (1994) is a prominent voice from the perspective of  Institutionalism arguing for the
importance of time lines, history and the culture of each institution as a significant factor in
economic governance, or which monetary governance plays a crucial role.  Many different
literatures discuss the specific internal decisions around currency which must be made by
institutional decision-makers.  Money specifically requires decisions about seigniorage
revenues, the issuance of the currency, and its backing, all of which have been mentioned
previously in this thesis.  While these currency-specific concerns are discussed in a wide
range of literatures, the functions of money tend to be discussed primarily by conventional
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economists, while the concept of currency limitation to certain geographical areas tends to
be discussed mostly in the context of community-based currencies.  This thesis attempts to
draw together these disparate literatures in order to create a picture of overall stakeholder
voice in currency governance. 
2.5  Currency  Scale:  Functions  and  Geographical  Range  vis-à-vis
Shared Monetary Governance 
This  third  section  explores  how different  literatures  understand the  third  influence  on
monetary governance, namely the currency functions vs. circulatory range, and how these
affect and are affected by external and internal decision-making processes5. 
Societies and their economic institutions at supra-national, national, and local levels have
issued  currencies,  as  Polanyi  (1957)  points  out,  in  many  forms  throughout  history.
Traditionally there has been no consensus over what should be the optimal geographical
scale  and  function  of  a  currency.   Huber’s  (2000)  national  level  seigniorage  reform
suggestion contrasts with the small  scale governance approach taken by Gesell (1906).
Gesell’s argument for functional separation as a way to overcome the hoarding induced by
the use of money as a Store of Value (SoV) was praised by Keynes (1936) and advocated
by Fisher (1933).  Gatch (2006) and Greco (2001) similarly explore how locally circulated
‘scrip’ currencies, exchanged for farm produce and other goods during the 1930’s in the
USA and Worgl Austria, separated currency functions.  Seyfang (2006a) however, applies
local sustainable development perspectives to currency design objectives, pointing out that
local  needs may also affect governance at  higher levels.   Thomas (2004),  furthermore,
notes that currency design and the functions which a currency emphasises depend heavily
upon the goals of the institution issuing the currency.  Yet  Freidman (1972), Greenspan
(1996), and Hayek (1976) agree that external Regulatory Frameworks, taken for granted by
Lipsey (2007),  can override internal  currency governance.  Since  Mundell (1961)  and
Boyle (2003) show currencies to function differently in different regions due to the effects
of geographical scale on monetary functionality, separate governance mechanisms could
allow more stakeholder control over local monetary priority setting.  In this light, it  is
necessary to examine the role of monetary functions and geography in more detail.  These
5 For clarification, Table 2.5 will shortly show how functions and geography influence scale, and thus SMG.
19
are  the  two  dimensions  of  what  is  summarily  defined  as currency  scale, which  are
examined below.
2.5.1 Currency Functions: The First Dimension of Currency Scale
Currencies can fulfil  one or many functions.   Each currency function affects monetary
governance differently, as Keynes  (1936) asserted, showing how conflicting  Medium of
Exchange and Store of Value functions affect national currencies.  Indeed, Polanyi (1977)
asserted that there were two distinct categories of money based on the number of functions
the currency fills:   General Purpose money and Special Purpose Currencies.   Different
currencies were used for different purposes.  General purpose money refers to money used
as a Unit of Account (UoA), Medium of Exchange (MoE), and Store of Value (SoV).  By
Polanyi’s  definition,  currencies  which  do  not  perform all  three  of  these  functions  are
Special Purpose Currencies (SPCs).  Furthermore, while state or local authority acceptance
of a currency for payment of taxes and fees or fines can encourage the use of that currency,
as Miller (2004) and Douthwaite agree, nevertheless such acceptance did not change the
functions  of  those currencies.   Cases  where SPCs  have been accepted  as  a  Means of
Payment (MoP) by local government authorities, cited by Douthwaite (1996), North (2007)
and Gomez (2008), such as Worgl, Austria,  Salta, Argentina, Auckland NZ and  Venado
Tuerto,  Argentina  did  not  change  the  functional  emphasis  of  those  community-based
currencies significantly enough to make them widely used for all three key functions of
accounting, exchange, and long term storage of value.  Table 2.5 illustrates currency scale
by function and geography.
Table 2.5: Currency Scale by Function and Geography
SPC
Geographical Scale













Larger scale, less direct 
currency user control 
Polanyi (1977) saw national currencies as a form of general purpose money because it fills
the three functions of UoA, MoE and SoV.  Melitz (1970), in contrast,  argues that notes
and coins, by their nature limited to hand-to-hand transactions, differ from checking and
savings  accounts  and  thus  constitute  SPCs  rather  than  general  purpose  money.
Nevertheless, Melitz  under-emphasises convertibility between forms of  modern national
money which  Dalton (1965) and  Codere (1968)  agree  make it  general purpose.  Miller
(2004) concurs that  the MoP function,  by generating a  guaranteed requirement  for the
currency,  does  stimulate  circulation,  mitigating  regional  impacts  of  instability,  but
reiterates  Codere’s (1968) warning that currency functions,  through  emphasising credit,
exchange, or stored value over time, affect stakeholders differently.  To assist the reader
through this material and provide illustrative examples, Table 2.6 provides an indicative
typology of  how  the  various  monetary  functions  affect  currency  decision-making  in
different ways depending on the function emphasised by the particular currency.  How
these functions are discussed in the literature is given in more detail next.














UoA Secondary Primary Secondary Secondary Primary
MoE Tertiary Secondary Primary Primary Primary
SoV Primary Primary
2.5.1.1 Unit of Account function 
  
The UoA function manifests through prices.  Every currency acts as a UoA, but Mutual
Credit Systems (MCS) currencies, in which money, by crediting an agreed upon price into
the account of the seller from the account of the purchaser,  is  created as  Harris-Braun
(2006) describes, 'at the point of transaction'.  MCS currencies tend to emphasise the UoA
function, with  members extending one another credit in paper or electronic accounts by
trading goods or services.  Douthwaite (1996),  Kennedy (1995), and Primavera (2001a)
discuss the well-known MCS currencies Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) and the
Swiss  WiR.  Such  currencies,  by allowing  users  to  issue  the  currency directly,  leave
money-creation decisions to currency users  rather than central banks,  which also  often
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results in price and circulation instability which affects currency viability.  Lee (2004) and
Douthwaite (1996) warn that currencies with no circulation oversight can be especially
vulnerable to instability.  On the other hand, the current economic crisis demonstrates that
central  bank  oversight,  while  limiting  currency  user  input,  also  does  not  guarantee
monetary stability.  Therefore price and credit  stability although functional in  nature is
clearly a stakeholder governance concern.
2.5.1.2 Medium of Exchange function
Jackson (1997) finds that the unlimited ability of currency users to issue money through
such complementary currencies as LETS often results in currency over-issuance, which in
turn leads to circulation problems.  Seyfang (2001) and Davis (1987) on the other hand,
find  that  despite  over-issuance  problems,  community-based  currencies  boost  local
economies.  Rothbard (2002) for instance blames over-issuance for the collapse of the
“Continental”, the currency issued as the USA’s first national Medium of Exchange (MoE)
at the founding of the new republic.  Rousseau (2006) likewise focuses primarily on over-
issuance of the Continental, although Desan (2005) blames backing for the Continental’s
demise.  While Primavera (2005) asserts that over-issue caused the sudden collapse of
Argentina’s  Red  Trueque system,  a  particularly  large  scale  non-national  MoE,  North
(2007)  counters  that  external  hostility  toward  the  system as  it  grew  in  scale  was  a
significant  influence  in  its  demise.   Indeed, MoE  emphasising  currencies  which  limit
circulation, such as the community-based currency in New York state known as 'Ithaca
Hours'  described by Mascornick (2007), do tend to be more stable.  For this reason Lee
(2004) emphasises the need for currency participants to understand monetary fundamentals
if they are to make issuance decisions.  Given that issuance affects monetary exchange and
thus heavily affects its value, it is important to discuss the third function of money, namely
Storage of Value (SoV).
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2.5.1.3 Store of Value function 
Value can be stored as money, or stored in a commodity such as gold or diamonds.  Gesell
(1906) argued that the SoV function when included in a currency encourages hoarding.6
Le Blanc (1998) draws connections between the work of Keynes and Gesell which Greco
(2001) agrees show many examples of stamp scrip as a successful MoE, but with no SoV
function.  Removing the SoV function leaves a monetary niche which is filled by Time
Bank currencies, the most well-known currency to emphasise this function.  Time Banks
use hours as the standard unit of currency, recording each member’s account deposits and
withdrawals for services rendered to or accepted from other members of the community,
with goods increasingly being traded in this way as well.   Seyfang (2006b) asserts that
Time Bank currencies are an effective SoV, with Collom (2007) listing Time Banks as the
most  wide-spread community-based currency.  Although Lee (2004) points  out that  an
hour is worth more or less at different times and depending on the task, one hour never
loses  its  value  as  an  hour.   While  time  may allow  storage  of  monetary  value  in  a
community where stakeholders know and trust one another, larger scales may inhibit the
trust necessary for retaining that value over longer time periods and geographical distances.
Turning  next  to  the  question  of  geography as  it  influences  scale  will  round  out  the
discussion of how scale influences monetary governance decisions. 
2.5.2 Geographical Range: The Second Dimension of Currency Scale 
Monetary function  influences  both  national  RF  treatment  and  decision-making  within
currencies.  While discussing  J.S. Mill’s dislike of multiple currencies due to accounting
difficulties  and  currency  exchange,  the  issue  of  interaction  between  function  and
geography prompted another Nobel Prize winner, Robert Mundell (1961), to observe that
6 Gesell suggested a usage charge on the money itself to prevent such hoarding.  Planes joins calls for
‘demurrage’ charge implementation, quoting Lietaer and Primavera on artificial scarcity through the SoV
function if the currency maintains equal or higher value in the future.  Greco claimed success for demurrage
arguing that 1930s stamp scrip in the US and in Worgl, Austria, was effective in speeding the circulation of
local currencies.  Planes, E.V., (2003). La Economia Social En El Proyecto Bolivariano: Ideas
Controversiales. Economia y Ciencias Sociales, 9, 111-143. Lietaer, B.A., (2000b). Community Currencies:
A New Tool for the 21st Century [online]. http://www.appropriate-economics.org/materials/21stcent.html
[Accessed 22 May 2007]. and Primavera, H., (2001b). La Moneda Social Como Palanca Del Nuevo
Paradigma Económico In P.D.S.-E. Solidaria (ed.) Encuentro de Findhorn, Cuadernos de Propuestas de la
Alianza para un Mundo Responsable. Argentina: Fondation Charles Léopold Mayer pour le Progrès de
l'Homme Alianza por un mundo responsable, plural y solidario.  Greco, T., (2001). Money: Understanding
and Creating Alternatives to Legal Tender White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co. 
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“the  optimum currency area is not the world”.7   Boyle (2003) cites Mundell (1961) in
asserting that the geographical effects of currency function change from region to region,
advocating different currencies for  different  regions,  in  accord with Noyer (2006) and
Munchau  (2006) who both acknowledge that price inflation affects currency stability as a
Unit of Account (UoA) differently in different regions.    
While non-national currencies have little  macro-economic impact compared to national
currencies,  DeMeulenaere’s (2006) database of non-national currencies shows over five
million world-wide users.  Indeed, Jayaraman (2005) asserts their lack of macro-economic
impact  to  be  an  asset,  since  it  allows  community-based  currencies  to  be  used  to
unambiguously signal demand for local products while Schraven (2000) finds that smaller
scale currencies build social capital.  North (2005) and Grover (2006) point to the small
scale  of  community-based  currencies  as  a  problem  which  Seyfang  (2001)  disputes,
pointing out that local priority setting may be inhibited by large scales.  Aldridge (2002)
and Davis (1987) concur, finding that currency function at the local level depends on local
decision-making, while North (2002) describes how exchange disruptions caused by large
usage increases in turn created difficulties both for users of the currency and for those
involved in  making decisions about how to administer  the currency.  These problems
brought  on  by  the  influence  of  the  geographical  circulation  on  currency institutional
decisions confirm that interactions between the functions of money and geographical range
of  circulation  also  impact  currency  governance.  As  Boyle  and  Mundell  point  out,
incompatible regions which share a single currency will see the competing needs of those
regions  affecting  governance of  the  currency.  Those  decisions,  which  in  turn  affect
currency users in some regions more adversely than users of that same currency in other
regions,  could potentially be  made at  levels  closer  to  the affected users  themselves  if
incompatible regions had separate regional currencies.  Interconnection between currency
institutions at various levels, as suggested by Fung (2001), could allow for coordination
between various parts of the monetary system, and cooperation at local, national and also
7 Buiter and McKinnon are among the many who have applied Mundell’s groundbreaking optimum currency
area theory. Mundell discusses the optimal geographical area for a currency, arguing for flexible exchange
rates among currency areas rather than among national currencies. Buiter, W.H., (2000). Is Iceland an
Optimal Currency Area? In E.D. Central Bank of Iceland (ed.) WORKING PAPERS No. 10. Mckinnon, R.I.,
(2004). Optimum Currency Areas and Key Currencies: Mundell I Versus Mundell Ii. Journal of Common
Market Studies, 42, 689-715.  Mundell, R., (1961). A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. The American
Economic Review,, 51, pp. 657-665.  
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international  levels.   Such  potential  layering  of  various  levels  of  currencies  will  be
discussed further in Chapter 7 in the broader context of stakeholder empowerment.   
2.6 Conclusion
Currency  stakeholders,  including  external  regulators,  internal  decision-makers  and
currency users, are affected by currency governance, but there exists no clear model for
what  shared  decision-making  among  all  stakeholders  might  look  like.   Stakeholders
include regulators, currency organisers, producers and consumers who use money.  While
those who wield external structural influence over the governance of money such as states
and bankers tend to exclude consumers from monetary decision-making, consumers, as
currency users, are fact in key stakeholders who most likely have produced the very value
to  which  that  money allows  access.   Indeed, the  Polanyian re-embedding of  currency
decision-making within  small scale  socio-economic spaces such as communities or even
local  businesses  may facilitate  greater  access  by all  currency users  to  both  monetary
decision-making and distribution.  While money interacts with other parts of the economic
system such as production, distribution and consumption, the role of stakeholder decision-
making  in  money  remains  under-investigated.  Applying  a  governance  approach  to
understanding  monetary  governance  illuminates  the  potential  of  (and  problems  with)
stakeholder  access  to  currency  institutional  decision-making  processes.   However,
problems raised by research on non-national currencies indicate the need to distinguish
regulatory issues from scale issues.  Thus, a re-conceptualisation of monetary governance
which places stakeholder access at its core is necessary, with the caveat that it must be
analytically capable of separating regulatory issues from scale issues.  This thesis addresses
that need by offering a holistic framework to capture the potential for Shared Monetary
Governance of any given currency.  Functional aspects of decision-making common to all
types of currency institutions, such as the ability to either spend or boycott the currency,
can  be  measured  next  to  participatory governance  aspects,  which  may allow  optimal
popular  influence  on  monetary governance.   Against  this  background,  the  thesis  will
explore the following research questions: 
 How can  the  potential  for  stakeholder  influence  over  monetary governance be
theoretically explored?
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 How  can  the  potential  for  stakeholder  influence  over  monetary governance be
empirically explored, particularly across different types of currency institutions?
 Which combination of governance arrangements and currency functions allow for
enhanced ‘Shared Monetary Governance’ (SMG)? 
 
 The following chapter deals with the first of them.  
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Chapter  3  -  A  Theoretical  Framework  for  Shared  Monetary
Governance
3.1 Introduction 
This  thesis  examines  interactions  between  national  RFs,  internal  currency institutional
decision-making and scale, defined here as the functions of money at various geographical
ranges.   Previous  studies  of  money have tended  to  emphasise  economic  functionality,
while sociological approaches such as Buchan (1997), Simmel (1978) and Zelizer (1997)
emphasise subjective meanings of money.  The joining of stakeholder decision-making
access with monetary scale is the intent of this thesis.  External RFs influence all internal
institution decisions, and thus all currency institutions, but particularly CCs, must adapt
their internal decision-making processes to both external regulations and to monetary scale.
  
The thesis  agues that  a more integrative analytical  framework is  necessary in order  to
capture not  only these different influences but also their interactions.  To this  aim the
analytical  framework  of  Shared  Monetary  Governance  (SMG)  is  developed.   At  its
essence, SMG refers to the potential of all monetary stakeholders to have meaningful input
into the decisions regarding money which affect their lives. This thesis builds a theoretical
framework  for  SMG  which  combines  national  regulatory  influence  with  internal
institutional  decision-making  processes  and  monetary  functions,  bringing  together
institutional  relationships,  currency functions  and geographical  range to  understand the
processes shaping monetary governance.   From there,  a methodology is  constructed to
measure the overall level of SMG for a currency.  Shared Monetary Governance (SMG),
formally defined here as the overall level of direct stakeholder control over a currency, and
measured via the confluence of external  influence,  internal  decision-making and scale,
encapsulates all of these factors.  
Table  3.1  shows  three  inter-related  elements  which  influence  SMG.   Firstly,  external
policies,  which  include  national  and  international  regulatory  frameworks as  well  as
markets,  but  are limited in  this  case to  national  regulatory frameworks, shape internal
monetary  institutional  decision-making.   Regulatory  frameworks  affect  both  the
governance and the functions of money at each geographical level.  Such frameworks act
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as meta-governance  influencing decision-making  within  currencies.  Secondly, currency
institutional responses to external incentives affect their tolerance by external regulators.
Thirdly,  scale  influences  both  external  and  internal  monetary  governance.   Monetary
functions  at  different  circulatory  ranges  impact  currency  stakeholders  differently.
Regulations,  internal  practices,  and scale  will  have different  effects  on the three main
functions of money, UoA, MoE and SoV, which require exploration of shared governance
for various types of money.  Table 3.1 illustrates interrelated the  Monetary Governance
Processes.
Table 3.1: Interrelation of Monetary Governance Processes
Influences on Monetary Governance Monetary Governance Processes
External Governance Toleration by National Regulatory Frameworks for non-
national currencies
(by indirectly affected stakeholders))
Internal Governance
Participatory Internal Decision-making (PID) 
(by directly affected stakeholders)
Monetary Scale
Currency Scale as percentage of  SPC
Currency Users (no decision-making input) affected by the
functions of money at various geographical ranges
(by directly affected stakeholders)
For an alternative view of this table and Venn Diagrams, see Appendix 5.
This  thesis  will  argue  that  currency governance must  take into  account  the  influences
corresponding to three types of monetary stakeholder.  The four previously discussed well-
established  governance  principles  of  consistent  regulatory  framework  (RF)  treatment,
transparency, accountability and participation are applied to each type of stakeholder in the
context of all currency institutions.   RFs external  to currency institutions influence the
governance of  those  institutions.   Regulators  are therefore indirect  stakeholders  in  the
governance of these currency institutions.  Regulators are accountable to external bodies,
but not to the currency institutions themselves nor to currency users.  The second type of
stakeholders in currency institutional governance are direct stakeholders who participate in
internal  decision-making.   The  third  type,  also  directly  affected  but  not  involved  in
decision-making, are currency users.  The power of each set of stakeholders is explored
through the external governance, internal governance, and currency scale related processes.
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To facilitate this exploration, this study draws upon Polanyi’s (1977) concept of SPCs as a
useful tool for conceptualising functional aspects of money alongside governance.  Polanyi
listed the UoA, MoE and SoV functions as requisites for a currency to be considered part
of the category of general purpose money, leaving other currencies to be classified as SPCs
if they fill only one or two of those functions.  Polanyi (1977) asserted that the limited
functionality of SPCs allowed the decision-making processes around those currencies to be
more fully governed by social  actors rather  than by purely economic interests.   While
Polanyi investigated the social effects of changing currency function, as general purpose
money came to be more widely used, stakeholder access to currency governance processes
remains under-investigated.  The approach taken here is necessarily limited in scope to the
exploration of some of these governance processes. The unit of analysis is currencies, in
terms  of  SMG,  influenced  by  national  RFs,  internal  governance  and  scale  for  each
currency.  Operationalising details are explained later, in the methodology chapter.
3.2  Predictable  and  Fair  Legal  Frameworks:  How  National  RF  Toleration
Influences SMG
“Only an accountant could get Al Capone” –famous IRS recruiting poster
Shared Monetary Governance (SMG) applies governance principles to currency decisions
by examining regulatory treatment, transparency, accountability and participation for all
stakeholders.   The  application  of  those  governance principles  to  currency institutions
requires the exploration of the effects of both national regulations upon currency decision-
making,  and  the  levels  of  transparency,  accountability  and  participation  in  internal
decision-making regarding currency-specific decisions, namely seigniorage, issuance, and
backing,  as  illustrated  in  Table  3.2.   Keeping  in  mind  the  potentially  overwhelming
influence of national level RFs, as the US Internal Revenue Service proved in the case of
famed gangster Al Capone, these decision-making processes are also strongly influenced
by the scale of the currency, and therefore scale must be taken into consideration when
investigating the governance of any currency institution.    Applying these in a monetary
setting,  currency institutions  are  explored  in  the  context  of  full  stakeholder  access  to
monetary decision-making processes.
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3.2.1 How RF Responses Influence Currency Decision-making
Currencies may simply be prohibited out of hand by banning the use of all non-national
currency transactions, or they may be discouraged indirectly by requiring full convertibility
to a national currency.  Tax and benefits agencies can also discourage wide participation in
lower  income  brackets  by  withdrawing  welfare  and  tax  benefits  from  users  of  local
currencies,  leaving innovative currency institutions available only to the middle classes
(Anonymous, 2007).  In this way such regulatory responses affect both functional viability
and  internal  processes  of  currency  institutions  either  directly,  by  discouraging  full
participation in these institutions,  or indirectly by limiting circulation and value of the
currency.  Consistent  treatment  by national  RFs  toward  differing types  and  scales  of
currencies is one key measure of SMG, since national RF policies shape the governance of
all currency institutions.  The previously discussed well-established governance principle
of fair and predicable RFs is applied in this case to national monetary governance in the
USA.  Comparing RF tolerance levels with overall levels of SMG illustrates how US RFs
respond to changes in currency institutional decision-making processes.  
National RFs shape both general monetary and SPC governance.  Galbraith (1975) decried
measures such as banning gold contracts, which allowed national money to fulfil  more
functions,  though  most  economists  agree with  Mundell  (1998)  that  centralised  money
decreases transaction costs, allowing more efficient trade.  National monetary monopoly
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and supra-national monetary unions  prioritise efficiency but neglect the concentration of
monetary  functions  which  Keynes,  Gesell  and  others  have  pointed  out  encourages
hoarding,  leading  to  monetary  instability.   From  a  stakeholder  perspective,  national
currencies may inhibit  priority setting by affected communities,  since national RFs can
only set policy at the national level based on overall national priorities, given the nature
and needs  of  centralised  government  constituencies.   For  this  reason,  Fung and  Olin-
Wright’s (2001) advocacy of local level participatory policy-setting highlights an important
concern for  stakeholder  access  to  currency institutions.   Participatory decision-making
processes encourage transparency and accountability by requiring information sharing and
debate  among included  stakeholders.   Thus  while  centralised  institutions  may inhibit
stakeholder institutional access, participatory decision-making may facilitate greater access
for all stakeholders.  However, the effects of RF tolerance on SMG require all three factors
of SMG to be compared.  Analysis of data for Regulatory Framework tolerance toward
different currency institutions, participatory internal decision-making and scale examines
the role of all three factors of SMG.
In conclusion, national RFs in general influence all other external governance mechanisms,
such as business chambers of commerce, employers, international regulatory frameworks,
and other forces outside of the currency institution which shape the internal processes and
scale of all currencies, general and special purpose.  Different levels of regulatory tolerance
can push currencies in different directions,  and national RFs are more likely to favour
national currencies due to the close linkages between national sovereignty and national
money.  Since those RFs give preference to national money in part due to its nature as
general purpose money, national money could thus potentially have lower overall levels of
SMG.  Consistent RFs are but one out of four governance principles upon which SMG is
built.  The remaining three principles of transparency, accountability and participation are
operationalised through  SMG  by investigating  internal  decision-making  processes  and
scale.  Although these last three governance principles are encompassed by the internal
decision-making processes of every currency institution, those very same internal processes
are heavily affected by external RFs.  Hence those processes are explored next.
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3.3  Transparency,  Accountability and  Participatory Decision-making
via Seigniorage, Issuance and Backing 
Hutchinson  (2002)  criticises macro-economic  theory,  pointing  out  theoretical  gaps  in
monetary governance, yet not  fully emphasising participatory currency decision-making
processes  as  they  derive  from  those  governance  gaps.   Likewise,  existing  analytical
approaches have tended to explore either global political economic governance as  Cerny
(2005) does, or to focus on one narrow aspect of local currency functioning, leaving out
currency-specific  processes  as  they apply  to  all  stakeholders.   While  the  functions  a
currency emphasises do not have to dictate Participatory Internal Decision-making (PID)
levels,  functional emphasis  certainly influences institutional decision-making processes.
Existing approaches  do  not  fully explore  stakeholder  influence  on  monetary decision-
making, yet for this thesis it was necessary to bring these functional concerns together
within a governance framework.  To explore these interacting systems of governance, the
principles  of  consistent  regulatory  frameworks,  transparency,  accountability,  and
participation are applied  to  three key currency institutional  decision-making processes:
distributing seigniorage revenues, issuing currency, and backing the currency.  Only taken
all  together  can  an  understanding be  constructed of  the  level  of  SMG for  a  currency
institution.  Two of these four influences, transparency and accountability, are controlled
more  by internal  institutional  processes.   The other  two issues,  legal  frameworks and
participation,  are  largely  determined  by  the  external  RFs  surrounding  the  currency
institution and by the scale of that institution as they affect stakeholder participation.  Sen
(1999)  points  out  that  participation  in  decision-making  is  the  right  of  all affected
stakeholders, and SMG is a conceptualisation of overall stakeholder participation in the
monetary governance process.  Fung and Olin-Wright (2001) argue that community-based
institutions facilitate participatory decision-making, with which  Bohman (1997) concurs,
arguing that stakeholders must be empowered to use information.  Internal processes form
the basis of institutional governance, but if implementation of those internal processes is
obstructed by regulatory frameworks  or by scale,  then participation in decision-making
may be  restricted.   Hence  Regulatory Framework  tolerance,  internal  decision-making
processes  and  scale  must  be  investigated  together  to  understand  the  overall  effect  on
seigniorage, issuance, and currency backing decision-making. 
Applying  the  principles  of  transparency,  accountability  and  participation  to  monetary
institutions  requires  exploring  how  seigniorage  revenue  decisions  are  shared  among
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currency stake-holders.  Seigniorage decisions are pivotal in shaping currency institutional
governance  through  both  internal  decision-making  processes  and  seigniorage  revenue
distribution.   Huber’s  (2000)  advocacy of  central  bank  distribution  of  those  revenues
acknowledges the “Constitutional Consensus” for shared benefit of common resources, but
neglects  the  shared  decision-making  power  also  implied  by  that  consensus.   Private
currencies in contrast, are accountable only to the private institutions which issue them,
potentially limiting sharing of decision-making based on business priorities.   Although
loyalty seigniorage distribution decisions are made by the issuing firms, loyalty programs
could  be  viewed  as  a  means  of  sharing  in  issuance  decision-making  by encouraging
members to buy according to shared priorities and normative values.  
   
Issuance  decision-making  is  a  second  key  process  operationalising transparency,
accountability  and  participation  in  internal  currency institutional  governance.   While
national currencies are issued by independent central banks, the issuance processes of SPC
institutions are heavily influenced by external RFs.  This requires institutions to take into
account and attempt to dovetail with those regulations and such accommodation may alter
internal institutional decision-making.    The three most common types of SPC institution
emphasise  the  three  main  functions  of  money:  UoA,  MoE  and  SoV.   Mutual  Credit
Systems  (MCSs)  as  credit  based  currencies  may have difficulty adapting to  limits  on
issuance (and on backing).  Currencies which issue physical notes, such as Ithaca Hours or
the older Farm Exchange Scrip currencies of the 1930’s, have a more limited ability to
issue currency than an MCS, but may be potentially more compatible with US national
RFs.  Time based currencies by contrast are based on mostly non-circulating media and
may thus be naturally more difficult to regulate, whilst also avoiding overlapping functions
with national currencies.  Time Dollars are an example of such a currency, emphasising the
SoV function over other functions, thus garnering issuance decision-making freedom.  No
matter which monetary function a currency  emphasises, that function will significantly
influence geographical circulation, in turn affecting issuance decision-making processes.
SPC institutions  which emphasise different monetary functions may also need different
types of internal structures and interact differently with external RFs.  This may lead to
different potential  levels of SMG for different types of SPC institutions  based on their
differing abilities to share currency issuance decision-making.  Privately issued currencies
in  particular  may allow little  currency user  decision-making,  as  they are  obligated  to
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prioritise profits.  On the other hand, loyalty currency issuance can be partially construed
as shared based on purchase by consumers.  This nonetheless lacks full participation since
decisions and terms of issue are fixed by the issuing firm.  
Choice  of  backing  is  the  third  key  influence  affecting  transparent,  accountable  and
participatory monetary decision-making, the need for which Jessop (1999) emphasises,
particularly transparency and accountability, in monetary governance.  Backing decisions
shape the internal processes and shared governance potential of all currency institutions.
Commodity-backed currencies may facilitate a form of participation in backing decision-
making since  a  variety of  commodities  can be  offered for currency redemption.   Fiat
currencies like credit based UoA emphasising forms of money (i.e. MCSs) may be more
limited in their redemption options.  Despite the functional difference between commodity-
backed money and fiat money, both types of money have been used for general and special
purposes.  Economists frequently discuss the ramifications of commodity vs. fiat money
from a  monetary efficiency perspective,  since  the  commodity which  backs  a  currency
affects  currency  stability.   However  backing  decision-making  is  also  an  important
governance  process.   Therefore  whether  a  currency institution  offers  currency users  a
choice of backing in which to redeem the currency is emphatically a monetary governance
concern.  
Transparency  and  accountability  can  be  optimised for  monetary  institutions  through
participatory  decision-making  processes  involving  seigniorage,  issuance  and  backing,
subject to external regulation and scale in terms of both function and geography.  The
currency function an institution chooses to emphasise affects the geographical circulation
of that currency, which in turn affects internal institutional processes.  Therefore the next
section will discuss interactions between currency functions and geographical circulation.
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3.4 Currency User Influence on Governance via Scale 
 Although functionality dominates monetary discussions, connections between governance
and monetary functionality are  largely neglected.   Monetary function  affects  monetary
stakeholders who therefore have a right to participate in monetary governance.  Currency
scale includes both Polanyi’s (1957) currency functions and geographical circulation both
within and outside of the nominal area for the currency, as Chinn (2005) explains.  Scale
affects decision-making in at least three ways which are relevant to this thesis.  Firstly, the
functional behaviour  of money changes with geographical circulation.  Secondly, scale
(both functional  and geographical) affects seigniorage distribution  decisions (Neumann,
1992).  Thirdly, geographical range affects direct decision-making participation potential
for  institutional  stakeholders  (Fung  and  Wright,  2003).   Whether  by  adding  more
functional expectations to a currency, for instance by using the same currency as both a
MoE  and  SoV  as  Keynes  (1930),  Gesell  (1906)  and  Greco  (2001)  point  out,  or  by
increased territorial circulation, as seigniorage hearings before Congress (2000) illustrate,
both  technical functions and geographical circulation change the scale of the currency.
Scale changes to a currency, including changes through convertibility between currencies,
in turn affect issuance and sometimes backing decisions.  Scale and governance are thus
inextricably linked. 
Functions of money, which most currency typologies emphasise, play the first key role in
monetary scale.  However this emphasis on function neglects the regulatory and internal
governance  context  of  currencies.   Greco  (2001)  for  instance  suggests  a  backing-
determined functionally-based classification system for local currencies.  He discusses pure
economic  viability  based  on  functional  emphasis  of  various  currencies,  thus  to  some
degree he does explore the difference between currencies which are convertible to national
money, and  hence  more  closely linked  with  general  purpose  money, but  he  does  not
elaborate on forms of governance within those currencies.  For that reason his typology
cannot be applied in this study.  Dalton (1965) classifies various forms of money based on
cultural  context  into  Polanyi’s  Special  Purpose  Currencies  (SPCs).   As  discussed
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previously, SPCs are classified as such because they do not fill all three of the following
functions: UoA, MoE and SoV.    
The  greater  number  of  functions  filled  by  general  purpose  money  may  increase  the
difficulty  of  sharing  decision-making  around  disbursement  of  seigniorage  revenues,
currency issuance, and backing choices.  UoA emphasising currencies, as the most limited
scale of all currencies, would be expected on these grounds to have the highest levels of
shared internal decision-making.  Internal processes must also vie with external regulations
for  influence  on  SMG  within  a  currency institution.   Function  shapes  both  internal
institutional  governance and  the  ability to  link  with  external  institutions.   Functional
emphasis may also influence motivation and values of objective setters within institutions.
All of these issues affect internal decision-making.  
Geography plays the second key role in monetary scale, delimiting currency circulation
ranges.  The walking distance limits of a local neighbourhood might be at most 5 miles
across for most fit people.  Many LETS users for example have commented that such range
limitation was an important component of trading.  The next logical step is a city-wide
circulation range.  The third would be regional, such as the Pacific North West in the USA,
while the fourth range could be the national boundary.  The fifth and final range would be
that of the supra-national and international circulation range, such as the Euro, or the US
Dollar.  The wider range of circulation a currency has the greater will be the impact on its
governance.  
Special Purpose Currencies (SPCs) include transferable currencies which act as a MoE but
are not  used to store future value, and currencies which hold future value, but  do not
circulate  as  a  MoE.   Privately  issued  currencies  can  also  circulate  as  a  type  of
complementary  currency,  filling  UoA  and  either  the  MoE  or  SoV  function,  being
transferable  within  a  limited  user  group,  redeemable  for  goods  and  services  with  an
expiration date, or other exchange limitations.  Since such SPCs are privately controlled,
and can limit circulation by redemption eligibility or by geographical boundaries, clearly
not all SPCs will have a high degree of SMG.  
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3.4.1 Convertibility and scale
If  convertibility  between  local  and  national  currency influences  functionality,  then  it
influences  scale  as  well.   Fluctuations  in  national  monetary  value  will  have
disproportionate  impact  on convertible  local  currencies, impacting circulation.   Gomez
(2008 ) emphasises the importance of open convertibility between community and national
currencies.  This trait can be partly used to determine if a currency is general or special
purpose,  since the ability to  exchange or convert  between currencies links  them more
closely.  For this reason, convertibility is weighted more heavily toward the general money
end of currency scale.  When such convertibility is mandated by national RFs, a direct
effect on the currency will be to keep that currency legally viable.  On the other hand,
possible secondary effects of this price of  RF toleration include some loss of currency
users’ ability to choose the backing in the case of fiat a currency and indirectly less user
control over currency decision-making.
National currencies and larger scale community-based currency institutions were initially
hypothesised to be better tolerated by national RFs, due to the connection between general
purpose money and markets  which national  RFs oversee.  Scope limitations  prevent  a
large-scale  study  from  being  undertaken,  but  this  theoretical  and  methodological
framework may be applicable to many more cases.  National  RFs in the USA classify
credit based UoA currencies such as LETS as barter and for this reason LETS are not
studied here.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The concept of SMG forms part of a growing literature related to the governance of money
at community levels, and can be applied across different time frames and locations.  While
limited scope prevents the addition of further currencies from other nations in this study, it
fills part of the gap mentioned by Hutchinson (2002).  The first part of SMG entails the
consistent  treatment  by national  RFs vis-à-vis  both national  and non-national  currency
institutions.  The extent of a currency institution’s ability to facilitate access to decision-
making  for  all  stakeholders  may  depend  on  the  level  of  national  RF  tolerance.   RF
tolerance is  measured by equating more participatory processes with higher degrees of
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shared governance.  The second part of this theory explores internal monetary governance.
Non-national currency institutions  are viewed here as small  scale and potentially more
participatory structures.  Participatory Internal Decision-making criteria are developed to
determine if such institutions deliver greater accountability and transparency to users of
local currencies.  Participatory Internal Decision-making (PID) is measured by the level of
community accessibility to participatory decision-making processes which are crucial to
monetary  governance,  namely  seigniorage,  currency  issuance,  and  backing  decision-
making.   The final  part  of  SMG  recognises the  importance of  scale,  which Table  2.5
showed is comprised of both the functions of money and geographical circulation, as a
crucial influence on currency institutional governance.  Two key concerns make the scale
of SPCs important to monetary governance, and they are: firstly that the smaller number of
monetary functions fulfilled by SPCs affect currency decisions differently than monetary
institutions which issue currencies that  fill  more functions,   and secondly that  smaller
geographical range may allow greater levels of participatory decision-making.  Both of
these concerns underline the importance of scale to shared governance.
 The research questions listed at the end of Chapter 2 turn on the interactions of external
and internal governance with scale as they influence overall Shared Monetary Governance.
Clearly, external governance and functional factors interact with internal money creation
decision-making processes across geographical boundaries, raising questions regarding the
extent to which any existing currencies fit the criteria of Shared Monetary Governance.
Based on theoretical and empirical exploration, SMG seeks to provide a measure of that
potential for all stakeholders to influence currency decision-making, wondering as a by-
product of those main questions: 
• To what extent, if any, does institutional sponsorship affect levels of  RF Toleration,
PID, scale, and in turn, overall SMG?   
• To what extent, if any, does scale determine the degree of SMG, and do the smallest
scale currencies necessarily have the highest levels of SMG?
In conclusion, the  governance principles  of  consistent  regulatory framework treatment,
transparency,  accountability  and  participation  as  applied  to  all  stakeholders  who  are
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affected by monetary functionality requires investigation of the processes used to make
decisions in monetary institutions.  Since no such dual-paradigmatic investigation has been
undertaken, this thesis asserts that metrics for such an investigation need to be developed.
This  study initially  hypothesised  that  small  scale  currency institutions,  more  so  than
general purpose money, better facilitate participatory stakeholder decision-making.  Yet
loyalty programs, where they are transferable, generally have limited use as money, hence
are also SPCs, creating a paradox in which small scale currencies in fact turned out to
allow  currency users less decision-making power than users of large scale general purpose
money, since decision-making for loyalty currencies can be limited to owners of business
institutions  issuing  the  currencies.   Therefore, while  both  community-based  SPCs  and
privately issued SPCs  could potentially address the lack of user decision-making influence
in monetary governance (by facilitating greater institutional  access), a measure of such
access is important in establishing criteria for full Shared Monetary Governance and what
types of institutions  actually facilitate  greater  levels of SMG overall,  and Participatory
Internal Decision-making in particular.    
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Chapter 4 - Methodology    
4.1 Operationalising the Theoretical Framework 
In  contrast  to  trade-offs between stakeholder priorities  and  Pareto economic efficiency
discussed by  Hansson (2004), this theoretical approach treats monetary governance and
functionality as interacting systems.  Three main monetary stakeholder influences explored
in  this  study are  monetary regulators,  internal  currency decision-makers  and  currency
users.   Currency institutional  decision-making  adaptations  to  regulatory influence  and
monetary function at different geographical ranges must be understood within the context
of governance.  While currency institutions can adapt to external Regulatory Framework
(RF) requirements by shaping their internal processes in ways which allow them to retain
shared decision-making, these governance factors also affect functional-geographical scale.
A process based typological methodology for evaluating Shared Monetary Governance
(SMG) is developed based on national regulatory treatment, internal decision-making and
scale for each currency.  
This chapter discusses methodological challenges encountered during this study, Ragin’s
(2000) Fuzzy Set-QCA technique which inspired this methodology, and methodological
modifications made for this study.  Influences that needed investigating are then discussed
followed by data sets.  Finally, reasoning behind the scoring system and analysis of the
processed data is explained.
 
Three  main  challenges  were  encountered  in  categorising currency  institutions  while
retaining  stakeholder  context,  focusing  on  decision-making.   First,  as  both  Schroeder
(2005) and Schraven (2000) note, there is little empirical data available to researchers for
non-national currencies.  Second, Dow (2003) and Heinrich (2004) stress the importance
of  balancing  individual  institutional  context  with  cross-system  comparability  in
conceptualisation.  These complex process interactions required methodological framing
which allows for consideration of internal institutional  processes against a backdrop of
external influences, each of which could change with scale.   The third methodological
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challenge,  timing,  was  framed  against  North’s  (1994)  contention  that  history  shapes
institutional development, making time frames important in judging institutional processes,
exacerbating the difficulty in finding comparable data sets.
  
4.2 Justifying SMG Criteria and Scoring
The  methodology  of  this  thesis  is  the  first  attempt  to  classify  currency institutional
governance while  taking into  account both  the  institutional  context  of  governance  and
functional impacts on SMG.  Accomplishing this required creating criteria which allow
comparison across different types of currency institutions.  Each set of criteria is derived
from  discussions  in  the  literature,  with  individual  indicators  drawn  from  the  various
debates surrounding monetary governance and functionality.  
4.2.1 Justifying National Regulatory Framework Criteria and Scoring
Measuring external, in this case national, RF tolerance for currency institutions is the first
part of this methodology.  Heinrich (2004) concurs with Jessop (2002) on the importance
of external factors to internal institutional governance structures.  National RF tolerance
for currency institutions is evaluated here on a spectrum of enforcement which takes into
account variations in regulatory policies.   That enforcement flexibility was captured by
using percentages between the two main sets of Fully Tolerated and Not Tolerated.  In
order  to  facilitate  analysis  and  comparison  with  other  data  sets,  those  scores  falling
between the  two sets  were  placed along a  spectrum from least  to  greatest  restriction.
Levels qualified as more tolerated if the Score is above 50%, while a greater number of
criteria are met below the 50% threshold results in a qualification of Less Tolerated.8   As
RF Tolerance is quite straightforward, the individual indicators are described with their
scoring methodology in section 4.4.3. 
4.2.2 Justifying Participatory Internal Decision-making Criteria and
Scoring 
Participatory Internal Decision-making (PID) operationalises the concepts of transparency
and  accountability,  drawing  on  Fung’s  (2003)  work  in  participatory  decision-making
8 For technical details regarding  RF scoring, see Appendix 1.
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processes.  The concerns of seigniorage, currency issuance, and currency backing guide the
direction of currency governance and functioning.  Each section (seigniorage, issuance and
backing) allows a range of scores based on how decisions are made, from one for the most
limited participation to five for fullest participatory decision-making.  Thus there are a total
of 15 criteria in total used to determine the PID score for a given currency, which then
contributes  to  the  overall  SMG score for that  currency.  Scoring details  are shown in
greater detail beginning with Table 5.5 in section 5.2.1.  The criteria permitting the greatest
level of direct participation in decision-making processes received the highest scores.  The
upper range of scores is extended by the fact that it is possible for a currency institution to
use more than one of the selectable options, resulting in greater flexibility for PID, and
thus a higher PID score.  
While Rolnick (1989) down plays the importance of seigniorage revenues, Huber (2000),
Linton (1994) and Neumann (1992), though neglecting shared decision-making, disagree
with Rolnick, agreeing that seigniorage plays both a governance role and a functional role
in currency institutions.    Seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends are
effectively spent by shareholders rather than by all of those people who use the currency.
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury gives somewhat more public choice via
a presumptive democratic process.  Since democratic states have elected representation to
voice governance concerns,  national  currency seigniorage decisions  are expected to  be
shared  to  a  greater  extent  than  those  of  loyalty  currencies.   Seigniorage  revenue
distribution among currency holders benefits currency users, but neglects the impact on
affected communities.  Admittedly, seigniorage revenues donated to charity are a form of
distribution rather  than participation.   Nevertheless,  if  those revenues are donated to a
charity  which  serves  the  local  community,  they  can  act  as  a  form  of  community
empowerment,  spreading among more stakeholders  than when revenues are not  shared
within local communities.  Finally, seigniorage revenues invested in the local community
allow greatest participation in the decision-making process by all monetary stakeholders.
Likewise, the widest possible participation in deciding how money is issued allows the
highest  level  of  PID.   Money  issued  by  Private  Firm  or  Individual  without  public
consultation,  input  or  representation  neglects  stakeholder  priorities.   When  issued  by
National,  supranational  or  international  Governmental  Authority,  monetary institutions
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may  claim  representation,  but  currencies  issued  by  publicly  chosen  or  elected  local
authorities  give  wider  participation  in  the  issuance  decision-making  process.   Going
further, money issued by an open management committee of Community, Civil  Society
Group or local business may be more open to involvement by those directly affected by the
currency.  Finally, currency issued by open vote or by consensus of community or Civil
Society Group  allows  fullest  participation  and  transparency,  since  any member  of  the
community can enter the open meeting and give input.  Although informal barriers such as
English language skills in the USA can be significant, those barriers are beyond the scope
of this study.
Justifying the choice of backing scoring was the most complex of all  the PID criteria.
Several issues affect the scoring for shared choice of currency backing as part of internal
governance.  Both commodity or cash redemption choice and full user decision-making
participation offer the most accountable form of governance and choice for both users of
the currency as well as those who may not use the currency but are still affected by it.  Fiat
currencies, by their lack of backing, may offer less choice than commodity or hard cash
backed  forms  of  money.   The  means  by  which  crucial  backing-related  decisions  are
reached is just as important to making the governance of a currency fully open.  Hence a
scoring balance  was  needed  between  commodity-backed currency, which  allows users
wider redemption choices, and fiat currency, which cannot be redeemed for commodities.
While commodity backing allows wider redemption choice, fiat currencies with fully open
participatory  decision-making  processes  allow  greater  choice  than  commodity  backed
currencies with no user decision-making input.  Thus currencies with a choice of either
commodity or hard cash backing where the currency committee was run by open consensus
receive the highest score as more open to participation and transparency in the decision-
making processes. 
Gomez (2008) points  to  active direction of  currency institutional  long-term strategy as
crucial  to  institutional  viability,  but  it  also,  if  guided  through  consensus-based  direct
participation, automatically puts a currency in to the set of Participatory Internal Decision-
making currencies because direct  participation allows greatest  stakeholder  access.   For
similar reasons, a negative score for PID was included to allow for currencies such as the
19th century railway wage vouchers in which workers were paid during the 1890s.  Railway
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Scrip currencies illustrate the effects of coercive internal processes on governance.  These
currencies,  while  clear  examples  of SPCs,  nonetheless  had a  very low degree of  PID.
Furthermore,  they  were  tolerated  by  national  authorities  despite  the  coercive  and
exploitative nature of these currencies.  Such currencies would therefore warrant a PID
score low enough to outweigh those external and scale factors, given the harsh effects on
currency users9.
4.2.3 Justifying Scale Criteria and Scoring 
Scale, which is the third piece of this methodology, determines currency users’ ability to
directly control money through counting, spending or saving with the currency.  While
choice of backing is a governance issue, backing and also exchangeability as Chinn (2005)
asserts,  touch on functional issues.  Loyalty currencies though special purpose, are also
linked to general purpose  money.  For this  reason,  a  method was  needed to  measure
currency scale by function and by geographical circulation.  This allowed currencies from
either  extreme  of  scale  to  be  graded  as  general  purpose  or  special  purpose,  and  all
remaining  currencies  to  be  somewhere  in  between,  using  a  combination  of  Polanyi’s
(1977) SPC functions criteria and geographical criteria.
There  are  five  criteria,  as  the  reader will  recall  from Table  2.5,  which  determine  the
vertical component of the scale score, placed along the functional criteria axis.  The first
three are the functions of UoA, MoE and SoV, which determine general purpose money.
There are, of course, overlaps in what may constitute a MoE or SoV, as with Time Banks
for example.  The fourth functional criterion is any Means of Payment (MoP) accepted by
the state, although automatic passage to general money has been downgraded here because
it is possible for a locally accepted MoP to still not be general money, as the reader will
recall from section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2.  The fifth and final function related criterion is that
the money be convertible to either a national or supra-national currency.  
Indirect  convertibility through exchangeability with  other convertible  currencies creates
closer links to general purpose money.  These five criteria, in combination with the five
geographical territorial ranges determine overlapping general or special purpose currency.
9 This will be further explained in section 5.2.1.
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This  determines  whether  the  same currency could  exhibit  a  tendency to  shift  between
general and special purpose depending on the RFs and internal processes.  Geographical
limits arise first in dealing with a Special Purpose Currency, and form the horizontal axis
of the scale matrix,  based on geographical distances.   Nonetheless,  it  is  possible for a
currency to be widely accepted and yet remain special purpose rather than a full-fledged
general purpose currency.  Continuing up the geographical scale, regions of the USA such
as the desert South-west, the South-east,  North-east, West and Midwest are distinct from
the City-County scale.  Note that currencies can also perform different functions over very
large  distances,  as  illustrated  by  the  world-wide  acceptance  of  the  US  Dollar  for
accounting (UoA) purposes, but not for tax payment (MoP).  To take this into account it
was necessary to include criteria to distinguish circumstances under which currencies could
flow between general and special purpose.  Thus, scale scores are the sum of functional
and geographical criteria.
  
4.3 Currencies and Institutional Influences 
Notably, Kahler (2000) reaffirms the strong effect of external governance constraints even
upon central banks, although states, civil society, and businesses remain key influences, as
sponsors of currency institutions.  Therefore in order to distinguish the various influences
on  governance  processes,  prominent  examples  of  monetary  institutions  sponsored  by
national, civil society, and business actors are investigated here.  National RF differences
among countries dictate that currencies from the same nations must be studied as a block.
Hence four types of currency institutions from the USA were investigated: the national
currency, two very different community-sponsored currencies, and one loyalty currency.
Note  again  that  community-based  currency institutions  are  defined  here  as  monetary
institutions sponsored by civil society actors for the explicit benefit of local communities.
The specific currencies reviewed were the US Dollar, Humboldt Exchange Dollars, Time
Dollars  and Deli  Dollars.   Each nation-state  and some local  authorities  within nations
oversee the issuance of currency and regulate issues connecting with money and its use.
Therefore  the  authorities  investigated  included  national  currency regulators  and  state
regulations affecting all types of money.  Business associations were not included in the set
of RFs despite having a potentially strong influence based on internal company procedures
because these data are effectively already included, based on acceptance as a MoE, via the
criteria used to score scale by function and geographical range.    
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Data for the national currency comes from secondary sources, while primary data gathered
to document governance issues  in  SPCs was in qualitative  format for each factor (RF
tolerance, PID, SPC).  Resulting data sets were analysed for trends in those areas.   These
institutional contexts were taken into account when examining the development of SMG.
Thus, the overall SMG score is the sum total of national RFs, PID, and SPC percentage
scores.
Fines and fees are an important part of the regulatory ability to create change in currency
institutions.  Previous research by North (2007) and others implied that national RFs were
to blame for the failure of many SPCs, as punitive regulations seemed to strongly affect the
governance processes with those currency institutions.   Also of clear importance is the
legality of non-national currency institutions, since what is legal in one place may not be
legal elsewhere.  This is partly dependent on US laws limiting circulation of tokens and
prohibiting note issues of less than $1 USD in value.  Solomon (1996) points to these in
his discussion of the legality of SPCs but does not categorise US regulatory toleration.  In
classifying currency regulations and internal processes, the influence of external regulation
was  emphasised.  The  need for  a  standard template  made some  form of  categorising
necessary.    
4.4 Data sets
The US Dollar, Humboldt Exchange Dollars, Time Dollars and Deli Dollars, as national,
community-based MoE and SoV, and loyalty currencies respectively, were selected to test
influences  on  governance by the  different  functions  of  money at  various  levels.  The
representative currency institutions were classified by RF treatment, Participatory Internal
Decision-making and functional geographical scale.  Data are based largely on secondary
sources with some interview questions, as Table 4.1 shows.  
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Governance data all last accessed March 2009 
4.4.1 US National RFs 
External (in this case, national) and internal governance of the US Dollar is intermingled
due to its nature as the national currency.  While the US Treasury Department (2008) now
oversees distribution of seigniorage from United States notes and Federal Reserve notes,
both of which remain legal tender, US notes were issued directly by the Treasury until
1971, with Federal Reserve notes issued through the Federal Reserve System.  US Dollar
issuance  decisions  are  now  made  by  the  Federal  Reserve’s  Federal  Open  Market
Committee (FOMC), which coordinates US Dollar exchange rate policy with the Treasury
Department.  Although the FOMC’s Board of Governors are presidentially appointed with
Senate  confirmation,  their  fourteen  year appointments  serve,  according to  the  Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (2008), “to contribute to the insulation of the Board—and the
Federal Reserve System—from day-to-day political pressures”.  Despite this independence,
as Paul (2006) points out, backing decisions by Presidents Nixon and Roosevelt impacted
stakeholders world-wide, making the US Dollar, according to the US Treasury (2008) a fiat
currency, “not redeemable in gold, silver or any other commodity” i.e. with no backing. 
4.4.2 Non-national currencies in the USA
Solomon’s (1996) national legal data covering currencies in the United States remains the
most comprehensive recent study, covering federal and state rulings in detail and is still
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widely referred to as an authoritative work.  Citing the 1948 Congressional prohibition of
private coinage, but not of small-scale paper currencies worth at least $1 USD, Solomon
(1996) concludes that since 1977, US citizens have been allowed to trade in gold and to
enforce gold clauses and therefore may now specify payment in any currency “pegged to
the US dollar”.
4.4.2.1 Humboldt Exchange Dollar Data
The  Humboldt  Exchange  Dollar  is  a  community-based local  currency started  in  2003
(Tracey, 2008) on the initiative of an anonymous citizen and continued in 2004 as a project
of  Democracy Unlimited  of  Humboldt  County (DUHC),  an  umbrella  organisation  for
several Humboldt, California area community projects.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars are
based in  large part  on the  well-known currency Ithaca Hours,  with the caveat that  the
purpose  is  not  only to  increase  local  economic  prosperity  but  also  to  enhance  local
community democratic processes through the use of a more democratic form of money.
Being sponsored by DUHC gave Humboldt Exchange Dollars the advantage of recognition
and association with a supportive local community organisation, helping the currency to
gain and increase circulation.  The key regulatory body influencing Humboldt Exchange
Dollars is the IRS, which Miller (2008) notes gives unofficial governance guidance despite
lack of  official regulations.   To meet  IRS requirements for exchangeability, Humboldt
Exchange  Dollars  are  directly  pegged to  the  US  Dollar.   Thus,  Humboldt  Exchange
organisers advise all users to  treat Humboldt Exchange Dollar transactions just  as they
would treat US Dollar transactions for IRS reporting purposes. The remaining key national
regulatory body, the US Treasury Department, requires that currencies issued in the USA
be clearly distinguishable from US Dollars and worth a minimum of one US Dollar, which
Humboldt Exchange  organisers are careful to observe.  As will be seen later in section
6.1.2  of  the  Analysis  chapter,  this  external  regulation of   Humboldt  Exchange Dollar
institutional  policy  strongly  affects  both  internal  institutional  policy  and  currency
functionality.  
Humboldt Exchange Dollar PID data was gathered in large part through interviews.  The
Humboldt Exchange Dollar currency project is sponsored by the local non-profit institution
Humboldt  Community Exchange,  which  is  connected to  DUHC.  Questions  regarding
control  and  participation  for  currency  users  were  answered  by  Humboldt  Exchange
48
organisers,  who  are  volunteers  from within  the  local  community who have  served  as
members of Humboldt Exchange committees for a set period of time.  Semi-structured
interviews with Humboldt Exchange organisers (Tracey, 2008) clarified decision-making
processes, describing “… the "volunteers" meeting  where we make decisions, which isn't
exactly closed, but is not  publicly advertised.  … The other meeting is our "open meeting"
which is publicly advertised  as a way to learn more and get involved…”
The  Humboldt  Exchange Dollar  is  a  currency issued  in  the  form of  notes  of  various
denominations which are directly intended to act as money.  The requirement in the case of
Humboldt Exchange Dollars to be exchangeable with the US Dollar certainly affects the
use  of   Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  as  a  UoA,  perhaps  limiting  use  of   Humboldt
Exchange  Dollars  due  to  exchange  and  book-keeping.   As  a  MoE,  however,  that
requirement can either increase or limit use of the  Humboldt Exchange Dollar, while as a
SoV, Humboldt Exchange Dollars will be subject to the same changes in value as the US
Dollar, effectively nullifying Humboldt Exchange Dollars as a separate currency for the
purposes of long term value storage.  Despite these potential limitations, the  Humboldt
Exchange Dollar is an important representative of a class of community-based currencies
which are deliberately issued as money in the form of hand-exchangeable notes.   This
distinguishes  Humboldt Exchange Dollars  and similar  currencies such as Ithaca Hours
from non note or scrip based currencies, such as LETS and Time Dollars.  Neither MCS
nor time based currencies issue physical scrip intended for hand-to-hand exchange, and
therefore these other  currency institutions  do not  need to  track the  circulation  of their
physical exchange media.  This means that different decision-making procedures can be
followed as institutions  that  do  not  issue  scrip  need not  deal  with  as  many problems
associated with notes, counterfeiting etc.  Also, credit and time based currencies need not
necessarily  be  fully  exchangeable  with  national  currencies.   Indeed,  many  currency
institutions insist on not pegging their currencies to a national currency for fear of inflation
or other external control issues affecting the currency.   Humboldt Exchange Dollars on the
other hand, like Toronto Dollars (TorontoDollar, 2010) in Canada, and the Totnes Pound
(Totnes, 2010) in England, are vulnerable to changes in value of the national currencies to
which they are pegged.  Yet like these community-based currencies outside of the USA,
Humboldt Exchange Dollars remain more functionally flexible than a strictly time based
currency, due to the ability to more easily charge varying prices for goods and services
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using physical scrip.   Physical scrip currencies  are   shown by  Mascornick (2007) and
others to be both more viable than LETS, which according to  Solomon (1996)  may not
even be legal in the USA.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars by contrast, share many traits, such
as  scrip  issuance and tracking, exchangeability with  the  national  currency,  and greater
flexibility as compared to  credit  or  time based currencies,  as  do the above mentioned
currencies from Canada and England.  They differ in how they are regulated by the various
national and regional governments, as well as in individual community policy.  
4.4.2.2 Time Dollar Data
Time Banking began in the early 1990s, starting with the Time Dollar Institute by Dr.
Edgar Cahn (Timebanks, 2010).  The impetus for the creation and success of Time Dollars
was the scarcity of national  money, particularly in  times of budget cuts and economic
crises.  The purpose of  Time Dollars was to  provide an egalitarian form of money to
augment scarce national money.  Through innovative networking and programs such as the
1995 Chicago Cross-Age Peer Tutoring Program, which featured the use of Time Dollars,
the acceptance of this currency grew and Time Banks received various types of funding for
several  years.   As  funding  was  withdrawn,  Time  Banks  adapted  procedures  and
institutional  structures  in  order  to  remain  viable,  thus  requiring  internal  Time  Bank
decision-makers  to  conform  to  external  regulatory requirements  while  simultaneously
working to maintain an egalitarian currency issuance policy.  Time Dollar external and
internal governance derives from Solomon (1996), Time Dollars Institute guidelines, and
interview data.   The  same national  RFs influencing other  currencies also  affect  Time
Dollars, but  these influences are moderated by the different functional and institutional
emphasis of Time Dollars, with some Time Banks even choosing only, as Rowden (2009)
notes, to “accept donations from any non-governmental source”.  
The use of time rather than printed notes as a currency allows more individual choice for
payment.   Time Banks also broker services across the community rather than between
individuals.  These differences prompted Coulter (1996) to rule Time Dollars tax exempt.
Internal rules governing Time Dollars are derived from the individual Time Banks that
issue them.  Each Time Bank is founded by a local community or member group, with a
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Time Broker who administers the Time Bank.  Member input guides Time Bank policy.
While the effect of national level tax-exempt status may be to limit the size and flexibility
of Time Dollars, thus limiting their use as a MoE, a strict adherence to the equality of each
Time Bank member´s hour means that Time Dollars will always be stable as both a UoA
and  SoV.   This  makes  Time  Dollars  an  important  representative  case  of  time  based
currencies which do not issue token or physical scrip and are automatically limited in their
issuance simply by the limited number of hours in a day.  This is quite different from other
types  of  currency institutions  which  need  to  monitor  circulation  in  order  to  prevent
inflation and over-accumulation or hoarding of the currencies.  While Time Dollars are
tax-exempt in the USA, Time Banks in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, are
regulated differently from one jurisdiction to the next.  A particularly important reason is
that some  Time Banks in the UK have (anecdotally) considered allowing highly skilled
members to charge more than one hour to the bank per hour of their own time donated, due
to scarcity of certain skills.  While the freedom to do this certainly exists, it would also
significantly change both the participatory governance dynamics as well as the external
regulatory stances  toward  those  specific  Time  Banks,  and  potentially toward  all  time
currencies in general.
4.4.2.3 Deli Dollar Data
Regulatory data for a loyalty currency accepted within a local  community presents the
dilemma of institutional sponsorship versus stakeholder popularity.  As a business-issued
currency, Deli Dollars could be regulated by the Securities  and Exchange Commission
(SEC), while as a community currency they were already regulated by both the IRS and
Treasury Department.  Deli Dollars came about as a result of the inability of Frank's Deli, a
small  business  in  Great  Barrington,  MA,  to  obtain  bank loans  needed to  relocate  the
premises  (Hannum,  2006).   After consultation  with  local  civil  society organisations,  a
time-limited issue of store scrip notes was implemented for the purpose of raising funds to
allow the deli to relocate without the need for bank loans.  Over the course of one year
those notes were redeemed, not only by store customers wanting to purchase from the deli,
but also by members of the local community who had accepted or exchanged deli notes
amongst  themselves  in  payment  for  non-deli  goods  and  services.   Those  deli  notes
circulated  within  the  local  community  far  beyond  the  deli,  before  eventually  being
redeemed in the store in exchange for deli products.  
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Not only the desire to support  the deli, but also trust in the fact that the notes could be
redeemed for  deli  products,  as  well  as  pride  in  the  ability  to  use  a  locally generated
medium of exchange appear to have been major motivating factors in the uptake of Deli
Dollars  as  a  widely accepted  currency during  this  limited  time  in  the  town  of  Great
Barrington, MA.  While courts are divided on what constitutes a security, Solomon (1996)
points out that since buyers of Deli Dollar notes did not expect to make a profit from them,
Deli Dollars did not qualify under all  criteria for securities.  This regulatory ambiguity
almost certainly limited the circulation and use of Deli Dollars as a UoA and MoE amongst
non-deli customers.  The limited redemption period clearly limited Deli Dollars as a SoV.
Yet  in  spite  of  these restrictions,  townspeople chose to  accept Deli  Dollars  as a  MoE
amongst themselves during this time.  That uptake as a circulating currency make Deli
Dollars  one  of  the  very few loyalty or  business-sponsored  currencies  to  have  gained
acceptance as a local currency in recent years.  This makes it an important representative of
privately-issued  money  which  although  local,  may  not  share  the  same  participatory
dynamics  as other local currencies.  Warner (2007) points out  that previous merchant-
issued currencies in the USA came and went in response to times of economic hardship.
Other private currencies which may or may not be exchangeable between non-company
customers,  such  as  the  various  AirMiles or  Nectar  Points  programs,  clearly lack  the
community focused person-to-person interchange of Deli Dollars.  Hence although other
private  currencies  do  exist,  this  currency was  rather  unique.   As  a  private  business-
sponsored currency, internal decisions for the Deli Dollar were made by the Deli owner,
Frank Tortorelli, who was unavailable for interview.  A Deli Dollar user (2008) pointed
out that this currency was sold over a “one month” period, and “redeemed over the next
year”  for  the  explicit  purpose  of  moving  the  deli.   This  leaves  questions  of  internal
decision-making  ambiguous,  given  community  acceptance  of  the  currency, despite  its
business sponsorship.
4.4.3 Governance Data Score Allocations, by Data Set
Scoring  procedures  for  the  various  components  of  raw governance data  resolved  two
distinct requirements.  The first need was to design and calibrate the three main analytical
sets into which raw data would be separated for later analysis.  The second need was for a
systematic method of allocating scores to individual indicators within each of the raw data
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sets.  The modifications by Kvist (2007) to fuzzy set analysis, while not directly applicable
for reasons explained later, inspired much of the methodology used in this study.
Set  calibrations  were  designed  to  facilitate  analysis  of  RF  toleration,  PID,  and  scale
together as one interacting system of processes.  Three sets give a more complete picture of
overall SMG, showing the three crucial components of monetary governance.  The RF
toleration set  adheres the most  closely to Kvist´s Ideal Type methodology.  This  uses
qualitative breakpoint criteria to determine which data points were IN the set, OUT of the
set, or more appropriately located at one of the eleven indicators between the two extremes
of the set.  While the criteria for falling IN or OUT of the RF Tolerated set are very clear,
contextual judgements needed to be used, as indicated by Kvist, spreading out from the
50% benchmark.  Because the emission, look and feel of physical  scrip can decisively
affect circulation10, it´s regulation was chosen as the midway benchmark for RF Toleration.
Below  the  midway point,  indicators  were  valued  by the  level  of  currency confidence
potentially generated by the specific indicator, ranging from very little if the currency is in
fact treated as an investment security rather than as currency, to much more confidence if
the currency must be pegged to a national currency (but nonetheless not truly autonomous).
Above the RF Toleration midpoint,  scores ranged from more to full  confidence in the
currency based on reporting, recognition, oversight and encouragement from external RFs,
each of which imply increasing measures of legality and viability. 
The PID set, by contrast, had to deviate from Kvist´s methodology due to the need for
three separate sets which were each built on a cumulative spectrum, allowing summation
into one complete set.   The three sets  within  the PID set,  Shared Seigniorage, Shared
Issuance and Shared Choice of Backing, are each built from a spectrum of shared decision-
making  indicators.   The  lines  dividing  each  indicator  in  the  spectra  are  blurred  by
ambiguity inherent in shared power within institutions.  These three spectra are used to
calibrate the resulting PID set.  Because each spectrum forms an equal part of the PID set,
the percentages determined at specific qualitative breakpoints Kvist describes could not be
employed by spectrum, but were shaped into percentages of PID, described in detail in
10 Schussman cites Costanza (2003) in pointing out that the emission of physical scrip boosts acceptance and
circulation.  Ithaca Hours, among other local currencies, began without physical scrip and later chose to emit
notes, as do Toronto Dollars and Totnes Pounds.  Schussman, Alan T., (2007).  Making Real Money: Local
Currency and Social Economies in the United States. [online]. http://textbench.com/schuss-
manuscript-20070426.pdf) [Accessed 22 March 2010].
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section 5.2.1 “PID Data Scoring”.  This allows the use of a more Kvist-like fuzzy set
effect, with IN, OUT, and percentages in between PID set extremes.  Thus the creation of a
three-part cumulative set intended for PID to be measured more accurately in cases where
there may be multiple practices or greater procedural variability within currency decision-
making.  The third set, the SPC set, required a different approach altogether, whilst also
maintaining the IN/OUT and percentages in between currency scales.
The  determining  factors  for  currency scale,  IN or  OUT of  the  SPC,  set  include  both
monetary functionality and geographical circulation.  Therefore both dimensions needed to
be represented in the scale matrix.  Since monetary functions are processes themselves,
several  qualitative  labels  related  to  the  uses  of  the  different  currencies  needed  to  be
assigned quantitative weights, described in section 5.3.  Those functional process weights
then needed to be applied to a quantitative scale in a way which would be compatible with
values  used  to  weigh  geographical  circulation.   The  resulting  matrix  then  needed  to
produce  a  set  compatible  with  the  RF  Toleration  and  PID  sets,  as  in  section  5.3.
Calibrating these three sets to form an overall SMG set is of course based on the  allocation
of individual scores within each subset, described next.
Individual score allocations within each set are described here, and in further detail in the
data presentation sections for each currency, in Chapter 5.  As previously mentioned, Kvist
and Ragin´s work on Fuzzy Sets inspired much of the methodology used in this study.
Contextual knowledge of qualitative data was used to create and score each indicator, as
summarised earlier.  Nevertheless, this study could not directly apply Fuzzy Set methods
for process and time-frame related reasons explained in greater detail elsewhere in this
dissertation.   SMG is  a conjuncture of three key sets  of processes, each with multiple
varying subsets of processes.  
Indicators within the three main sets, RF Toleration, PID, and scale (SPC), were scored as
follows.   RF  Toleration  indicators  were  generally straightforward  to  score,  based  on
national and state regulations.  PID indicators were each allocated a score based on specific
details  mined  from  qualitative  data.   Shared  Seigniorage  scores  derive  from  stated
investment policies of the currency institution.  Scores for Shared Issuance came from the
stated decision-making consultation policies together with institutional  policies on how
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those  decision-makers  who  are  consulted  are  located,  whether  through  a  Board  of
Governors,  open  community meetings,  etc.   Finally,  the  scores  for  Shared  Choice  of
Backing were allocated based on the currency redemption policy stated by each currency
institution.  Indicator scores then formed sets with common calibration for comparison.
  
The set calibration techniques and means of scoring individual indicators used in this study
share Kvist´s emphasis on scoring judgements based on contextual knowledge of the data,
applied to different ends.  The three sets calibrated using qualitative breakpoints allow a
more complete picture of monetary governance process interactions than one set alone.
Creating these sets requires that those interacting processes be taken into account when
scoring  indicators,  but  allows  a  multi-dimensional  understanding  of  the  combined
paradigms of monetary governance and monetary functionality.  Analysing those varied
dimensions required consistently processed data scores across each of the sets, described
next.       
   
4.4.4 Analysing Processed Data 
Analysis  shaped  the  collection  of  data  with  an  emphasis  on  examining  interacting
processes  rather  than  finding  causal  relationships.   Data  sets  were  compared  for
relationships between RF tolerance, internal decision-making, and scale, which required
consistency between RF, PID and scale scores.   Care was taken to avoid bias in score
creation through uniform application of criteria, while maintaining consistency between
scores,  yet  allowing  for  contextual  differences  in  classification.   Two  additional
comparisons are made for each currency between RF toleration PID and scale.  The first
comparison uses  summation of  data scores while  the  second comparison depicts  them
together visually.  For clarity purposes, technical details have been included in the relevant
chapters.
4.5 Reflections on methods not used 
4.5.1 Unrelated methods
Other methods were considered initially but did not fit with the broadly comparative nature
of this study, thus data  analysis methods needed to be extended for this  thesis.   Non-
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national currency research does not lend itself to quantitative methods due to the small
macro-economic impact of SPCs and the qualitative nature of RFs.  
Analysis  of data  within  and across data sets  raised questions  of  RF bias  against  non-
national currencies.  Huang (2003) investigated the impact of China’s RFs on foreign and
domestic firms operating in China, exploring the type and weight of monetary regulation.
While  Huang’s study compared qualitative  interview data with statistical  data to  show
operational effects of regulatory bias on various types of firms, that methodology could not
be applied here due to lack of statistical data for non-national currencies.
  Unstructured interviews may not  provide the specific data needed to create currency
governance and scale data, particularly for a wide range of currency institutions.  Likewise,
case  studies,  though  favoured  earlier  in  this  project,  would  not  allow  wide  ranging
comparison between a broad spectrum of currencies.  Other conventional research methods
such as surveys or questionnaire enquiries were considered, but deemed inapplicable due
to  the  very small  number  of  currency institutions  available  to  study,  as  well  as  the
hesitation on the part of many groups contacted in the USA and in the UK to participate in
such  a  study.   Furthermore,  the  questions  this  study  asks  revolve  around  details  of
decision-making  processes  and  circulation  with  which  many  currency  users  may  be
unfamiliar.  Study of these processes required a somewhat more open question set, and the
ability to obtain information from specific members of each currency institution, making
general surveys unsuitable for this study.  The use of questionnaires was also less suitable
for the variety of qualitative data necessary to begin understanding process interactions
between economic and governance paradigms.  Since much of the data necessary for this
study varied in detail from case to case, a standard set of questions could not be created
until much of the data had already been gathered.  The variability of the processes under
study  allowed  little  room  for  quantitative  data  gathering.   Perhaps  in  future  studies
combining  these  two  paradigms,   economic  and  governance  processes  can  be  further
quantified in larger scale comparisons.   
  Seyfang’s (1996) application of the social audit methodology evaluates the success of an
organisation  based  on  the  organisation’s  own  objectives.   The  difficulty  with  her
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methodology is that this investigation compares a varied set of currencies as a group with a
more  fixed  set  of criteria.   This  project  also  does not  aim to  evaluate  the  success  of
individual currencies but to understand their shared institutional governance in the face of
multiple governance and functional influences.   Using the social  audit  approach would
require a different definition of success for each currency institution. Since the goals of an
organisation derive from a foundation of governance, it is necessary to know who sets the
goals and why, which is not what the social audit technique is intended to measure.  
4.5.2 Fuzzy sets
Data for this project, though mixed, is largely qualitative.  Data comparison and analysis
was done using a method inspired by Ragin’s (2000) Fuzzy–Set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA), which allows quantification of qualitative data over time using sets and
truth-tables  to  determine  cause  and  effect.   Kvist (2007)  adapted  Ragin’s  work
emphasising context and qualitative anchors for descriptive analysis.  Kvist, whose ideal
type technique uses similar contextual judgements and qualitative breakpoints, describes
Ragin’s process in four steps.  First,  empirical indicators are chosen for each set  to be
studied.  Indicators are drawn from data, informed by theory.  Second, nine qualitative
break point  indicators are calibrated for each set  and placed in a  table  with  the  same
relative numerical placements.  These indicators spread upward and downward from the
50% cross-over point based on contextual knowledge of the data.  The numerical table
converts indicator labels into fuzzy scores ranging from fully OUT of each set to fully IN
each set. Third, qualitative data is scored by each indicator for each time frame.  The fourth
step is to use set logic to compare truth tables showing qualitative ‘differences in kind’ in
the set memberships over time.  These differing set configurations show both qualitative
(movement from IN a set to OUT or vice versa) and quantitative (degree of change in a set
without crossing over the qualitative 50% threshold) changes over time in the categories
being studied.  Together, these categories make up the ideal type, which can be approached
or moved away from over time.
Determining  cause  and  effect  is  not  the  objective  of  this  thesis,  which  uses  simpler
techniques, ruling out Ragin’s (1987) initial method immediately.  While  Kvist’s (2007)
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descriptive application of fuzzy-sets appeared more applicable to this thesis, there were
several differences which made it less feasible to apply fuzzy-sets.  
First, this study does not use data over differing time periods, but in a single cross-section.
Previous applications of fuzzy-sets used time as a key factor, which is not applicable here.
Second, this investigation is more of a case study than Ragin’s preferred balance between
case study and quantitative analysis.  A larger scale study may potentially change this, but
this thesis did not hazard a first application of fuzzy-sets to currency governance and scale
because it did not fit the types of large data sets previously used with fuzzy-sets.
Third, the analysis technique used here is simpler  and hopefully more accessible to all
currency stakeholders. 
Fourth, the data available for this study was not amenable to the same set layout due to the
types of  theoretical  issues  under  discussion.   For  example,  the  Tolerance  by RFs  set
indicators was drawn from literature discussing the importance of each of those indicators.
While the PID set might have been broken up into three individual sets, this would have
produced more sets than Kvist illustrates, while fewer indicators for the PID set would not
adequately have evaluated the categories.
Fifth, the need to combine function and geography into one scale metric for the SPC set
differs from the direct indicator construction of each fuzzy set.  The need to include both
parts of scale thus precluded using direct indicators.
 
Finally, rather than describing movement toward or away from an ideal type over time, this
study aims to understand how underlying processes influence the outcome of SMG.  The
SMG score is intended to show how RFs, internal processes and scale influence each part
of institutional governance in a simpler way than fuzzy-set appears to do.  A summation
table rather than truth tables shows to what extent a currency institution allows SMG and
in which dimensions.  This thesis interactions between governance and function factors in
order  to  illuminate  stakeholder  ability  to  engage fully with  currency decision-making
processes.  
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No existing  methodology seemed appropriate  for  this  study,  given  the  interconnected
process-based typology needed.  Charmaz´s (2006) emphasis on understanding processes
in their social context  highlights the complexity of combining currency governance and
function within the context of money as socially constructed under competing influences.
Heinrich  (2004),  while  in  accord  with  both  Charmaz  and  Dow (2003)  in  noting the
importance of flexible conceptualisation in measuring influences contextually yet within a
comparative  framework,  encounters  similar  obstacles  to  this  thesis,  including  lack  of
empirical data.  
4.6 Conclusion
This  methodology evaluates  the  SMG  level  of  a  currency as  determined  through  its
treatment by external governance factors, internal decision-making processes and scale,
although the scope of this thesis limits examination of external factors to national RFs.
Transparency, accountability and stakeholder  participation in decision-making form the
background of internal monetary governance, which applies these governance principles to
three currency-specific processes.  Seigniorage revenue distribution and currency issuance
decision-making are the first two.  The third process, currency backing decision-making,
links  closely with scale,  which  is  operationalised through  the  functions  of  money and
geographical circulatory range.  As previously discussed, general purpose money performs
the UoA, MoE and SoV functions, while SPCs do not fulfil all of those functions.  Though
SPCs can allow greater shared decision-making due to their smaller institutional scales,
this may not hold true in all cases.  There were varying degrees of SMG found among both
general and special purpose currencies.  This classification allows for these differences
when evaluating SMG.  These elements  are all  examined empirically in  the  following
chapters.
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Chapter 5 - Data  
The  measurement  of  SMG begins  by presenting  a  comparison of  national  Regulatory
Framework  (RF)  tolerance  toward  various  currencies  in  the  USA.   Raw data  is  first
presented  for  external  governance,  operationalised  here  as  US  national  RFs,  then  for
internal  governance,  and  lastly  for  scale.   The  conclusions  for  each  currency  are
summarised together at the end of this chapter.
5.1 Tolerance by US National Regulatory Frameworks 
Solomon  (1996)  summarises legal  concerns  around  taxability,  financial  securities  and
counterfeiting of national currency, finding that US law exempts non-profit institutions,
time limited note issues, and limited circulation notes from most reporting requirements.
Hence each of these concerns is used in evaluating US national RF tolerance toward any
given currency institution.  While all paper currencies are required to differ visually from
the US Dollar,  and may not be  allowed at  all  in  the states  of  Virginia  and Arkansas,
Solomon´s circulation range and securities  criteria must  be applied separately for each
currency, albeit with some potential amount of uncertainty.  
5.1.1 US National RF Tolerance for the US Dollar
RFs surrounding the US Dollar are voluminous and complex, demonstrating the tensions
Chinn  (2005)  notes  in  the  world’s  largest  economy’s domestic  currency and  de  facto
world-wide  reserve currency.  Responses  to  questions  about  the US  Dollar  tend to  be
unambiguous.  Raw data on US Dollar tolerance by US RFs is examined followed by the
processed data and finally the analysis of how that regulatory treatment may affect SMG
potential for the US Dollar.  Table 5.1 below shows that the US Dollar is fully supported
by all  RFs  in  the  USA,  with  legal  tender  status,  Federal  Reserve  oversight  and  tax
reporting and payment requirements.  US coinage is treated as part of the US Dollar since
it  falls under the same regulations  as the US Dollar equivalent Federal Reserve notes.
Given that legal tender status is in itself  an incentive to use national currency, the US
Dollar is Fully Tolerated.
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Tolerated Currency is legal tender
"1.0  fully
IN" y
IN Is the currency accepted for tax payment? 95% y
 Encouraged to be accepted or available credits/tax breaks, incentives awarded 90%
 Is the currency Overseen by a central bank 80% y
 Currency governance structural forms, procedures or office hours mandated? 70%
 
Are earnings in the currency reportable to benefit, tax or other agencies (by
requirement)? 60% y
 Is the look and feel of notes regulated or prohibited? 50% y
Is circulation of the currency restricted? 45%
Must backing, exchangeability, convertibility or value be pegged to national
money? 40%
 
Are benefits recipients (dole/welfare, disability, etc.) penalised for using this
currency? 30%
 
Are  the  processes  which  apply  to  this  currency  inconsistent  in  law  or
application? 20%
 Is this currency overseen as a financial security? 10%











Processing  national  Regulatory  Framework  data  for  the  US  Dollar  was  the  most
straightforward of any of the currencies studied.  As a currency with legal tender status, the
US Dollar automatically falls Fully IN to the set of Tolerated currencies by US monetary
RFs.  Questions encountered while tallying and processing data for the US Dollar involved
deciding what to do with remaining data points after the automatic IN questions scored Yes
responses.  For completeness those responses were kept along with the top two ‘automatic
IN’  triggering responses  in  order  to  compare  with  other  currencies  if  necessary.   As
expected of a national currency, the tolerance criteria showed Yes responses for the full
spectrum of More Tolerated percentages, yielding no surprises in the data processing of the
US Dollar.
The preference enjoyed by the US Dollar from the surrounding US regulatory environment
may actually limit the Dollar’s potential for shared decision-making.  While seigniorage
revenues  are  shared  with  the  US  Treasury Department  by  the  Federal  Reserve,  thus
becoming part  of the US national budget,  most  stakeholders  have no direct  input  into
seigniorage  decisions.   Likewise  the  position  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  FOMC  as
independent issuer of the US Dollar closes input to most stakeholders.  Such rigidly closed
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governance  appears  unlikely  to  allow  for  more  general  participation  in  monetary
governance.  Thus while the US Dollar enjoys the full support of national RFs, that support
may not create an environment in which shared US Dollar decision-making can grow.   In
conclusion, RFs in the USA are intended to facilitate the functioning of the US Dollar, and
so while it is unambiguously Fully Tolerated this may not hold true for other currencies
issued by private or community-based organisations.  
5.1.2  US  National  RF  Tolerance  for  Community-Based  Currencies:
Humboldt Exchange and Time Dollars
Warner  (2007)  and  Gatch  (2006)  assert  that  there  has  always been a  wide  variety of
currencies in the United States.  Currencies designed to be used in hand to hand exchanges
and time based currencies designed to allow users to store value are most prevalent now.
UoA emphasising currencies such as Local Exchange Trade Systems (LETS) are excluded
for reasons of scope and unclear regulatory status.  The currencies chosen to represent the
key functions  of MoE and SoV are Humboldt  Exchange Dollars  and the Time Dollar
respectively.  Tolerance by US federal and state level regulatory agencies toward both of
these  currency institutions  are  compared  later  to  understand  effects  on  their  potential
degrees of SMG.
5.1.2.1 US National RF Tolerance for Humboldt Exchange Dollars 
Humboldt Exchange Dollars are community-based, modelled on  Glover’s (1997) Ithaca
Hours,  sponsored  by  the  non-profit  Humboldt  Community  Exchange,  of  Humboldt
County, California.   Notes printed and decorated by local artists  start at  $5 Humboldt,
exchangeable for $5 USD and are issued in three ways, all based on backing of the US
Dollar.   Individuals  may buy advertising  space,  paid  in  US Dollars,  in  the  Exchange
newsletter, earn Humboldt Exchange Dollars from others, or exchange US Dollars directly
for Humboldt Exchange Dollars.  Although decisions are made by Humboldt Exchange
members as a community, national RFs may approach this currency from its non-profit
community-based status, or merely as an issuer of currency.  
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Tolerated Currency is legal tender
"1.0  fully
IN"
IN Is the currency accepted for tax payment? 95%
 
Encouraged  to  be  accepted  or  available  credits/tax  breaks,  incentives
awarded 90%
some
 Is the currency Overseen by a central bank 80%
  




Are earnings in the currency reportable to benefit, tax or other agencies (by
requirement)? 60%
y
 Is the look and feel of notes regulated or prohibited? 50% y
Is circulation of the currency restricted? 45% some








Are the  processes which  apply  to  this  currency inconsistent  in  law or
application? 20%
 Is this currency overseen as a financial security? 10%





Federal  oversight  of  currency  institutions  like  the  Humboldt  Exchange  is  somewhat
inconsistent,  due  to  questions  about  circulation  and  exchangeability  of  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars, which are neither legal tender nor accepted for tax payment in any US
jurisdiction.   Although  there  is  no  Federal  Reserve  oversight,  earnings  in  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars remain reportable for federal and local taxes.  Nonetheless, the fact that
they are exempted from Federal securities reporting and oversight requirements as well as
from most  state  oversight  implies  an  increased level  of  toleration  as  Table 5.2  above
shows, the 90% criterion scoring “some” in acknowledgement of this regulatory toleration.
Based  on  Solomon’s  (1996)  findings,  Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  are  exempt  from
Federal  securities  reporting requirements  since they are non-profit  sponsored and most
transactions are intra-state.  Earnings of all  reportable transactions must be paid in US
Dollars, which is touched upon further in the internal governance data.  
Data  ambiguities  arise  in  three  areas  regarding  national  regulation.   First,  Federal
exemptions from reporting requirements may not provide positive incentives to use the
currency.  Second, uncertain requirements for proving non-profit status and the attendant
procedures,  office  and  paperwork  requirements  can  create  disincentives  to  use  the
currency.  For this reason, a score of “some” is also given in the 70% IN criterion.  Third,
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taxing earnings from Humboldt Exchange Dollar transactions may penalise the poor, since
taxes are payable in  US Dollars,  resulting in a  score of “some” for the  30% tolerated
criterion.  Thus the limited circulation and community orientation of Humboldt Exchange
Dollars seems to be a legal grey area allowing them to be legally tolerated, but not fully
encouraged by US RFs.
Of the four clearly applicable criteria, all but one fell below the 50% threshold, while the
fourth Yes is at 60%, implying Less Toleration.  On the other hand, there are important
exceptions for  Humboldt  Exchange Dollars allowing regulatory authorities to treat  this
currency with greater leniency.  Two of those allowable exceptions fall reasonably well
above the Tolerated threshold, at 90% and 70%.  Taking the community and non-profit
nature  of  this  currency institution  with  the  regulatory ambivalence  toward  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars,  it  seems reasonable to  assign a value of slightly More Tolerated to
Humboldt Exchange Dollars, at 65% Tolerated.
Analysis of the previously discussed data gives the first indications of how toleration by
national RFs may affect the Shared governance potential of Humboldt Exchange Dollars
and other community sponsored currencies.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars appears to strike
a  favourable  balance between external  regulation and institutional  independence.   The
Humboldt  Exchange’s non-profit status allows the  benefit  of community oriented legal
exemption  from  reporting.  But  it  also  encumbers  the  institution  with  paperwork  and
structural  requirements  that  are  more  demanding  than  other  possible  institutional
structures.   Indeed,  the  requirements  of  non-profit  status  impact  seigniorage  revenue
decision-making, while limiting circulation likewise removes reporting requirements for
financial securities, but adds the difficulty of reporting local currency earnings taxable in
national  currency,  impacting  issuance  decision-making.   Furthermore  the  US  Dollar
exchangeability requirement which the Humboldt Exchange governing committee works to
meet heavily impacts Humboldt Exchange Dollar backing.  
A delicate  balance  of  retaining the  tolerance of  US Federal and California  regulatory
bodies while upholding Humboldt community values is achieved by using the Humboldt
Exchange institutional  framework to address regulatory requirements, yet the reasonably
tolerant national RF stance toward a carefully designed community-based currency such as
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Humboldt Exchange Dollars can be both an asset and a liability for important aspects of
SMG.  Nevertheless, this RF toleration may allow a greater degree of SMG for Humboldt
Exchange Dollars than for the US Dollar.  The next currency to be surveyed will be a
primarily SoV community-based currency.  
  
5.1.2.2 US National RF Tolerance for Time Dollars
Time Dollars,  initiated  through Cahn’s  (2006)  Time Dollar Institute,  are a  time based
currency administered through any community Time Bank.  Currency users volunteer their
time as deposits into the´ bank´ and may withdraw hours of time from other members who
donate services.  Initially each person deposited one or more hours as a unit of currency
and could  withdraw similarly.   As  Time Banks evolved,  concerns over  differences  in
desirable skills and hour for hour qualitative differences began to result in changes at some
Time Banks to accommodate greater skill levels.  The overall ethos of community spirit
and  egalitarian  exchange  of  time  appears  to  remain  the  overriding  principle  of  Time
Dollars and the basis of the currency. 
The  non-profit  status  of  the  Time  Dollar  Institute  and  Time  Banks  in  general  create
incentives to use this currency via relaxed Federal reporting requirements.  On the other
hand, non-profit status also brings structural and procedural requirements, despite the lack
of circulating transaction media.  By  encouraging community volunteering, and allowing
storage of donated time rather than circulating currency, Time Dollars are exempted from
most reporting and oversight requirements as Coulter (1996) confirms, ruling Time Dollar
earnings in the USA non-reportable for tax purposes.  Thus the community orientation and
lack of circulation make Time Dollars the most lightly regulated non-national currency in
the USA.
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Tolerated Currency is legal tender
"1.0  fully
IN"
IN Is the currency accepted for tax payment? 95%
 
Encouraged  to  be  accepted  or  available  credits/tax  breaks,
incentives awarded 90%
 Is the currency Overseen by a central bank 80%
 




Are earnings in the currency reportable to benefit, tax or other
agencies (by requirement)? 60%
 Is the look and feel of notes regulated or prohibited? 50% n/a
Is circulation of the currency restricted? 45% n/a
Must  backing,  exchangeability,  convertibility  or  value  be
pegged to national money? 40%
n/a
 
Are benefits recipients (dole/welfare, disability, etc.)  penalised
for using this currency? 30%
 
Are the processes which apply to this currency inconsistent in
law or application? 20%
 Is this currency overseen as a financial security? 10%






Table 5.3 shows national RF data for Time Dollars.  Processing RF tolerance data for Time
Dollars revealed the most surprising of the currency results processed in this study.  While
none of the responses produced clear Yes criteria for  any of the regulatory categories,
several were in fact not applicable.  All of these categories, which fall in the midrange of
the Tolerated percentage spectrum, presented difficulties with the data.  None were clearly
answerable as Yes or as No, but fell somewhere into a category that simply did not exist.
The  only  case  which  presented  compelling  evidence  in  favour  of  an  unofficial  Yes
response was that of incentive based encouragement.  Communities and local authorities
informally give a good deal of encouragement to Time Banks in the US.  On this basis the
assessment of More Tolerated is assigned to Time Dollars, at of 80% Tolerated.
Benign neglect by most US RFs may allow Time Dollars a greater potential for SMG.  The
lack of a circulating transaction medium allows the currency to be distributed in ways that
may not be allowed to other currencies.  For example, there are technically no seigniorage
revenues  with  Time  Dollars,  but  hours  donated  or  charged  as  fees  for  Time  Bank
membership can still be viewed as a form of seigniorage revenue, and be redistributed in
any  way  agreed  upon  by  Time  Bank  members.   Hence,  seigniorage  decisions  are
potentially more fully shared with a time-based currency, as are issuance decisions for
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Time Dollars, unrestricted by circulation concerns.  Choice of backing is fully open in the
case of Time Dollars since the time based valuation and lack of market style transactions
eliminates the need to peg Time Dollars to the US Dollar.  However, the two main factors
granting relative regulatory advantage to Time Dollars also potentially limit its degree of
SMG.  Despite the advantage that Time Dollars derives from simplicity, its simplicity and
non-profit status can place limits on the flexibility and thus the viability of the currency.
The ultimate effect of regulation on Time Dollars depends on how the internal governance
is affected by those external (national) RFs, and whether the scale of the currency affects
those internal decision-making processes.  The design simplicity and basis in community
volunteering may leave little to regulate, yet the very qualities which favour Time Dollars
could also conspire to limit currency stakeholder input concerning the functional uses and
circulatory range of the currency.
This section has explored two major community-based currencies, Humboldt  Exchange
Dollars which emphasise the MoE function of money, and Time Dollars, which emphasise
the  SoV  function.   Community-based  currencies  take  various  forms.   MoE  based
currencies like Humboldt Exchange Dollars can be more flexible from a transaction point
of view than SoV emphasising currencies like Time Dollars, however that very flexibility
may to lead to greater regulatory pressure on such currencies.  While community-based
currency institutions differ in decision-making processes from privately issued currencies,
Deli Dollar data can shed light on whether these distinctions are recognised by RFs in the
USA.
5.1.3 US National RF Tolerance for Privately Issued Loyalty Currency:
Deli Dollars
There  is  a  popular  perception  that  RFs  in  the  USA  are  biased  toward  the  business
community.   If this  is  true then it  would be expected that RFs would favour business
sponsored loyalty currencies.  Deli Dollars was a community supported loyalty currency
which began as a series of forward-purchase deli product notes issued by a local business
owner  when financing was unavailable to move premises.   The deli  was popular with
community members, who supported the effort and began to purchase and exchange the
notes  in  transactions  among  themselves.   Thus,  this  loyalty currency also  became  a
circulating community supported currency.  
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Deli Dollars, whether treated as a loyalty currency or as a financial security, were less
ambiguous than other non-national currencies.  They were not legal tender, nor were they
usable for payment of taxes, yet Solomon (1996) points out that they were not completely
exempt  from  Federal  securities  reporting  requirements,  hence  they  were  neither
encouraged nor  incentivised.  While not overseen by the Federal  Reserve, Deli Dollars
were  reportable,  in  their  US  Dollar  equivalent,  for  tax  liability.   The  circulation  and
appearance of Deli Dollar notes remained restricted and benefits recipients would have had
to pay taxes  on any Deli  Dollar  earnings in US Dollars.   Although Deli  Dollars were
partially exempt from securities reporting requirements due to the time limited issue, any
loyalty notes issued without expiration dates would not be exempt.  There is also some
inconsistency regarding the exemption period, due to differing state regulations.  While
most  states  exempt  time expired notes  of less  than nine months,  two states  Ohio and
Oregon, do not.  Hence Deli Dollars, as a business sponsored currency, were marginally
tolerated by US regulations, but other loyalty currencies might not fair as well, should they
be taken up by local communities as the Deli Dollar was.









IN Is the currency accepted for tax payment? 95%
 
Encouraged to be accepted or  available credits/tax breaks,  incentives
awarded 90%
 Is the currency Overseen by a central bank 80%
 
Currency  governance  structural  forms,  procedures  or  office  hours
mandated? 70%
 
Are earnings in the currency reportable to benefit, tax or other agencies
(by requirement)? 60% y
 Are the look and feel of notes regulated or prohibited? 50% y
Is circulation of the currency restricted? 45% y
Must  backing,  exchangeability, convertibility or  value be  pegged to
national money? 40% y
 
Are benefits recipients (dole/welfare, disability, etc.) penalised for using
this currency? 30% y
 
Are the processes which apply to this currency inconsistent in law or
application? 20% initially
 Is this currency overseen as a financial security? 10% y





Deli Dollar treatment by national RFs, shown in Table 5.4, came out fairly clearly in terms
of classifying Yes responses.  While there were two potential  areas of uncertainty, the
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majority of categories were clear for this currency.  Some regulatory inconsistencies exist
from state to state due to the status of the Deli Dollar as a time limited note issuance.  Deli
Dollars  earnings  being  tax  reportable  indicates  a  measure  of  toleration  by  national
authorities, rather than simply banning it, as other privately issued currencies have been
recently, Liberty Dollars being a prominent example.  However, beyond this bare crossing
of the More Tolerated threshold at 60%, all of the remaining Yes responses, including all
of  the  remaining Less  Tolerated  categories  with  one exception,  are  placed at  the Less
Tolerated end of the spectrum.  The one exception is due to the status as time limited
notes,  which  provided  some  relief  from  Federal  and  most  state  securities  oversight
requirements.  Solomon notes a degree of ambiguity surrounding Deli Dollars status as a
security.  That ambiguity combined with convertibility questions for the Deli Dollar loyalty
currency appears to have made it tolerated by US RFs, but not encouraged, meriting an
assessment of 50% Toleration.  
In contrast to previously surveyed currencies, more regulatory tolerance for the Deli Dollar
might have enhanced its shared governance potential.  Most of the regulatory criteria to
which  Deli  Dollars  conformed are  applicable  because  it  is  a  loyalty currency, despite
having had a staunch community following.  Deli Dollars are noted by Witt (1998) as one
of the first post 1930’s community supported currencies.  Nevertheless, the for-profit basis
of issuance for this currency made it distinct legally and treated differently from not-for-
profit  community supported currencies.   Despite its  community orientation,  RFs in the
USA appeared to show a lower tolerance for the Deli Dollar than for community-based
currencies, implying that institutional sponsorship really does matter.  A summary of RF
treatment by currency follows. 
5.1.4 US National Regulatory Frameworks Data Summary
This section has explored some aspects of US national monetary regulation in the context
of  multiple  currencies.   It  has  looked  at  the  national  currency,  two  major  types  of
community-based  currency,  and  a  loyalty  currency as  they  fall  under  US  regulatory
scrutiny and reporting requirements.  
The  US  Dollar  and  the  regulations  surrounding  it  are  well  known  if  complex,  and
processing the data was straightforward, as was the resulting Full regulatory toleration for
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the US Dollar.  However that toleration also implies a rigidity which may not allow much
sharing of monetary governance.  
Interpreting data for Humboldt Exchange Dollars presented challenges for processing yet
showed a regulatory flexibility which may allow potentially higher degrees of SMG.  
The limited nature of Time Dollars by contrast may limit its overall level of SMG despite
passing unnoticed by most US RFs.  Nevertheless, Time Dollars turn out to be quite highly
tolerated by national RFs.
Deli Dollars were found to be only marginally tolerated by RFs, potentially pushing them
toward greater SMG in the long run.  Detailed comparisons of regulatory treatment toward
each  currency are  undertaken  next,  followed  by examinations  of  regulatory toleration
toward various currencies in the light of other influences.
Figure  5.1:  Comparison  of  Tolerance  Percentage by  US  National  Regulatory

































It  is  now possible  to  make  comparisons  regarding regulatory tolerance  shown toward
different  currencies.   Clearly, RFs  will  be  more  tolerant  toward  some currencies than
toward  others  based  on  national  RF  priorities.   Despite  commonly-known anecdotes
alleging  that  US  RFs  prioritise  businesses  and  discourage  community-based  currency
institutions, the data points to favourable treatment for community-based currencies, and
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ambivalence toward business-sponsored loyalty currencies.  Indeed, Figure 5.1 shows the
US Dollar as the sole Fully Tolerated currency, yet both community-based currencies are
more  tolerated,  while  business  issued Deli  Dollars  were the  least tolerated of  all  the
currencies studied.  While  the limited circulation of  a local  loyalty currency may ease
reporting  requirements,  business  sponsorship  seems  to  make  loyalty  currencies  less
favoured than community-based currencies, due to their explicitly non-profit sponsorship.
In conclusion, US national regulatory oversight and reporting requirements were compared
for  each  currency,  with  loyalty  currencies  faring  less  well  than  community-based
currencies.   The  next  section  adds  further  context  to  the  regulatory  perspective  by
exploring how internal currency institutional  decision-making affects potential levels of
SMG as internal institutional  policies interact  with the external impositions of national
RFs.
5.2 Internal Monetary Governance Data 
In the previous section, effects of national RFs on currency institutional governance were
explored based on prior  conceptualisations of governance which emphasise the need for
fair  and  predictable  legal  frameworks.   Transparent,  accountable  and  participatory
decision-making processes at various scales within a currency institutional framework are
examined through seigniorage distribution, issuance and backing across currencies.  While
national currencies may have limited stakeholder input,  since they must maintain value
against  other  world  currencies,  community-sponsored  currencies  may  have  a  greater
freedom of  scope  for  shared  decision-making,  given their  community-based priorities.
Loyalty currencies however, appear more likely to limit shared decision-making given the
business requirement for profitability.  These concerns are explored using data collected
for each currency.  The scoring details for PID are explained below.
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Shared Seigniorage   
Seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends or profit 1  1
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury 2
Seigniorage revenues shared between currency holders 3  
Seigniorage revenues donated to non-local charity 4  
Seigniorage revenues invested in local community 5  
Shared Seigniorage tally: S. total 1
Shared Issuance Decision-making   
Issued by Private Firm or Individual without public consultation 1 1 
Issued by National, supranational or international Governmental Authority 2
Issued by publicly chosen or elected Local Authority 3  
Issued via elected management committee of Community, Civil Society Group or
local business 4  
Issued via open walk-in vote of community or Civil Society Group 5  
Shared Issuance tally: I. total 1
Shared Choice of Backing   
Fiat currency with no user decision-making participation or representation 1
Fiat currency with limited user decision-making participation 2  
Backed  by  commodit(ies)y,  no  user  decision-making  participation  or
representation 3  3
Backed by cash or commodities, limited user decision-making participation 4  
Backed by both commodity and cash redemption choice with full user decision-
making participation 5  
Shared Choice of Backing tally: B. total 3
Coercively Issued: Automatic OUT and score of “-1” Fully  OUT -1
The currency's long-term  strategy is user consensus based with open membership
direct participation Fully IN  
Total PID score 45 5
Percentage 'IN' the set of PID Currencies: 100%  IN
5.2.1 PID Data Scoring
Participatory Internal Decision-making data has three sections: seigniorage, issuance, and
choice  of  backing,  which  were  each  scored  from l  to  5  based  on  shared  stakeholder
decision-making.  Adding the possible scores together within each section gives a possible
score of 5 if only one choice is picked within the section, as will be the case for most
currencies.  However, some currency institutions do use multiple approaches, for example
to sharing seigniorage, and so it  is  possible to  have a  maximum score of 15 for each
section,  yielding a  total  of  45  rather  than  the  total  governance  score  of  15  as  first
anticipated.   To  account  for  the  possibility of  multiple  practices,  multiple  checks  are
allowed within each section, with the caveat that the average expected score will be closer
to 15 and that scores above 15 are more likely to be outliers.  Hence scores between 12 and
45 will be 1.0, or fully IN the set of Participatory Internal Decision-making Currencies,
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those with scores from 1 to 6 are 0.0 or fully OUT of the set, while scores ranging from 7
to 11 are in-between.  Scores from 7 to 11 will be 10% for a score of 7, 30% for 8, 50% for
9, 70% for 10, and a score of 11 indicates 90% of the way IN to the PID set11.  This
comparison  uses  15  criteria  previously  described  in  section  4.2.2  of  the  methodology
chapter  to  process  the  raw  data  and  analyse  its  implications.   IRS  exchangeability
requirements  and  exemptions  from intra-state  reporting regulations  are  left  out  of  the
analysis since they apply to every currency.  While the sample Company Store Scrip shown
in Table 5.5 above would normally score 5, making it completely out of the PID set, the
fact that it is also very small in scale would ordinarily make the currency more susceptible
to  influence  from  its  users.   However,  because  Railway  workers,  the  main  users  of
Company Store currencies were coerced into accepting it,  an overall PID score of -1 is
issued for this particular currency, as discussed in section 4.2.2.
5.2.2 Internal Governance of the US Dollar
The US Dollar has a complex internal decision-making structure, with both the Treasury
Department and the Federal Reserve (“The Fed”) holding key stakes in operations related
to  the  running  of  the  national  currency.   Cukierman  (1992)  points  to  functional
implications  of  central  bank  independence,  but  such  independence  can  lock  currency
stakeholders out  of decision-making process, as illustrated by the FOMC´s closed door
meeting policy mentioned earlier.  US Dollar issuance involves multiple agencies, being
overseen and issued by the Fed, which is technically a semi-private organisation, although
run by Presidential  appointees  who are confirmed by Congress.   While  publication  of
FOMC meeting minutes conforms to Fed transparency requirements, the Fed is  neither
publicly  accountable  nor  accessible  to  most  users  of  the  US  Dollar,  a  fact  which  is
reflected in US Dollar PID data below.  
11A summary depiction of these percentages is repeated in Appendix 2, bottom of the Table.
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Shared Seigniorage   
Seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends or profit 1  
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury 2 2
Seigniorage revenues shared between currency holders 3  
Seigniorage revenues donated to non-local charity 4  




Shared Issuance Decision-making   
Issued by Private Firm or Individual without public consultation 1  
Issued by National, supranational or international Governmental Authority 2 2
Issued by publicly chosen or elected Local Authority 3  
Issued via elected management committee of Community, Civil Society Group or local
business 4  
Issued via open walk-in vote of community or Civil Society Group 5  
Shared Issuance tally: I. total 2
Shared Choice of Backing   
Fiat currency with no user decision-making participation or representation 1 1
Fiat currency with limited user decision-making participation 2  
Backed by commodit(ies)y, no user decision-making participation or representation 3  
Backed by cash or commodities, limited user decision-making participation 4  
Backed by both commodity and cash redemption choice with full user decision-making
participation 5  
Shared Choice of Backing tally:
B.
total 1




Total PID score 45 5








Table 5.6 shows seigniorage revenues split between the Fed and Treasury, giving the US
Dollar  a  score  of  2  for  seigniorage  decision-making,  while  closed  FOMC  issuance
decisions also yield a score of 2 for shared issuance decision-making.  President Nixon’s
1971 decision to make the US Dollar a fiat currency lacked consultation with users of the
US Dollar, thus scoring 1 for shared choice of backing.  Lack of stakeholder participation
in US Dollar internal decisions therefore puts it entirely OUT of the PID set with a very
low PID score of 5.   The only difficulty encountered while  processing data was some
uncertainty over how much weight to assign the fact that the Dollar’s backing was decided
by a nationally elected representative.  Scoring Shared Choice of Backing as 2 rather than 1
would make no difference to the outcome, since a score of 6 is also fully OUT of the set of
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PID Currencies.  Nevertheless, in processing the data all decisions were made to conform
to the reality of representation as much as possible, and for the US Dollar, user decision-
making is  far  from effective  in  spite  of  nominal  representative  input.   Thus,  internal
governance of the US Dollar by The Fed and US Treasury Department appear to leave
little potential for SMG.
US Dollar PID data analysis has several implications.  First, the processing and analysis of
internal governance data bears out initial indications pointing to a low shared governance
potential for the US Dollar.  Secondly, the doctrine of independent central banking tends to
isolate a national currency from participation in internal decision-making by domestic and
also  international  users.   While  currency users  can  make  their  wishes  known through
external economic pressure in various ways such as consumer activism, participation in
decision-making processes offer the fullest means of sharing institutional power.  A third
important factor in setting internal policy is that the Fed is not a fully public institution,
limiting the level of public participation in issuance decisions.   Finally the world-wide
circulation  of the  US Dollar  adds even greater complexity to  internal  decision-making
processes.  These internal governance factors limit PID for the US Dollar.  Nevertheless,
non-national  currencies  may  also  be  restricted  in  their  potential  for  governance
participation by the ways in which their own internal governance is structured.  
5.2.3 Internal Governance of Community-Based Currencies:  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars and Time Banks
To introduce the data for internal governance of community-based currency institutions, it
is  useful  to  recall  the  nature  of  a  community-based  sponsoring  institution.   Both
institutions  reviewed  here  are  local  non-profit  grassroots  sponsored  community
organisations.   Thus,  their  priorities  are  at  least  nominally  set  by  the  community.
Community members should be able to share power within these structures, but practical
issues such as external legalities or functional limitations also influence these processes.
Humboldt Exchange Dollars are primarily a MoE while Time Dollars are primarily a SoV.
These different functional emphases influence internal currency institutional processes and
are explored through the data for each currency. 
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5.2.3.1 Internal Governance of Humboldt Exchange Dollars 
The Humboldt Exchange shares seigniorage revenues with local charities and community
enterprises,  which  invest  in  the  local  community,  and make decisions  through topical
committee meetings which are fully open to the local community (Tracey, 2008). Although
currency backing by US Dollars may enlarge purchasing options in the community, US
Dollar backing also links Humboldt Exchange Dollars partially to US Dollar governance.




Shared Seigniorage   
Seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends or profit 1  
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury 2  
Seigniorage revenues shared between currency holders 3  
Seigniorage revenues donated to non-local charity 4  
Seigniorage revenues invested in local community 5 5
Shared Seigniorage tally: S. total 5
Shared Issuance Decision-making   
Issued by Private Firm or Individual without public consultation 1  
Issued by National, supranational or international Governmental Authority 2  
Issued by publicly chosen or elected Local Authority 3  
Issued via  elected management  committee  of  Community,  Civil  Society Group or  local
business 4  
Issued via open walk-in vote of community or Civil Society Group 5 5
Shared Issuance tally: I. total 5
Shared Choice of Backing   
Fiat currency with no user decision-making participation or representation 1  
Fiat currency with limited user decision-making participation 2  
Backed by commodit(ies)y, no user decision-making participation or representation 3  
Backed by cash or commodities, limited user decision-making participation 4 4
Backed  by both commodity and  cash  redemption  choice with  full user  decision-making
participation 5  
Shared Choice of Backing tally: B. total 4




Total PID score 45 14
Percentage 'IN' the set of PID Currencies: 100% 100%




Table 5.7 shows Humboldt Exchange Dollars scoring 5 for shared seigniorage, and 5 for
shared issuance decision-making.  National currency backing curtails choice for Humboldt
Exchange Dollar users, resulting in Shared Choice of Backing scoring of 4.  This difficulty
arises with all  community-based currencies whose backing is  based in some part  on a
national or private currency.  Nevertheless, this currency’s highly participatory governance
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structure  and  long  term  strategy of  full  user  participation  in  decision-making  argues
strongly in favour of Humboldt Exchange Dollars being scored as Fully IN for the PID set.
The overall result indeed led to a total score of 14, which is fully IN the set, although there
were some ambiguities.  Classification problems involved distinguishing between potential
revenues donated to charities which served non-local clients, and revenues invested solely
in the local community, since there are currently no actual seigniorage revenues.  
Humboldt  Exchange  Dollar  data  points  to  open  yet  well-organised  decision-making
processes in both the Humboldt Exchange and its parent community institution, DUHC.
Funding  shortfalls  are  made  up  by  the  parent  community  institution,  but  any  future
seigniorage  revenues  will  also  go  back  into  the  community.   Allowing  community
volunteers to shape decisions at the institutional level allows grassroots players a stake in
the currency.  These processes not only assure continued sharing of seigniorage revenues
and currency issuance decisions but also make it possible to consider changing the backing
of Humboldt Exchange Dollars in the future, should stakeholders desire to do so.  The
internal processes of the Humboldt Exchange thus allow Humboldt Exchange Dollars wide
latitude for shared governance.
5.2.3.2 Internal Governance of Time Dollars 
While  Time  Dollars  are  issued  through  individual  Time  Banks,  internal  Time  Bank
priorities are set by each community when it establishes its Time Bank, according to Time
Dollar Institute guidelines.  Time Dollar data seems to indicate a mixture of individual
member currency issuance control and group control of currency related decision-making,
allowing flexibility in the decision-making process.  Despite initially unclear raw PID data,
Time Dollars are fully IN the set of Participatory Internal Decision-making currencies by a
comfortable margin.  Although based entirely on time volunteered in the local community
rather than on market style transactions, Time Dollar data seemed surprisingly at first to
lead to a rather closed internal governance structure, since there is no seigniorage revenue
from printed  notes,  and frequently no  cash  fees  at  all  as  with  the  Chicago  Suburban
(2009a) and Mid Maine Time Banks (2009).  Paradoxically, the resulting null score for
shared seigniorage would distort Time Banks PID scores by artificially lowering them in
comparison to MoE emphasising currency institutions.  This is due to the fact that although
Time Banks generate no extra revenue via seigniorage, which physical scrip issuing MoE
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currencies  do,  Time  Banks  are  explicitly dedicated to  community volunteerism,  while
other currency institutions may or may not be.  However Time Banks do sometimes charge
various types of fees, discussed shortly, to which the same shared seigniorage standards
can be applied.    






Shared Seigniorage   
Seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends or profit 1  
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury 2  
Seigniorage revenues shared between currency holders 3  
Seigniorage revenues donated to non-local charity 4  




Shared Issuance Decision-making   
Issued by Private Firm or Individual without public consultation 1  
Issued by National, supranational or international Governmental Authority 2  
Issued by publicly chosen or elected Local Authority 3  
Issued via elected management committee of Community, Civil Society Group or local business 4 4
Issued via open walk-in vote of community or Civil Society Group 5  
Shared Issuance tally: I. total 4
Shared Choice of Backing   
Fiat currency with no user decision-making participation or representation 1  
Fiat currency with limited user decision-making participation 2  
Backed by commodit(ies)y, no user decision-making participation or representation 3  
Backed by cash or commodities, limited user decision-making participation 4  
Backed  by  both  commodity  and  cash  redemption  choice  with  full  user  decision-making
participation 5 5
Shared Choice of Backing tally:
B.
total 5




Total PID score 45 14
Percentage 'IN' the set of PID Currencies: 100% 100%







Weighing  potential  data  distortion  against  community  oriented  Time  Dollar  Institute
guidance of Time Banks, Table 5.8 shows Shared Seigniorage scoring 5, explained below.
Since  Time  Dollars  are  allotted  on  the  basis  of  service  donated  to  the  Time  Bank,
measured in hours, they reinforce community interaction and local management of Time
Bank concerns, meriting a score of 4 for Shared Issuance of Time Dollars.  Finally the
choice  of  backing  is  limited  only  by  the  availability  of  goods  and  services  in  the
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community, and shared with a time currency since any good or service earned is chosen on
the basis of amount of time given in service, resulting in a Shared Choice of Backing score
of 5.  Given the potential restrictions a time broker could place on full user participation
and decision making, it remains unclear from the raw data whether Time Dollars can be
scored by default as Fully PID.
While  Table  5.8  shows the  Total  PID score  for  the  Time Dollar  of 14,  placing Time
Dollars  fully IN the  set  of  currency institutions  which  facilitate  Participatory Internal
Decision-making,  ambiguities  arose in  two  areas  during  data  processing for  US Time
Banks and the Time Dollar Institute.  First the apparent lack of seigniorage revenues due to
the non-physical nature of this currency had to be resolved, since administration fees are
frequently  charged  in  hours  by  Time  Banks,  creating  a  form of  seigniorage  revenue
generated by the use of the currency on a par with that of printed note revenue for physical
circulating currencies.  This  seigniorage revenue is  redistributed  to  benefit  community
projects supported by the Time Bank, meeting the local community criterion investment,
thus scoring 5 for fully shared seigniorage.  Second, the intrinsic natural limit on issuance,
namely time, limits institutional options on deciding what quantity of currency to issue,
since  each  person  has  the  same  number  of  hours  in  every  week,  though  prioritised
differently.  While hours can be valued differently based on the service being donated, as is
apparently done in some Time Banks in the UK, none of the Time Banks interviewed in
this study chose to follow that example, since they preferred to follow the Time Dollar
ethos of egalitarian hourly service.  Nevertheless, hours can also be donated and shared
among Time Bank members (Rowden, 2009) which creates a greater level of flexibility in
issuing Time Dollars.  Hence, as a grassroots community sponsored currency institution,
the Time Dollar Institute and derivative Time Banks meet the criteria for full PID.
The data analysis holds several implications for the Shared governance of Time Dollars.
Internal  processes can affect  currency functioning by affecting the  circulation of hours
between and within individual Time Banks, thus affecting the exchange of Time Dollars
and their ability to store future value.  Some Time Banks are expanding the ability of Time
Dollars to circulate as a limited  MoE whilst  primarily acting as a SoV, promoting the
sharing of the resulting Time Dollar seigniorage revenues among community members.
While  it  is  the  individual Time Bank member  who effectively issues  this  currency by
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performing services in the community, the policies which govern Time Dollar distribution
also affect issuance decisions.  Those decisions are taken as a group by members, making
currency issuance essentially an activity shared between individuals and the group as a
whole,  resulting  in  a  high  degree  of  shared  currency issuance.   Likewise  since  Time
Dollars backing is mostly in locally donated services, though there are also increasingly
goods available as well in some Time Banks, there is a locally defined range of backing
choices for Time Dollar redemption.  In conclusion, while the highly community-specific
setup of each Time Bank allows variations, Time Dollar Institute core values provides
standardisation among Time Banks from Maine (2009) to Illinois (2009a) to California
(2009b) which exhibit  high potential for SMG and are fully IN the set of Participatory
Internal Decision-making currencies.
The following conclusions can be drawn from community-based currency internal  data
with regard to SMG.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars have a total SMG score of 14, which is
fully IN the set of PID Currencies.  This resulted, with little ambiguity, in a high potential
degree  of  shared  governance,  implying  that  community-based  institutions  have  wide
latitude for power sharing.  Flexible grassroots decision-making led to both Time Dollars
and Humboldt Exchange Dollars being Fully IN the set of PID Currencies.  The conclusion
for community-based currency institutions is therefore similar for currencies emphasising
MoE or SoV: either functional emphasis can allow high levels of shared internal monetary
decision-making.
5.2.4  Internal  Governance of  Privately Issued Loyalty Currency: Deli
Dollars
Deli Dollars demonstrates the influence of business priorities on the shared governance
potential  of a  loyalty currency.  This particular loyalty currency is  special since it  had
community support, being privately issued by a for-profit local business, but evolving into
a community currency.  The community support for the local business which issued the
Deli  Dollar  may be a  key factor in pushing this loyalty currency and others  to  higher
potentials of SMG.  Data scores are based on Deli Dollar business status and options that
Deli Dollar users had in choosing how to redeem the currency. 
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Shared Seigniorage   
Seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends or profit 1 1
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury 2  
Seigniorage revenues shared between currency holders 3  
Seigniorage revenues donated to non-local charity 4  




Shared Issuance Decision-making   
Issued by Private Firm or Individual without public consultation 1  
Issued by National, supranational or international Governmental Authority 2  
Issued by publicly chosen or elected Local Authority 3  
Issued via elected management committee of Community, Civil Society Group or local business 4 4
Issued via open walk-in vote of community or Civil Society Group 5  
Shared Issuance tally: I. total 4
Shared Choice of Backing   
Fiat currency with no user decision-making participation or representation 1  
Fiat currency with limited user decision-making participation 2  
Backed by commodit(ies)y, no user decision-making participation or representation 3 3
Backed by cash or commodities, limited user decision-making participation 4  
Backed  by  both  commodity  and  cash  redemption  choice  with  full  user  decision-making
participation 5  
Shared Choice of Backing tally:
B.
total 3




Total PID score 45 8
Percentage 'IN' the set of PID Currencies:  30%





In contrast to its high profile as a community supported loyalty currency, Table 5.9 shows
Deli  Dollars  to  have  been  less  than  fully  PID.   Seigniorage  revenues  from  forward
purchased Deli Dollars went back into the local business, and so the currency scored 1 for
shared seigniorage.  Despite questions of how much actual issuance decision-making input
the community had, high levels of community support made it reasonable to score 4 for
Deli Dollars in the Shared Issuance category as a local business.  The final category of
shared backing choice is relatively straight forward given the fact that the forward sold
notes promised redemption for products retailed by the business, which puts profits back
into the business and although the business benefits the community, it remains in the hands
of the proprietor and so cannot be considered by default to be Fully IN the set of PID
Currencies.   The  degree  of  shared  governance  displayed  by  a  loyalty currency may
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generally depend  on  the  cooperative  context  of  business  and  community  where  it  is
located.  For this reason, both national  RFs and scale must also be taken into account to
understand the overall shared governance level of each loyalty currency. 
Processing Deli Dollar data juxtaposed institutional  and community goals.  On the one
hand, Deli Dollars were a loyalty currency primarily intended to raise capital for moving
Frank’s Deli.  On the other hand, Schumacher Society support entailed community access,
thereby increasing shared decision-making.  Deli  Dollars  scored a  total  of 1  point  for
Shared Seigniorage, 4 for Shared Issuance decision-making, and 3 for Shared Choice of
Backing.  The PID total score for the Deli Dollar was 8, putting it neither IN the set of PID
Currencies, nor completely OUT of the set.  A score of 8 yields the Participatory Internal
Decision-making level of 30%.  This is probably higher than the average loyalty currency
would  score,  based  on  the  community support  for  Deli  Dollars,  presumably allowing
enhanced customer feedback and mutual support between this popular local business and
the  community.   Community  support  for  Deli  Dollars  probably  increased  its  overall
potential  for  shared  governance  beyond  that  of  other  loyalty  currencies,  but  further
investigation is needed beyond the scope of this thesis.
The  effects  of  Deli  Dollar  internal  governance on  the  outcome  of  its  overall  shared
governance depend on decision-making and scale factors.  The evolution of Deli Dollars as
a loyalty currency seems to have been influenced by the store´s popularity.  This appears to
have encouraged a higher level of shared governance.  Despite its founding by a for profit
local business, the Deli Dollar founder’s involvement of community input in the issuing of
the  currency gave it  a  higher  level  of  shared  issuance  decision-making.   This  use  of
community  participation  can  be  encouraged  by  any  loyalty  currency  where  internal
processes have sufficient flexibility to allow community input.  Choice of backing was,
naturally, more restricted.  Nonetheless, such openness merited a score of 30% PID rather
than  what  would  typically be  a  score  entirely OUT of  the  fully Participatory Internal
Decision-making set for most loyalty currencies.  Thus the Deli Dollar shows that even a
currency  founded  by  a  for-profit  entity  can  potentially  reach  high  levels  of  shared
governance.
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5.2.5 Internal Governance Process Data Section Conclusion 







































To  conclude  this  section  on  Participatory Internal  Decision-making  (PID),  Figure  5.2
briefly revisits results for each currency.  The US Dollar, which Figure 5.2 and Table 5.6
show does not allow any  participatory decision-making to most stake-holders, thus scores
0 for facilitating participatory processes.  This is the lowest score in this study, and is also
completely OUT of the PID set. By contrast, both community-based Humboldt Exchange
Dollars and Time Dollars are fully IN the PID set, while Deli Dollars being neither IN nor
fully OUT of  the  set  scored  30%  PID.   From  highest  to  lowest  in  Figure  5.2,  both
community sponsored currencies score highest, being fully PID, while business-sponsored
loyalty currency Deli Dollars fell in between, and the US national currency falls entirely
out of the PID set.  Table 5.7 shows that Humboldt Exchange Dollar  PID is based on
completely local distribution of seigniorage revenues, fully open issuance decision-making
meetings, but with backing limited by the peg to the US Dollar.  Time Dollars, by contrast
in Table 5.8, though also allowing completely local seigniorage distribution, have a less
open issuance policy by virtue of the very nature of Time based currencies.  Compensating
for that difference however is the fully participatory choice of currency backing facilitated
by  the  redeemability  of  Time  Dollars  for  any  goods  or  services  offered  through
participating Time Banks.  Thus effectively the PID scores for Time Dollars and Humboldt
Exchange Dollars result in a quite similar level of access to internal governance processes
for most  currency users.   These currencies both facilitate  greater levels  of access  than
either the US Dollar or Deli Dollars due to their more open internal structures.  This is
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despite the fact that Deli Dollars, which Table 5.9 shows allowed relatively little internal
process access, were actually a smaller scale currency than either of the two community
sponsored currencies.  Clearly small scale alone therefore does not facilitate participatory
processes, yet community-based institutional sponsorship does.  Later sections explore the
possible relationship between national RFs and internal institutional processes, focusing on
how that relationship affects SMG.  Beforehand, there is an examination of the potential
influence of scale upon the governance, both external and internal, of currency institutions.
5.3 Scale Data 
The limited scope of this project confined it to one country.  The currencies reviewed were
chosen because they represent examples of currencies traded in the USA.  The US Dollar
as legal tender fills all monetary functions in the United States.  It is also used globally as a
UoA, MoE and SoV.   Humboldt Exchange Dollars represents a regional MoE sponsored
by a community-based institution.  Time Dollars, by contrast, are time based and in most
cases can only be exchanged between other members of the same Time Bank.  Although
some Time Banks do now exchange hours with other Time Banks, circulation remains
limited,  keeping  Time  Dollar  emphasis  on  SoV.   Deli  Dollars,  which  evolved  into  a
community MoE, no longer exist but remain the best example of a loyalty program which
became exchangeable between currency users, rather than simple redemption for goods or
services, as traditional loyalty programs are.  The scale data for each of these currencies
will  be processed into a set  of scores as shown in Table 5.10 below, facilitating scale
comparison between currencies.

















The currency is used as a  UoA
1 2 3 4 5 6
The currency is a MoE
2 3 4 5 6 7
The currency is a MoP
3 4 5 6 7 8
The currency is used as a SoV
4 5 6 7 8 9
The currency is convertible to
national and supra-national
money
5 6 7 8 9 10
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Scores are derived from the scale matrix by ticking the converging box for an applicable
monetary function (vertical axis) at the appropriate geographical distance (horizontal axis).
Currency scale scores can range from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 40 where 2 is the
smallest possible scale currency and 40 is the largest possible scale currency.  Note that no
currency circulating below the national level for which only two monetary functions are
applicable can score more than 11, and conversely any convertible currency circulating at
or above the regional level which acts as a UoA, MoE and SoV will score at least 24.
Therefore scores between 2 and 12 will be counted as fully IN the set of Special Purpose
Currencies (SPCs), while scores between 24 and 40 will be counted as fully OUT of the set
of  SPCs.   Visually these fall  inside  the  upper  right  corner triangle formed by the  4´s
diagonal from (1,3) to(3,1), and the lower left corner triangle formed by the 8´s diagonal
from (3,5) to (5,3) respectively12.  It should be pointed out that the sums on the diagonals
are the same because various combinations of currency functions at different distances are
equivalent for all practical purposes, as the reader will recall from section 2.5.2 of Chapter
2.  Currencies with a score between 12 and 24 will be partially in and partially out of both
sets with 18, the midway point, as the 50% score.  Remaining scores had to be set based on
judgement of degrees of scale.  Hence currencies with a score of 13 are .95 or 95% of a
percent SPC while a score of 14 is 90%, 15 is 80%, 16 is 70%, 17 is 60%, 19 is 40%, 20 is
30%, 21 is 20%, 22 is 10% and a score of 23 is 5% SPC.  While the initial  working
hypothesis was that currencies closer to General Purpose Money, or completely OUT of
the SPC set, would be favoured by national RFs, this turned out not to be the case.  Hence,
the area of scale can offer some interesting surprises.  There are certain areas around which
the data may all look quite similar.  The IRS requires all taxable currencies to be pegged to
the US Dollar, making every circulating currency convertible to the US Dollar.  While this
influences scale by skewing MoE currency scores toward the General Purpose end of the
scale spectrum, implying that non-MoE currencies may tend to be SPCs, it remains to be
seen to what extent scale influences SMG. 
12 Clearly, any currency with ALL appropriately ticked boxes appearing completely within only one or the
other of these triangles is automatically either Fully IN or Fully OUT of the SPC set, respectively. 
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5.3.1 Scale Data for National Currencies: The US Dollar
The US Dollar is used across the USA as the domestic currency, shown in Figure 5.3, and
as a global reserve currency, making the US Dollar by default a very large scale currency.
The question of how scale impacts the SMG potential of the Dollar is investigated through
US Dollar decision-making processes as affected by scale.  Chinn (2005) points out that
the US Dollar must cope with the tensions of meeting the needs of US citizens, as the
national currency, and the effects of its functions outside of the USA. 
 
Figure 5.3: US Circulating Currency
Source:  Anon,  nd. United  States  One  Dollar  Bill  [online].  http://www.munic.state.ct.us/BURLINGTON/us_one_dollar_bill/
us_one_dollar_bill.htm [Accessed 13/2/2009].
How a currency institution  placed into  this  position can fare  in  terms of  potential  for
sharing monetary governance decisions can be analysed through the various functions of
money it covers in conjunction with its geographical transaction distance.  The data for the
US Dollar will apply this process, as described in previous sections. 
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The currency is used as a  UoA     y 6
The currency is a MoE     y 7
The currency is a MoP    y  7
The currency is used as a SoV     y 9
The  currency  is  convertible  to
national  and  supra-national
money     y 10
%
SPC:
 Total Score:      39 0
Data Source: Solomon (1996)
Table 5.11 shows US Dollar scale, which is the largest currency surveyed in this thesis.
The US Dollar also presents a bit of an anomaly for a national currency because it serves as
both a national and world-wide UoA.  Hence the US Dollar as a UoA at both national and
supra-national levels scores 6.  As a MoE for domestic and global transactions, US Dollar
scores 7, again in the supra-national column.  The US Dollar is a Means of Payment (MoP)
for taxes and fines in  the USA and in dollarised nations,  but most governments prefer
payment of taxes or fines in their own national currency rather than US Dollars, so it is
rated at 7 in the national column for MoP.  Since it is also used around the world as a
reserve currency, it  is a supra-national Storage of Value and scores 8.  Finally, the US
Dollar, as a currency which is convertible worldwide into other national currencies, it is
placed in the supra-national column with a score of 10.  The multinational and domestic
use of the US Dollar gives it worldwide functional scale in every way except as a MoP, not
counting nations which have unilaterally dollarised since they have no seats on the Fed
governing board.  Thus the US Dollar is fully General Purpose money.
Table 5.11 shows how the US Dollar’s use as a UoA for debt, expense comparisons and
worldwide MoE and SoV gives it supranational scale in all but one category, leading to a
score of 39 which is completely OUT of the SPC set.  While a large scale UoA can provide
a convenient means of counting across wide geographical areas, Keynes (1930) and Gesell
(1906) agreed that MoE and SoV functions conflict, encouraging hoarding and adding to
the pressure on the currency to be all things to all people.  Thus the scale of the US Dollar
may lower its  potential for SMG.  In addition to international pressures on the Dollar,
domestic needs within the USA must be met by a national currency which is spread across
a wider area than most stakeholders can meaningfully hope to influence.  That is not to say
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however that  a small  scale currency institution automatically has a higher potential  for
SMG.  The  next  currencies examined are smaller in  scale,  but  have different  limiting
factors on functionality which may impinge on their ability to facilitate shared decision-
making.  
5.3.2 Scale Data for Community-Based currencies: Humboldt Exchange
and Time Dollars
The  two  most  common community-based currencies  in  the  USA  emphasise the  MoE
function and the SoV function.  Those currencies which emphasise the MoE function are
likely to have larger circulation and to be more exchange or trade oriented.  By comparison
currencies which emphasise the SoV function are likely to be quite small in circulatory
range and to be more stability oriented.  The Humboldt Exchange, by keeping its currency
circulating within the local economy, acts as an incubator for local businesses.  In this way
many  advocates  of  non-national  currencies  also  hope  to  encourage  trust  in  local
communities and self confidence in new start-up businesses.  Time Dollars by contrast are
SoV based, emphasising stable value over time.  Value stability is achieved by using a
scarce  commodity,  in  this  case  time  which  is  one  of  the  most  limited  commodities,
particularly in countries where workers lack leisure time, as the basis for the currency.
Both Humboldt  Exchange Dollars and Time Dollars are community-sponsored and are
expected to fall into the set of SPCs.  Data for Humboldt Exchange Dollars follows.
5.3.2.1 Scale Data for Humboldt Exchange Dollars 
Humboldt Exchange Dollars are a local community oriented currency based in Humboldt
County, California in the town of Eureka, as shown by Figure 5.4 in the design of the
currency notes:
Figure 5.4: Humboldt Exchange Circulating Currency
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Source:  Project,  T.H.E.C.C.,  2008.  Humboldt  Community  Currency  Bills  [online].  http://www.humboldtexchange.org/
currencyBills.htm [Accessed 13/2/2009].
Looking at the range of Humboldt Exchange Dollar usage for each monetary function can
provide insight into how the scale of such a fully community-based currency can affect its
potential for SMG.
  












used as a  UoA  y    3
The currency is
a MoE  y    4
The currency is
a MoP      0
The currency is





money  y    7 % SPC:
Total Score:      19 40.00%
Data Source: Interview Data
Table  5.12  shows  Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  as  a  UoA  in  the  area  of  Eureka,  in
Humboldt County, California and across the local county, scoring 3 in the county-wide
geographical  scale,  and with circulation  across Humboldt  County,  scoring 4 for  MoE.
Humboldt Exchange Dollars are not accepted as an official MoP in any jurisdiction to date,
and  while  not  intended  primarily  for  long-term  value  storage,  their  acceptance  by
community members allow them to hold value as long as trading continues,  hence the
score of 5 at  walking distance rather than the full  circulating range for SoV.  Finally,
Humboldt Exchange Dollars are convertible to the US Dollar, scoring 7 in the county-wide
column.  Thus, in all but the SoV range, Humboldt Exchange Dollars receive scores for a
county scale currency, with a more restricted score for SoV.  This gives an overall scale of
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19  placing  it  between  Fully  General  Purpose  money and  Special  Purpose  Currencies
(SPCs) at about 40% SPC, or 60% General Purpose.
Humboldt Exchange data analysis must take both local and national monetary linkages into
account.  Community institutional control of mid-scale currencies like Humboldt Exchange
Dollars  may  allow  greater  direct  stakeholder  access  to  decision-making  processes.
Nevertheless, Humboldt Exchange Dollars convertibility to national currency widens the
scale of this  community currency, which may reduce stakeholder choice over currency
backing.  While increasing the scale can have advantages, as may the link with general
purpose money, it  is the community institutional guidance which is more likely directs
Humboldt Exchange Dollars toward higher levels of SMG.
5.3.2.2 Scale Data for Time Dollars
As a currency deliberately designed to remain small scale and grassroots, Time Dollars
should be expected to be within the set of SPCs.  While it is not designed to function as a
MoE, there are still features which allow it to be exchanged under limited circumstances.
The practical implementation of time storage determines how widely Time Dollars can be
used in the role of a SoV.  












used as a  UoA y     2
The currency is
a MoE y     3
The currency is
a MoP      0
The currency is





money      0
% SPC:
Total Score:      12 100
Data Source: Interview Data
Table 5.13 shows Time Banks to have a very limited scale due to the time based nature of
the currency.  Time Dollars are counted in hours as a UoA at each Time Bank, hence the
90
score of 2.  Although not the general use of Time Dollars, hours are sometimes traded
between individuals making them a limited MoE, scoring 3.  Time Dollars are not usable
to  pay fines  or  taxes  and are  intended  to  be  used  as  a  SoV in  the  local  community,
sometimes being traded between Time Banks in neighbouring areas, hence the regional
score of 7 for SoV.  
While Time Dollars are not convertible to other currencies, borrowing of ideas between
Time Banks  in  the  USA, the UK and other  countries  has  given them wide  influence.
Although individual  Time Banks may vary, Time Dollars, standardised through  Cahn’s
(2006) Time Dollar Institute core values, present the most clearly small scale, with a fully
SPC score of 12.   The variability of market value against hours of service delivered may
prevent both conversion of Time Dollars into national currency and use as a MoP for taxes,
yet that small range may allow greater stakeholder institutional access at the expense of
some flexibility, while retaining a high potential degree of SMG for Time Dollars.
To  conclude  this  community-based  currency  section,  different  currencies  emphasise
different functions of money, as with Humboldt Exchange and Time Dollars.  There may
be other  SoV emphasising currencies  which could have different  scale tendencies,  but
Time  Dollars  are  thus  far  the  only  widely  adopted  primarily  SoV  community-based
currency.   As  a  growing  community  sponsored  currency  institution,  the  Humboldt
Exchange shows high potential  SMG.  Its  link to general purpose money may allow it
wider circulation than SPCs such as  Time Banks.  Time Banks on the other hand are
individually founded within neighbourhoods, giving stakeholders greater access despite the
limited number of areas where the currency can be spent directly.  Both community-based
currencies reviewed seem to have a  high potential  for SMG.  The next  currency, Deli
Dollars, was community supported despite being business sponsored.  Regardless of Deli
Dollars ability to function in both categories however, its business institutional sponsorship
gave  it  different  priorities  than  community-based institutional  sponsorship,  potentially
affecting both scale and SMG.
5.3.3 Scale Data for Privately Issued Loyalty Currency: Deli Dollars
Deli Dollars, not to be confused with current similarly named loyalty programs by other
businesses, were relatively unique, issued in 1989 with support from the E. F. Schumacher
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Society (1989).   The Schumacher  Society is  described by  Hannum (2006) as  a  Great
Barrington, MA based educational non-profit organisation, thus making the Deli Dollar a
community supported loyalty currency, as Deli Dollar notes showed.  Its circulation within
the local community came from local support for Frank’s Deli, illustrated by the note in
Figure 5.5.  Nonetheless, that business foundation also linked it to larger scale monetary
institutions, bridging the gap between general purpose money and SPCs.
Figure 5.5: Deli Dollar Circulating Currency
Source: Society, E.F.S., 1989. Local Currencies [online]. http://www.smallisbeautiful.org/local_currencies.html [Accessed 13/2/2009].
Raw Deli Dollar scale data presented somewhat unclear results.  The difficulty arises when
deciding whether Deli Dollars or any other loyalty currency, is convertible into a national
currency.  Most loyalty points are redeemable for goods and services, as were Deli Dollars.
But  when  such  programs  become  exchange  currency as  Deli  Dollars  did,  value  may
change, resulting in further scale changes.  











The  currency  is
used as a  UoA  y    3
The  currency  is
a MoE  y    4
The  currency  is
a MoP      0
The  currency  is
used as a SoV      0




money      0 % SPC:
Total Score:      7 100
Data Source: Interview Data
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Table 5.14 shows how Deli Dollars were a UoA in the community, scoring 3 as a city or
county-wide UoA, and 4 as a MoE.  Deli Dollars were not accepted as a Means of Payment
(MoP),  and due to their time limited  offerings were not usable for storing value.  The
origins of Deli Dollars as community supported yet business sponsored raise questions
regarding its scale, on the one hand having had a small circulation area, giving it a rather
low score for Scale in the functions of UoA and MoE, yet on the other hand linked to
general purpose money through business sponsorship.  The small range of circulation and
lack of direct convertibility argue strongly enough for Deli Dollars to have been placed IN
the SPC set  despite  the institutional  link to General Purpose  money.   While the  scale
appears to have been quite small, its business sponsorship had other implications.
Deli Dollars, although an SPC, was linked to general purpose money, and as a  business
sponsored loyalty currency this link may affect potential stakeholder access to decision-
making.  As with community-based currencies, limiting circulation to a small geographical
area allowed greater currency user access to decision-makers.  Yet this access could imply
a tension between full  community participation and the expected demands of business
profitability.  Sharing seigniorage decisions, loyalty issuance decision-making privileges
and currency backing choices may hamper the ability of the business to make a profit,
which is normally a key business goal and may not take precedence over community input
if business survival is at stake.  These sound and reasonable conditions imply that however
community oriented a loyalty currency might be, it remains institutionally limited in its
overall potential for SMG.
While Deli Dollars showed flexibility as a community-based loyalty currency, some data
ambiguity means it  could have been scored just  slightly outside  of the SPC set.   Deli
Dollars were not directly convertible to the national currency, resulting in a smaller scale
which may have kept Deli Dollars more community accessible.  The variance in its scale
may also have lent it greater overall potential for SMG, while at the same time, though
Deli  Dollar’s  small  scale  kept  it  community supported, that  scale may also limited its
usability.  A comparison of all currency scales studied thus far may enhance understanding
of how scale impacts SMG. 
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5.3.4 Scale Comparison Section Conclusion
Currency scales tended to meet  expectations  based on each currency circulation range.
Individually,  the  functions  and  the  shared  governance  potential  for  each  currency is
affected by its scale.  Taken as a whole, the different scales of each currency and the sets
into which they fall may provide a means of understanding how the institutional links
between currencies can affect SMG.





























The scale of each currency, shown in Figure 5.6, can now be compared by institutional
sponsor13.  In broad terms, national currencies tend toward being Fully General Purpose
money, as with the US Dollar, although investigation of other less widely used national
currencies would be needed to confirm this.  Community sponsored currencies also vary in
scale, as MoE  emphasising Humboldt Exchange Dollars fell relatively close to General
Purpose money, at 60% general purpose, or 40% SPC, while Time Dollars (primarily SoV)
turn out to be fully SPC.  Therefore, as Humboldt Exchange Dollars show, community
institutional sponsorship does  not ensure SPC status.  Furthermore, despite Deli Dollars
institutional linkage to general purpose money through its for-profit sponsor, this widely
business sponsored loyalty currency was firmly IN the SPC set.  It is interesting to note
however, that direct convertibility to national currency would have increased Deli Dollars
scale just outside of the SPC set.    
13 Note that the US Dollar, scoring 0% SPC, appears in the left hand column marked “0”,
but does not show as a column itself, due to that 0 percentage. 
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In summary, while smaller scale can indeed facilitate direct participation in institutional
processes,  institutional  sponsorship  also  determines  access.   Small  scale  does  not
guarantee  participatory decision-making,  although small  scale  does  appear  to  facilitate
direct participation in decision-making if internal and external structures permit sharing.
For this reason it is necessary to compare the ways in which national RFs and internal
processes interact with currency scale in order to  understand the implications for these
three factors of SMG.  Nevertheless, scale data shows that scale does influence currency
decision-making.  While scale is an important facilitating factor, other institutional factors
interact  with  scale  to  shape  the  currency’s level  of  SMG.   A  full  analysis  of  these
interactions is now possible, and follows in the upcoming chapter.
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Chapter 6 – Analysis 
Currencies are examined in the light of three sets of data: external (national) regulations,
internal decision-making, and scale. Analysis of how the first two of these institutional
influences interact with one another and how they affect the level of Shared Monetary
Governance (SMG) is the main concern of this section.  A preliminary summary of the
information  collected  for  four  currency institutions  reviewed  in  the  USA begins  each
analytical  section.   However,  at  this  point  it  is  important  to  remind  the  reader  (see
Theoretical  Chapter)  of the differences between Participatory Internal Decision-making
(PID) and SMG before beginning the analysis of each currency.  The key components
making  up  SMG  are  weighted  equally  between  tolerance  by  national  RFs,  direct
participation  in  internal  decision-making  and  small  institutional  scale.   Yet  either  the
weight of external governance, via RF intolerance, or simple impracticability of scale can
prevent a currency institution from being functionally viable.  If one of these circumstances
prevails, then that currency will still not be a practical vehicle for SMG in the ‘real’ world.
Therefore interaction is analysed between external  RFs, internal  processes and scale as
they affect overall levels of SMG.
To facilitate analysis two aids are used: sums and quadrants.  A three part summation is
used to show the overall level of SMG for a currency in comparison with other currencies.
First, Tables 6.2-6.5 will show how adding the RF toleration score and the PID score yields
a combined governance sum with a minimum of -1, and a maximum of 2.  This sum is
compared across currencies to show how national RFs and internal institutional decision-
making interact to influence SMG from a governance perspective.  Second, the analysis of
interaction between internal  institutional  decision-making and currency scale,  shown in
Tables 6.8-6.11, is facilitated by adding the PID and SPC scores yielding a minimum of -1
and  a  maximum  of  2.   Third,  analysing  interaction  between  external  regulations  and
currency scale combines scores for RF tolerance and SPC percentage with a minimum of 0
and a  maximum Regulatory and scale  interaction sum of 2,  as  the  final  set  of  Tables
6.14-6.17.  Note that combining RF tolerance scores with scale scores,  in which small
scale  currencies  score  higher,  takes  into  account  institutional  scale  in  its  ability  to
effectively allow full stakeholder participation.  Thus national RF tolerance, PID and Scale
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are combined using tables giving minimum SMG scores of -1, and a maximum total SMG
scores of 3, as described previously and shown again in Appendix 3. 
The second analytical aid visually maps into which of four quadrants a currency could fall.
Charts plotting each currency use one score as the X coordinate, another score as the Y
coordinate  to  visualise  combined  influences.   Quadrants  for  the  following  section
comparing  RF  with  PID influence  are  illustrated  in  Table  6.1  below.   The  left  hand
quadrants indicate low PID, while the right hand quadrants indicate greater PID.  Upper
quadrants are more tolerated by national RFs while the lower quadrants are effectively
discouraged.  For example Quadrant A (the upper right hand quadrant), “Both PID and
Tolerated” is formed by currencies which range between 50% to Fully tolerated by US RFs
and between 50% and Fully PID currencies.









Quadrant A: Currencies with BOTH considerable PID AND well RF tolerated 
Quadrant B: Currencies with considerable PID but minimal RF toleration 
Quadrant C: Currencies with BOTH low PID AND low RF toleration, 
Quadrant D: Currencies minimal or no PID but well tolerated by RFs 
6.1 National RFs vs. PID and Shared Monetary Governance (SMG)
This section compares combined governance (External and Internal): RF tolerance against
PID trends for all currencies, in relation to overall influence on SMG.  RF and PID scores
are added to  create  a combined governance  sum allowing comparison of  external  and
internal governance influences with scale.  Quadrants are discussed from a governance
perspective with the aid of the Table 6.1 described previously.  Finally, a comparison of
trends  for  all  currencies,  shown  preliminarily  in  Figure  6.1,  brings  together  previous
analysis starting with the US Dollar.
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6.1.1 Regulatory Framework Tolerance vs. PID for the US Dollar
Internal institutional  governance for the US Dollar is overseen by the Fed, the Treasury
Department and, at a greater remove, Congress.  Solomon (1996) notes RFs influencing all
currencies circulating in the USA include the IRS, Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and laws passed by national and state authorities.  The US Dollar is used in this
thesis as the baseline currency for comparison purposes.  It provides three main things in
this role.  First it gives consistency with the definition of a currency and its use in this
thesis.  Second it gives a large scale monetary institution for comparison. Third it provides
a known reference standard against which other currencies may be understood more easily,
despite differing from other currencies in this thesis.  There may be different relationships
between national RFs and internal processes due to its status as the US national currency
and  worldwide  reserve  currency,  affecting  comparison  with  other  currencies.
Relationships between external and internal  governance are examined in the context of
how both influences affect SMG for the US Dollar.
Table 6.2: US Dollar RF and PID Combined Governance Sum
Minimum Possible RF Tolerance PID Governance Sum Maximum Possible
-1 1 0 1 2
Table  6.2  shows  the  sum  of  the  US  Dollar’s  RF  tolerance  and  PID  scores  give  a
Governance Sum of 1 from a possible maximum of 2.  This combined governance sum
will be used later for comparison with all SMG factors together.  The initial relationship
between  external  and  internal  governance  for  the  US  Dollar  seems  to  be  inversely
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proportional.  Full RF toleration of the US Dollar is paired with an almost complete lack of
PID,  implying  that  surrounding  national  regulations  may  exert  pressure  on  internal
decision-making processes.  This is consistent with the independence of the US Federal
Reserve.   While  other  factors  such  as  markets  clearly have  an  influence,  interactions
between  national  RFs  and  internal  institutional  processes  strongly affect  the  practical
sharing of monetary governance.  Analysis of these factors would be facilitated by larger
data sample size, but given the uniqueness of many of these currencies, a much larger
project would be necessary to fully investigate all influential factors.  
Figure 6.2: US Dollar National Regulatory Frameworks vs. PID Quadrants 
Figure 6.2 plots the comparison of RF tolerance toward the US Dollar with its internal
institutional processes.  Combining the data obtained from internal process and external
RF data creates a coordinate pair placing the US Dollar in Quadrant D: (as described in
Table  6.1)  well  tolerated  by national  RFs  but  with  minimal  PID.  The  US  Dollar  is
atypical, unique in being a domestic currency which is used internationally as a reserve
currency and UoA.  Therefore, even with more flexible internal processes, the US Dollar
might have difficulty implementing participatory decision-making due to pressure from
international stakeholders.  
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6.1.2  Regulatory  Framework Tolerance  vs.  PID for  community-based
currency institutions: Humboldt Exchange and Time Banks
Figure  6.3  below  summarises  the  community-based  currencies  below.   Humboldt
Exchange Dollars’ MoE emphasis may interact differently with national RFs than the SoV
emphasis of Time Dollars.  
Figure 6.3: Humboldt Exchange Dollar and Time Dollar RFs vs. PID Comparisons 
Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars’  combined  national  RF  tolerance  and  PID scores  reflect
circulation  influence.   The  level  of  tolerance  shown  by  national  RFs  for  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars may reflect organiser’s efforts to avoid MoE competition with the US
Dollar.  
Time Dollars combined RF and PID score by contrast, reflect SoV influence.  The RF
tolerance for a mostly non-circulatory currency such as Time Dollars may allow greater
latitude in its institutional processes for shared stakeholder input.  A circulating MoE like
Humboldt Exchange Dollars could potentially be seen as a threat to the national MoE.  The
two  community  sponsored  currency  institutions  in  Figure  6.3  are  treated  somewhat
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differently by national RFs, although they both have Full PID.  Interaction between RF
influence upon Humboldt Exchange Dollars and shared internal decision-making within
the Humboldt Exchange impact heavily on its overall level of SMG.
6.1.2.1  Regulatory  Framework  Tolerance  vs.  PID for Humboldt  Exchange
Dollars 
Humboldt  Exchange  Dollar  institutional  processes  appear  to  cooperate  closely  with
national  RFs.   As  decision  makers  prioritise shared  governance,  regulators  can  either
support those priorities or negate them in various ways.  Table 6.3 shows sums of the
governance  scores  illustrating  this  relationship  for  Humboldt  Exchange  governance
influences.
Table 6.3: Humboldt Exchange Dollars RF and PID Combined Governance Sum
Minimum Possible RF Tolerance PID Governance Sum Maximum Possible
-1 .65 1 1.65 2
The impact  of tolerance by RFs for Humboldt  Exchange Dollars  on shared PID score
comparisons for Humboldt Exchange Dollars is unclear.  Table 6.3 shows the combined
sum of Humboldt Exchange Dollar national RF tolerance score and its PID score is 1.65
out of a possible total of 2, indicating fully PID and high tolerance by national RFs.  
Figure 6.4: Humboldt Exchange Dollar National Regulatory Frameworks vs. PID
Quadrants














Humboldt Exchange Dollars seems to indicate a close relationship between US Regulatory
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national RF tolerance score and its PID score, which will be discussed shortly, is relatively
high, showing potentially high SMG.  That sum is illustrated by the plot in Figure 6.4
above using the national RF tolerance score as a vertical component and the PID score as
the horizontal component (recall Table 6.1) to  visualise the relationship between the two
forms of governance.  
Humboldt  Exchange  organisers  have  been  careful  to  conform  with  US  regulations
surrounding currency creation.  However, its non profit  status  which gives  relief  from
securities  reporting  requirements  may  impose  internal  structural  requirements.  These
requirements  include  organising  a  committee  to  manage  and  track  institutional
information, leading to a need for certain roles within the institution. Hence national RFs
can limit direct institutional participation.  On the other hand, national regulations for non-
profit roles and accountability may enforce greater transparency and standard requirements
which  may  lead  to  more  participatory  decision-making.   As  with  the  US  Dollar,
understanding these influences requires more contextual information.  
Judging the influences of external  RFs in comparison with the resilience of Humboldt
Exchange internal decision-making participation is complex.  Larger samples sizes from
other currencies in the USA can provide firmer trend data.  Figure 6.4 shows combined
governance  in  Quadrant  A  of  Figure 6.4,  indicating  high  RF  Toleration  and  PID  for
Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars.   One  compromise  organisers  make  between  increased
community economic decision-making and external influence is the recommendation that
transactions be half in Humboldt Exchange Dollars and half in US Dollars.  This indicates
that Humboldt Exchange Dollar organisers make strong efforts to present the currency as
complementary rather than competitive with the national currency, the US Dollar.  While
regulators tolerate Humboldt Exchange Dollars based on this link with the US Dollar, they
also  influence  Humboldt  Exchange  Dollar  issuance  indirectly  by  effectively  limiting
Humboldt Exchange Dollars circulation to via to the suggested ½ and ½ ratios.  The link
with general purpose money seems to directly reduce the level of community issuance
control over Humboldt Exchange Dollars.  Whether these observations are generalisable
will be investigated for the community sponsored currency Time Dollars next.
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6.1.2.2 Regulatory Framework Tolerance vs. PID for Time Banks 
Time Bank comparisons must refer back to the Time Dollar Institute guidelines.  The Time
Dollar Institute, as described previously, is the basis for the institutional development of
the Time Dollar which is issued through individual Time Banks in each local community.
Time Banks are neither securities nor taxable, thus ‘slip mostly under the radar’ of US
RFs.  This in turn may increase flexibility of internal decision-making.  The grass roots
nature of Time Banks makes generalising Time Bank governance trends somewhat more
variable.  
Table 6.4: Time Dollars RF and PID Combined Governance Sum
Minimum Possible RF Tolerance PID Governance Sum Maximum Possible
-1 .8 1 1.8 2
The relationship for Time Dollars between national RF influences and internal institutional
policy appears more cooperatively driven than with other currencies.  With a PID score of
1 and RF toleration of .8, internal and external governance of Time Banks appears to be
fairly closely coupled.  Table 6.4 shows a combined governance sum for Time Dollars is
1.8 out of a possible 2, representing high potential SMG if it is not obstructed by scale
issues.  National RFs seem quite tolerant of Time Dollars, which are fully PID.  While
national RFs are key to determining which monetary institutions will survive, exercising
influence on internal governance, other factors also influence currency governance.  
Figure 6.5: Time Dollar National Regulatory Frameworks vs. PID Quadrants 















   
The limitations of Time Dollar data underscore the need for context to allow generalisation
to other currencies.  The small sample size reflects the small number of time based SoV
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Table 6.1, Figure 6.5 shows the result in Quadrant A: well RF tolerated and high PID.  The
visual  relationship between external  and internal  governance may not indicate a causal
relationship.  While this should  generalise well to all Time Banks, as with all grassroots
phenomena  variations  are  always possible.   Time  Dollars  high  level  of  PID  supports
Fung’s (2001) contention that small scale institutions encourage participatory governance.
The fact that US RFs are reasonably encouraging toward Time Banks allows better chances
that the open internal processes stay open.  
The overall conclusion on tolerance toward community-based currencies by US RFs vs.
PID comparisons is that US national RFs may actually favour such currency institutions.
Adding RF and PID scores for Humboldt Exchange Dollars produces a sum of 1.65.  The
combined RF and PID score for the Time Dollar is 1.8.  This shows a significantly higher
combined  governance  score  and  a  potentially  higher  SMG  level  for  Time  Dollars
compared against the other currencies reviewed so far, consistent with Figures 6.3, 6.4, and
6.5.  Linkages between external  and internal rule structures appear to  exert compelling
influences  on  currency  institutional  power  sharing,  but  by  cooperating  with  RFs
institutions can achieve a level of partnership with the dominant general money institutions
while retaining participatory input.  While these scores are still subject to the influences of
scale on practical sharing of governance, private currency issuance gives the final example
of interaction between external and internal governance. 
6.1.3  Regulatory  Framework  Tolerance  vs.  PID  for  Privately  Issued
Loyalty Currency: Deli Dollars
Deli Dollars, as a loyalty currency, were more closely tied to the business institutional
model  than to the public sector.   Nevertheless they were traded enthusiastically in  the
community. They also seemed to have a closely coupled relationship between external and
internal governance.  Yet the outcome is different for the case of loyalty currencies than for
community-based currencies.
Table 6.5: Deli Dollar RF and PID Combined Governance Sum
Minimum Possible RF Tolerance PID Governance Sum Maximum Possible
-1 .5 .3 .8 2
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A comparison of the RF tolerance for the Deli Dollar against its PID shows how national
regulations can influence the internal processes of a community supported loyalty currency.
The Deli Dollar appeared to have a fairly closely coupled relationship between external
and internal governance.  Its PID score was .3, with relatively little participatory decision-
making.  The Deli Dollar RF tolerance score was .5, which shows low regulatory tolerance
for this  currency.   Table 6.5  shows the  sum of .8,  indicating relatively low combined
shared governance.  Given the Deli Dollar’s status as a loyalty currency it was obligated,
quite  appropriately,  to  contribute primarily to making a profit  for  its  business oriented
sponsoring institution, Frank’s Deli in Great Barrington, MA.  For this reason community
participation in decisions could not take precedence over business objectives.  This was
entirely appropriate however  it  also  limited  PID.  Previous  reports  on the  Deli  Dollar
portrayed it as a local community circulating currency.  It may be true that it increased
local economic health via local currency circulation, but what is largely neglected is the
discussion of shared institutional decision-making.  This neglect may be appropriate from a
functional perspective given the loyalty currency purpose of furthering business objectives,
but  must  be  taken  into  consideration  when  arguing  that  these  currencies  increased
community empowerment via shared voice and local decision making.  It may indeed have
increased  local  economic  activity,  but  loyalty  currencies  seem  unlikely  to  bring
significantly higher SMG to all community stakeholders.  
Figure 6.6: Deli Dollar National Regulatory Frameworks vs. PID Quadrants 















Deli Dollar trend predictions were limited by lack of data involving community supported
loyalty currencies.  However, not many loyalty programs would qualify under this  thesis'
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customers as Deli Dollars were or even among business customers.  While some loyalty
point programs apparently do allow transfer of these points to other customers, this does
not appear to be a widely enough spread practice in most cases to evolve into a thriving
trade, as happened with Deli Dollars.  Furthermore, no other well-known loyalty programs
have been community supported as  Deli Dollars were, although  Seyfang (2004) cites a
new community loyalty currency, the NU Spaarpas card, which has yet to be studied.  The
relationship between external and internal governance is appears just on the vertical RF
tolerance border of Quadrants C and D (recall Table 6.1) as marginally tolerated with low
PID in Figure 6.6.  Low RF tolerance may also explain infrequent trading of loyalty points.
The  lack  of  explicitly community orientation  may be  a  deciding factor  in  the lack of
regulatory enthusiasm for the Deli Dollar.  While imitations of the Deli Dollar do exist,
community popularity of the Deli Dollar may have been unique to Great Barrington, MA,
making  generalisation to  other  loyalty  programs  tenuous.   Nevertheless,  more  data
comparison for the effects of other influences is needed.
6.1.4 Competing Effect of National RFs and PID on SMG in the USA 
To draw conclusions about the interaction between External and Internal Governance on
SMG in currencies in the USA it is necessary to understand that there is a great variety of
currency types, as Witt (2004) points out, as well as variation within each type of currency.
While each currency faces its own pressures and is set in a unique context, the national
currency provides a point of reference for non-nationally sponsored currencies.  Although
different  currencies  emphasise different  functions  of  money,  affecting  currency
institutional  governance,  the  explicitly  public  orientation  of  community  sponsored
currencies contrasts with business institutional objectives reflected in loyalty currencies.  It
is helpful to view a comparison of external RF toleration against PID for all currencies.
Table  6.6  shows  RF Tolerance and PID scores  for each currency and their  totals.   In
summary, this analysis produced the following outcomes. 
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Table 6.6: Sums of Combined Governance Scores
US Dollar H. E. Dollar Time Dollar Deli Dollar
Toleration
by RFs
1 .65 .8 .5
PID 0 1 1 .3
Gov. Total 1 1.65 1.8 .8
Interestingly, the US Dollar appears to confirm Kahler´s (2000) assertion of susceptibility
to  varying  influences,  falling  between  other  currencies  for  external  and  internal
governance.  Out of a possible combined governance score of 2, the US Dollar scores 1
point for combined external and internal governance.  
Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  are  less  polarised in  terms  of  the  relationship  between
external  and  internal  governance  than  the  US  Dollar.   Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars’
combined  governance  score  is  1.65.   The  relationship  between  external  and  internal
governance for Time Dollars is even more closely paired. 
Time Dollars have a combined score of 1.8 which gives the highest shared institutional
governance score of all of the currencies reviewed.  
Deli Dollars seemed to share the same degree of external to internal closeness as Time
Dollars, but had a combined score of .8, considerably lower than Time Dollars combined
score.  This may indicate an overall lower shared governance score but will not be known
without the addition of the influence of scale.  
The numerical  distance between external  and internal  governance scores may illustrate
some of the influences internal processes can have on external regulations and vice versa.
On the other hand, inconsistency of these gaps shows that summing up the RF tolerance
scores with the PID scores may give a closer indication of the actual level of stakeholder
input.  Thus far trends point to a reasonably high correspondence between favourable RFs
and  higher  PID  scores  for  explicitly  community  sponsored  currencies  in  the  USA.
Pressure on institutions to conform to national regulations may push currencies to higher
shared governance levels, but this does not explain why the low PID score of the Deli
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Dollar was accompanied by less tolerant RFs.  This is particularly intriguing considering
the completely polarised relationship between external and internal governance for the US
Dollar, though acknowledging its uniqueness as a national currency.
Figure 6.7: External and Internal Governance Quadrants for All Currencies
Figure 6.7 depicts the combined governance quadrants for each currency reviewed in the
USA.  The US Dollar falls in Quadrant D, which is designated as well tolerated but low
PID.   Both  community-based  currencies  reviewed  fell  into  Quadrant  A  as  both  well
tolerated and substantial  PID, while  Deli  Dollars  were more  difficult  to  place,  falling
between Quadrants C and D, being marginally tolerated by US RFs and relatively low PID.
Though further studies involving more US currencies would be helpful, it is also useful to
look more closely at other aspects of governance for clues.  This is  done in upcoming
chapters, starting next with the relationship between internal processes and scale.
Before moving on to the next set of analyses, it is important to bring together implications
from  earlier  analysis  of  how  external  regulations  affect  internal  processes.   Internal
institutional processes may affect national regulatory treatment of institutions, with these
interacting  influences  in  turn  affecting  SMG.   Shared  institutional  currency decision-
making, particularly with regard to how RFs shape internal processes, has been the focus
of this section.  Each currency institution bears the tensions between external and internal
governance in a different way.  
108

































The US Dollar is perhaps most clearly influenced institutionally by US national RFs and
the international monetary system, international use of the US Dollar making its stability
important for both domestic and international needs.  Secretary Edwin Truman’s testimony
before Congress (2000) exemplifies international effects on internal US Dollar seigniorage
decisions.  As an independent central bank, issuance decisions by the Fed require little
public transparency or accountability.  Likewise, President Nixon’s decision to abrogate
gold backing lacked stakeholder input.  While conceding that full stakeholder participation
was impractical given the large scale of the US Dollar, nevertheless this decision impacted
US  Dollar  users  around  the  world.   Whether  a  smaller  scale  currency allows  more
participatory decision-making is investigated in the light of different currency institutional
priorities.  
Humboldt Exchange Dollars allow direct participation for community members in making
important decisions for the currency, while being tolerated as an institution by US RFs.
Much  of  that  tolerance  comes  from the  Humboldt  Exchange’s  status  as  a  non-profit
community sponsored institution.  Thus, Fung’s (2001) conceptualisation of participatory
governance calling for small scale community level institutions cooperating with national
level institutions supports Humboldt Exchange policy of trading in both US Dollars and
Humboldt Exchange Dollars.  Indeed, this policy may play a significant role in that official
toleration.    
Time Dollars by contrast, issued through small scale non-profit community Time Banks,
receive tax  exemption,  and are possibly kept small  scale by the  SoV emphasis.   Both
community-based currencies show,  despite  the  differing linkages with  general purpose
money and  the  differing levels  of  national  regulatory tolerance,  that  cooperation  with
national  RFs (through direct  linkages  to  the  national  currency or by limiting  scale  by
function or geography) enhance viability.  Local community economies are thus boosted,
as Seyfang (1996) and others have found, while the dominance of the national currency is
acknowledged.  
Deli Dollars, no longer in circulation, may have been marginally tolerated by national RFs
due to their business institutional issuance, despite their very small scale.  
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Analysis of these issues for each currency shows that external regulatory factors do seem to
exert  greater influence on  internal  governance than vice  versa  as  Monbiot (2009)  and
others assert.  Nevertheless, the tolerance shown to community-based currency institutions,
Time  Banks  in  particular,  also  shows  that  currency  institutions  can  work  to  meet
stakeholder priorities and national level concerns simultaneously.  Thus, linkages national
regulatory influence can contribute positively toward higher levels of SMG.
6.2 Relating Participatory Internal Decision-making to Scale and SMG 
Internal governance is influenced by external RFs and by institutional scale.  This section
explores the interactions between PID of scale as they affect SMG.  Figure 6.8 provides a
preliminary summary to aid comparison.



















































PID and Scale scores for each currency are added to give a maximum combined PID and
scale interaction sum of 2.  This sum allows an estimate of how much greater the influence
on shared governance of one currency’s internal processes and scale may be than another.
Scores are discussed from governance and scale perspectives with the aid of the Quadrants
in Table 6.7 below, as described previously, starting with the US Dollar.
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Table 6.7: Quadrants for Participatory Internal Decision-making (PID), Scale
Participatory Internal
Decision-making (PID)




Quadrant A: Currencies with considerable to maximum PID, and small scale (higher percentage of SPC)
Quadrant B: Currencies with considerable PID but large scale (not SPC, or low percentage of SPC)
Quadrant C: Currencies minimal or no PID, and large scale (not SPC)
Quadrant D: Currencies with low PID, small scale (higher percentage of SPC)
As noted previously, these currencies are examined in the light of each of three sets of
data: external RFs, internal stakeholder decision-making, and scale.  This section focuses
on interactions between internal governance and scale.  Recall that  PID  operationalises
governance  principles  of  transparency  and  accountability  through  direct  stakeholder
participation in seigniorage, issuance and backing decisions.  PID is strongly affected by
practical issues involved in participatory decision-making.  Furthermore, the number of
functions a currency implements and the geographical area in which it circulates also affect
governance.   The  juxtaposition  of  PID  against  scale  within  the  context  of  overall
institutional ability to facilitate stakeholder input is explored next, starting with the US
Dollar.
6.2.1 PID vs. Scale for US Dollar
The US Dollar is both the national currency of the USA as well as a worldwide reserve
currency and UoA for international accountancy, affecting people in many other countries.
Those effects imply that SMG should apply globally to all  US Dollar stakeholders.  It
should be noted that the internal governance of the US Dollar, the only national currency in
the USA14, is not typical of any currency in the world, and neither is its scale.  While scale
influences  US  Dollar  internal  governance  in  conjunction  with  many external  factors,
nevertheless,  examining the  internal  governance  and scale of  the US Dollar  facilitates
understanding other currency institutional influences.  First, a comparison of US Dollar
internal processes and scale maps those two influences against each other, then lays the
groundwork for understanding how these processes affect other currencies.
14 The case of Cuba, with its exchangeable national currency and second non-exchangeable national currency,
would have been very interesting to study applying this methodology.
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Table 6.8: US Dollar PID and Scale (% SPC) sum
Minimum Possible PID Scale PID and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
-1 0 0 0 2
 
The reader should be mindful that the US Dollar is not typical, even of other national
currencies.  Table 6.8 shows that the US Dollar has an almost complete lack of PID and is
very large scale, falling entirely outside of the set of SPCs.  The PID score of 0 and the
SPC score of 0 together give the US Dollar a total PID and scale interaction sum of 0 out
of  a  possible  score  of  2.   This  outcome is  not  surprising  given  the  difficulty of  full
stakeholder access to such a large scale monetary institution.  
Figure 6.9: US Dollar PID vs. Scale Quadrants 















Figure 6.9 shows into which PID vs. Scale quadrants The US Dollar, and probably most
world reserve currencies by extension, fit.  Combining the two data points from the PID
score and SPC percentage yields coordinate pair of (0,0).  This falls in the extreme lower
right hand corner, or Quadrant C, indicating no PID and very large scale.  These findings
support Fung’s (2001) assertion that large scale institutions are less effective at sharing
governance
6.2.2 PID vs. Scale for Community-Based Currencies: Humboldt
Exchange and Time Banks
Community-based currencies are next analysed from the perspective of internal governance
and scale interactions.  First discussed are Humboldt Exchange Dollars which emphasise
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are contrasted with currency scale to understand how these processes interact with each
other  and  influence  SMG.   Figure  6.10  shows  that  these  community-based  currency
institutions  differ  from  each  other  both  in  circulation  and  by  emphasising different
functions of money.  Their SMG hinges on how functional and geographical differences
affect their decision-making processes and RF treatment.
Figure 6.10: Humboldt Exchange Dollar and Time Dollar Participatory Internal
Decision-making (PID) and Scale Quadrant Comparisons
6.2.2.1 PID vs. Scale for Humboldt Exchange Dollars 
To introduce comparisons of Humboldt Exchange Dollar PID and scale scores, recall that
Humboldt Exchange Dollars are issued as a community MoE backed by the US Dollar.  It
is important to compare internal governance with scale in order to understand how these
influences interact.    
Table 6.9: Humboldt Exchange Dollar PID and Scale (% SPC) sum
Minimum Possible PID Scale PID and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
-1 1 0.4 1.4 2
The sum of the PID and scale scores is 1.4, from a possible maximum of 2 is fairly high,
raising the possibility that PID and scale may be related.  It is reasonable to expect that
internal processes will require adjusting for functional emphasis and circulation range as
the  number  of  monetary tasks  and stakeholders  increase.   Backing particularly affects
functionality, which in turn affects seigniorage and issuance.  Humboldt Exchange internal
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processes attempt to allow as much local participation as possible while creating a viable
currency which serves the Humboldt community.
Figure 6.11: Humboldt Exchange Dollar PID vs. Scale Quadrants















While small sample size limits conclusions that can be drawn with regard to how PID and
scale influence one another, Figure 6.11 shows Humboldt Exchange Dollars in Quadrant B
representing currencies with significant PID which are also on the larger end of the scale
spectrum.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars  emphasise the MoE function, circulating only at
the  community  level,  although  convertibility  to  the  US  Dollar  increases  Humboldt
Exchange Dollars scale.  This trade-off of functional linkage for greater viability as a MoE
could affect PID in the long run if the functional or circulatory scale increases dramatically.
However, these trade-offs do not currently appear to lower Humboldt Exchange Dollars
PID.  
While circulating physical currency in the local community allows greater flexibility for
transactions than a credit based or time based currency, the trade-off may be an element of
impersonality in the money, possibly reducing community control of the currency.  Despite
their linkage to general purpose money, Humboldt Exchange Dollars have a great deal of
direct participatory input from the community.  This demonstrates that even medium scale
community currency circulation can retain high levels  of PID.  Next, analysis of  Time










6.2.2.2 PID vs. Scale for Time Banks  
This  section analyses the relationship  between internal  governance  and scale  for  Time
Dollars, using the sum of Time Bank scores for PID and scale as a percentage of SPC.  
Table 6.10: Time Dollar PID and Scale (% SPC) sum
Minimum Possible PID Scale PID and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
-1 1 1 2 2
Time Dollars, which  emphasise the SoV function, appear to suggest a close relationship
between PID and small scale.  The PID score of 1 and identical Fully SPC scale score of 1
gives a total PID and scale interaction sum of 2, which is the maximum sum for PID and
degree of SPC, implying that Time Banks should have a high level of SMG.  The small
scale of Time Banks seems to allow more participatory input from stakeholders.  Whether
it is the emphasis on the SoV function of money or small geographical range that keeps
Time Banks closely oriented to local  communities,  both of these factors are important
influences on Time Dollars SMG.
Figure 6.12: Time Dollars PID vs. Scale Quadrants















Figure 6.12 shows Time Dollars in Quadrant A, indicating the highest degrees of both PID
and SPC.  While comparison against other SoV emphasising currencies would fortify the
findings  presented  here,  there  currently do  not  appear  to  be  other  similar  SoV based
currency institutions.   Time  Dollars  emphasis  on  SoV combined  with  direct  personal










circulating MoE may limit  the circulatory flexibility of Time Dollars, but the high PID
score appears to show that storing value as time and situating each Time Bank in a local
community facilitates greater stakeholder access.  Personal donation of time to the Time
Bank may reduce pressure to exchange, distinguishing Time Dollars from other currencies
which require exchange with other individuals rather than with the community as a whole.
Such decision-making flexibility may only be possible with a currency which primarily
stores value rather than issuing credit or circulating notes, since storing value may allow
communities  to  accept  a  wider  range  of  services  from  excluded  individuals.   The
egalitarian nature of time storage may offer greater levels of stakeholder empowerment
than credit or exchange based currencies are able to allow.  The decision to  emphasise
future value may inhibit growth, and therefore PID can affect scale more heavily based
upon community priorities.  
To conclude the community-based currencies PID and scale comparison section, emphasis
on different functions affects PID and scale.  PID appears to have a stronger influence than
scale.  The large variation in PID and SPC score sums of 1.4 for Humboldt Exchange
Dollars versus 2 for Time Dollars indicate that community sponsored currencies are not all
alike.  This variation also implies that larger scale may not necessarily hinder sharing of
governance.   Given  the  requirement  for  full  transparency  and  accountability  which
underlies PID, participatory governance seems more effective in a smaller scale institution.
A higher  combined  total  sum of  PID and  SPC implies  a  higher SMG level  for  Time
Dollars. 
6.2.3 PID vs. Scale for Privately Issued Loyalty Currency: Deli Dollars
Although a community supported currency, Deli Dollars were business sponsored, so it
seems remarkable to have had a loyalty currency taken up by a local community.  While
loyalty  currencies  can  be  expected  to  have  lower  PID  than  community  sponsored
currencies,  the  small  scale  of  this  loyalty currency may have  been  one  factor  in  the
enthusiasm  the  local  community  had  for  this  currency  which  led  to  its  successful
community uptake. 
Table 6.11: Deli Dollar PID and Scale (% SPC) sum
Minimum Possible PID Scale PID and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
-1 0.3 1 1.3 2
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Internal decision-making and scale seemed to have little relationship to one another in the
unique case of Deli Dollars.  Despite the community support for this loyalty currency and
its very small scale, there seems to be no clear correspondence between the Deli Dollar’s
low PID level and its status as a full SPC.  The score of .3 for PID was due to the priority
conflict  business  sponsored  currency  institutions  experience  in  sharing  revenues  and
decision-making with customers.  Yet the Deli Dollar’s score of 1 for SPC means that it is
nearly as small scale as a currency can be.  Deli Dollar combined PID and scale sum of 1.3
out of a total maximum of 2 for combined PID and scale interaction indicates that not all
SPC institutions have a high PID level.  Nevertheless, despite the Deli Dollar’s business
institutional sponsorship, the fact that it was embraced by the local community suggests
that it met some stakeholder need in the community.
Figure 6.13: Deli Dollar PID vs. Scale Quadrants















Deli Dollars were one of very few for-profit institutionally sponsored currencies which
have been accepted by a local community.  Figure 6.13 shows Deli Dollars in Quadrant D,
indicating low PID, yet also a very small scale.  Clearly business institutions face pressure
to maximise profits.  This implies that given a choice between low shared input in a large
scale currency and low shared input in a local currency, community members chose a local
currency, even without the benefit of fully participatory decision-making.  While any SPC
can act as a symbol of local area pride, institutional sponsorship appears to determine the
level of PID.  Therefore small scale does not automatically bring fully shared input into
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6.2.4 Effects of Participatory Internal Decision-making versus Scale on
SMG in USA 
The final section of this chapter summarises findings on PID as it interacts with functional
and  geographical  currency scale.   Analysis  of  interaction  sums  for  all  currencies  are
compared as are PID vs. Scale quadrant plots to form conclusions regarding the influences
of internal processes and scale upon SMG.  At this point a summary comparing PID levels
against scale for all currencies may facilitate understanding these interactions.  Table 6.12
shows  the  combined  Participatory Internal  Decision-making  score,  Percentage of  SPC
score and the total of those scores for each currency.  
Table 6.12: Sums of PID and Scale Interaction Sums




0 1 1 0.3
Percentage of
SPC 0 0.4 1 1
PID / Scale
interaction sum
0 1.4 2 1.3
Table 6.12 shows the US Dollar to be both highly centralised in decision-making and very
large in scale by comparison with other currencies.  It is interesting to note the inverse
relationship between PID and scale in this case.  The low PID score of 0 and the large scale
score of 0 give the US Dollar a total PID and Scale interaction score of 0 out of a possible
score of 2.
Humboldt Exchange Dollars on the other hand, seem to decouple high PID from small
scale.  The sum of the PID and scale interaction scores is 1.4, from a possible maximum of
2.  While not as clearly matched as the US Dollar PID and SPC scores, the reasonably high
sum of 1.4 implies that community-based institutional sponsorship may have increased the
SMG potential of Humboldt Exchange Dollars.
By contrast, Time Dollars relate PID to scale, but in the opposing direction to the US
Dollar.  The combined PID score of 1 and SPC score of 1 gives Time Dollars a total PID
and scale sum of 2, which is the maximum combined score for PID and scale, implying
that Time Banks may have very high potential SMG.  The lack of correspondence between
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PID and scale for other currencies reviewed and the fact that the US Dollar is not typical of
other currencies makes this trend difficult to confirm without more data.  
Deli Dollar’s  Fully SPC score of 1 and low PID score of 0.3 again seems to decouple
correspondence between PID and scale.  Paradoxically, although priority setting may be
less  flexible  for  a  loyalty  currency  given  the  business-based  institutional  context,
community acceptance of Deli Dollars was significant.
While there are no clear trends within the PID and scale interaction overall,  there does
appear to be a trend combining small scale and high PID for the two community sponsored
currencies.  Community-based currencies therefore may potentially facilitate greater access
to currency decision-making than private or national currencies despite the smaller scale of
privately issued currencies such as Deli Dollars. 
Figure 6.14: PID vs. Scale Interaction Quadrants for All Currencies
Participatory Internal Decision-



























Figure 6.14 shows US Dollars falling into Quadrant C, indicating very low PID and very
large scale (recall  Table 6.7).  Humboldt  Exchange Dollars, meanwhile,  emphasise the
MoE function, appear in Quadrant B, have a large degree of PID and are also on the larger
end of the scale spectrum.  Time Dollars by contrast fall into Quadrant A, indicating the
highest degree of PID and small  scale as a SPC.  Time Dollars  emphasis  on the SoV
function of money may facilitate both high PID and small scale.  Finally, Deli Dollars in
Quadrant D, despite their small scale, showed little shared stakeholder decision-making.
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Paradoxically, despite being fully SPC and community supported, it did not have a high
PID level.  The choice to use a loyalty currency could in itself be viewed as a form of
shared community decision-making, suggesting that  smaller  scale allows greater  direct
stakeholder participation done.  Nevertheless Deli Dollars did not share decision-making
as  effectively  as  the  community  sponsored  currencies,  which  appear  to  have  higher
potential SMG based on their combined institutional governance and scale.
It is now useful to bring together the implications of this section for SMG, focusing on
how internal decision-making processes and scale affect one another.  Interaction between
internal processes and scale does appear to affect the potential SMG of even the largest
currency institution.   In general, scale does not appear to correspond directly with PID.
When  combined  however,  there  does  seem  to  be  a  trend  toward  community-based
currencies showing higher general levels of PID.
The  US  Dollar  presents  an  intriguing  question  of  the  impact  of  scale  on  internal
governance.  While the lack of shared seigniorage with  dollarised nations underlines the
low  PID  of  the  US  Dollar,  geographical  circulation  clearly  influences  the  internal
governance of even this very large scale currency.  
If  the  case  of  Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  is  representative  for  community-based
currencies which  emphasise the MoE function, then PID appears to place only minimal
limitations on the scale of a currency.  Interaction between PID and scale for Humboldt
Exchange Dollars is more complex due to tensions between community empowerment and
the need to avoid competition with the US national currency.  Here internal processes
intervene to  control  the scale of  the currency, imposing limits  to  Humboldt  Exchange
Dollar circulation by recommending equal use of the national currency in transactions.
While this compromise retains stakeholder input, it also represents some loss of choice
since the national currency limits circulation of the community-based currency.  
Time Dollars on the other hand avoids circulation competition by emphasising a different
function of money.  Although the US Dollar does function as a SoV, Time Banks allow
members  to  store  time  directly,  negating  the  effects  of  inflation  suffered  by  MoE
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currencies, including the US Dollar.  The stakeholder decision to store value as time rather
than within a circulating local MoE however may limit the scale of Time Dollars.  
Deli Dollars shows that small scale does not necessarily bring with it high levels of PID.
While  this  loyalty currency’s small  scale  did  not  result  in  high  PID,  the  community
sponsored currencies Humboldt Exchange Dollar and Time Dollars show that PID does not
prevent scale from growing, at least to a medium level.
Conclusions  based  on  these  analyses are  that  smaller  scale  currencies,  even when not
sponsored by a community-based parent institution, can allow greater levels of stakeholder
monetary decision-making.  The analysis also finds that it is possible to share monetary
governance decisions within medium scale institutions, and that there does not appear to be
a direct correspondence  between PID and currency scale, although it  does appear that
small scale currencies tend to allow more shared internal decision-making than very large
scale currencies.  This  implies that  both internal  processes and currency scale must  be
taken together to understand their impact on SMG.  The final set of interactions is between
national RFs and scale.
6.3  Relating  Scale  to  Toleration  by  National  (External)  Regulatory
Frameworks (RFs) and Shared Monetary Governance 
Scale  interacts  with  governance  in  complex  ways.   To  reiterate  previous  definitions,
external governance in this project is defined as international, State, grant funders, venture
capital underwriters, business and chamber of commerce processes and policies, and any
other  regulatory  influences  which  are  external  to  the  currency  institution.   Internal
governance comprises the internal processes of the currency institution itself.  For reasons
of scope, only national  level  governance frameworks  are examined here in  the role of
external governance.  A comparison of trends for all currencies is used to investigate the
interactions between scale and national RFs, summarised below in Figure 6.15.
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A comparison of trends is explored for all currencies, and limitations of the analysis will
be examined, adding scores for each currency together to create a sum showing combined
scale  and  national  RF  interaction.   Scores  are  discussed  from  a  scale  and  national
regulatory perspective with  the aid  of  Quadrants described in  Table 6.13 below.   The
section examines all four currencies beginning with the US Dollar.
Table 6.13: Tolerance by Scale vs. Regulatory Frameworks (RFs) Quadrants
Percentage SPC




Quadrant A: Currencies BOTH high percentage SPC (small scale) AND well RF tolerated 
Quadrant B: Currencies with high percentage SPC (small scale) BUT low toleration from RFs
Quadrant C: Currencies with BOTH low SPC percentage (large scale), AND minimal or no RF toleration 
Quadrant D: Currencies with low SPC percentage (large scale) BUT well tolerated by RFs 
The complex interactions between RF response to currency institutions and scale made it
necessary to limit the scope of this inquiry to manageable factors.  The most prominent
influential  factor  based  on  frequent  mention  in  the  literature  is  circulatory scale  and
national regulatory responses to that scale.  Therefore these factors are explored for each
currency beginning with the national currency, which is the US Dollar.
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6.3.1 Scale vs. National RF Tolerance for the US Dollar
The US Dollar  is  again used  as  the  representative national  currency for this  study of
currencies in the USA.  Naturally, as a national currency it is well tolerated by national
RFs, though it is in fact international in scale.  A comparison of US Dollar scale against
national RF influence follows.
External factors affecting internal governance of the US Dollar, run by the Federal Reserve
(The Fed) and the US Treasury Department include US national and state regulations and
international monetary concerns, such as debt, dollarisation and speculation.  Each of these
factors influences the scale of the US Dollar while the Dollar’s scale reciprocally affects
those factors.  External factor investigation in this thesis is limited to US national RFs as
covered in Solomon’s (1996) thorough study which remains the most up to date and cited
work on US monetary legal frameworks.
Table 6.14: US Dollar Scale (% SPC) and RF Tolerance sum
Minimum Possible RF Tolerance Scale RF and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
0 1 0 1 2
Table 6.14 shows the US Dollar to be very large scale and fully tolerated by national RFs.
The combined scale and RF Tolerance interaction sum for the US Dollar totals only 1,
implying that the very large scale of the US Dollar may inhibit national regulatory attempts
to set priorities based on domestic needs.  Indeed, even among national currencies, Banchs
(2008) finds  US Dollar  governance to be atypical due to its  status  as  a  major reserve
currency.  The  large  number  of  factors  complicates  the  influence  scale  and  national
monetary regulations  exercise  over  each other  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Fed must  also
consider international effects when deciding how to govern the US Dollar.  Although such
factors play less of a role in shaping SMG for smaller scale currencies, it is beneficial to
understand at least in part how these factors affect larger scale currencies.  
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Figure 6.16: US Dollar Scale vs. National RF Tolerance Quadrants 























Figure 6.16 above compares scale with national RF tolerance for the US Dollar, appearing
in Quadrant D (recall Table 6.13).  Pressure on the US Dollar to meet both domestic needs
and  international  needs  result  from  its  very  large  scale,  presenting  regulators  with
conflicting priorities.  How small scale influences currency institutional governance vis-à-
vis national RF treatment is explored through smaller scale currencies next.
6.3.2 Scale vs. National RF Tolerance for Community Sponsored
Currencies: Humboldt Exchange Dollars and Time Dollars
Community-based currencies tend to have functionally and geographically limited scale,
usually making such currencies special purpose rather than general purpose money.  Many
communities  choose  to  explicitly  separate  the  functions  of  money,  as  Gesell  (1906)
advocated with separating the MoE function from the SoV function to increase speed of
circulation.  The effects of such scale changes to a currency upon national RFs tolerance
toward that  currency appear  to  be favourable  if  it  does  not  compete with the national
currency, or less favourable if a community appears to reject use of the national currency.
While  Douthwaite (1996) and others point to the government banning of stamp scrip in
1933 as evidence of national RF antagonism toward community-based currencies,  data
presented here shows this no longer to be the case.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars scale vs.
RF comparisons show the relationship between scale and national RFs for a community-
based MoE, while Time Dollars comparisons show that relationship for a SoV currency.
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Figure 6.17: Humboldt Exchange Dollar and Time Dollar Scale vs. National RF
Comparisons
6.3.2.1 Scale vs. National RF Tolerance for Humboldt Exchange Dollars 
Comparing the impact of scale on national RFs and vice versa in the case of Humboldt
Exchange Dollars is complex due to intermingled factors influencing these interactions.
First, the scale and RF toleration scores for Humboldt Exchange Dollars are compared, and
then the  limitations of those comparisons will be discussed in light of the impact those
interactions may have on SMG for Humboldt Exchange Dollars.
Table 6.15: Humboldt Exchange Dollar Scale (% SPC) and RF Tolerance Sum
Minimum Possible RF Scale RF and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
0 0.65 0.40 1.05 2
Table 6.15 shows a smaller gap between the scale and RF Tolerance sum for Humboldt
Exchange Dollars than for the previously examined US Dollar.  While relatively closely
linked  to  the  national  currency at  only  %40  SPC,  the  RF Toleration  score  of  .65  is
surprisingly only just above marginal.  Added together, the scale and RF score give a sum
of 1.05, from a possible maximum score of 2.  That combined total implies a relatively low
SMG potential from the perspective of how Humboldt Exchange Dollar scale influences
national  RFs  which  surround  it.   Thus,  small  scale  institutions  may be  allow  greater
stakeholder input, yet when scale interfaces with external RFs, stakeholder priorities may
be overridden by national regulations. 
125
H.E. Dollar and Time Dollar
































 Figure 6.18: Humboldt Exchange Dollar Scale vs. National RF Tolerance Quadrants 


























Figure 6.18 shows that small scale currencies are heavily influenced by US national RFs.
Humboldt Exchange Dollars fall into Quadrant D, indicating medium to large scale and
medium to high tolerance by national RFs (see again Table 6.13).  The linkage between
larger scale general purpose money and RF tolerance for Humboldt Exchange Dollars may
allow more large scale monetary institutional  influence.   This  toleration,  based on the
Humboldt Exchange Dollar’s linkage with the US Dollar, increases Humboldt Exchange
Dollars  scale,  while  allowing  increased  stakeholder  input  into  the  local  monetary
institutional decision-making.  Non-MoE community-based currencies are explored next
through Time Banks.
6.3.2.2 Scale vs. National RF Tolerance for Time Dollars 
While  Humboldt  Exchange Dollars  are community sponsored and emphasise the  MoE
function, Time Dollars place most emphasis on the SoV function of money.  It is therefore
important to understand how functions affect currency scale, and how scale in turn affects
the  relationship  of  such  community-based currency institutions  to  national  RFs.   The
functional  limitation  of  SPCs  (which Humboldt  Exchange Dollars are  not)  may allow
greater focus on stakeholder priorities.  This is because small scale currency institutions
which  are  well  tolerated  may have  greater  potential  to  empower  users  through  direct
community institutional  governance.  
Table 6.16: Time Dollar Scale (% SPC) and RF Tolerance  Sum
Minimum Possible RF Scale RF and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
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Time Dollars scale is determined by the scale of each individual Time Bank which issues
Time Dollars.  There again appears to be a closely related interval between the scale and
the Toleration by national RFs for the Time Dollar SoV emphasising currency.  The scale
score of 1 indicates a full SPC, while the RF Tolerance score of 0.8 indicates a quite well
but  not  fully  tolerated  currency.   The  combined  total  score  for  SPC  percentage  and
Toleration by national RFs is the sum total of 1.8 out of a possible maximum total of 2.
This high Scale to National RF sum implies a high potential level of SMG.  
Figure 6.19: Time Dollar Scale vs. National RF  Tolerance  Quadrants

























Figure 6.19 shows Time Banks close connection between scale and national RF tolerance
in  Quadrant A,  which could  encourage greater issuance of  Time Dollars.   Indeed,  the
relationship between small currency institutional scale and high RF Tolerance implies that
RFs in the USA may raise SMG levels of small scale currency institutions partly because
Time Dollars do not compete functionally with the national currency.  Small scale SoV
currency  institutions  may  complement  the  national  level  MoE,  offering  stakeholders
greater transaction flexibility.  Because these two functions are held in separate currencies,
they may encourage greater levels  of  shared decision-making without  the  tension of a
competing currency as in the case of a MoE like Humboldt Exchange Dollars.  
While  individual  Time Banks vary, the  general  scale and regulatory stance toward the
Time Dollars they issue is similar due to the standardised guidelines for starting up Time
Banks and the care taken to ensure compliance with Coulter’s (1996) tax ruling.  This care,
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allows  Time  Dollars  to  generally  escape  the  notice  of  federal  regulators.   This  care
combined with the very small scale of each Time Bank seems to allow a significant level
of autonomy and ability to keep value stored at the local community level, implying that
stakeholders may exercise greater levels of direct participation in local monetary decision-
making.  Furthermore, it seems likely that the greater levels of confidence inspired by high
tolerance from national RFs increases participation in Time Banks. 
US national RFs appear to  incentivise community-based currencies  if they functionally
complement the US Dollar.  Adding the scale and RF Toleration score yields combined
scale and RF interaction sums of 1.05 for Humboldt Exchange Dollars contrasted with 1.8
for Time Dollars, giving Time Dollars higher potential SMG based on interaction between
scale  and  national  RFs.   Figures  6.18  and  6.19  show Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  in
Quadrant D, and Time Dollars in Quadrant A respectively.  Humboldt Exchange Dollars,
which are more functionally similar to the US Dollar than to Time Dollars, appear to be
somewhat limited  by their  linkage to general purpose money, with a  potentially lower
SMG than Time Dollars.  Yet Humboldt Exchange Dollars, as a MoE, may provide more
functional flexibility than Time Dollars.  Whether loyalty currencies can achieve similar
flexibility with RF toleration is explored next through Deli Dollars. 
  
6.3.3  Scale  vs.  National  RF Tolerance  for  Privately  Issued  Loyalty
Currency: Deli Dollars
Finally, how tolerance by national RFs toward currencies may affect scale and vice versa is
now  reviewed  for  the  community  accepted  loyalty  currency,  Deli  Dollars,  not  to  be
confused with the loyalty programs by the name of Deli Dollars which currently exist in
several  places  in  the  USA.   This  locally accepted  loyalty currency was  sponsored  by
Frank’s Deli, no longer in business, in Great Barrington, MA and circulated throughout the
local  community.  It was the only freely circulating well known loyalty currency to be
taken  up  enthusiastically  by  a  community  to  date,  and  is  still  often  referred  to  in
complementary currency discussions.  For this reason it is important to understand how its
scale may have interacted with tolerance for the Deli Dollar by US national RFs.
Table 6.17: Deli Dollar Scale (% SPC) and RF Tolerance Sum
Minimum Possible RF Scale RF and Scale Sum Maximum Possible
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
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Despite full SPC status, Table 6.17 shows that Deli Dollars were only marginally tolerated
by US national RFs.  Nonetheless, the score of 1 for scale and .5 for RF toleration give the
Deli Dollar a Scale and RF interaction sum of 1.5 out of a possible maximum score of 2,
implying a relatively high potential SMG level.  This is somewhat paradoxical since the
currency was sponsored by a business rather than by a non-profit institution.   The high
level of community acceptance implies that there was significant perceived value to the
community for this loyalty currency, possibly beyond the role of keeping the popular local
Deli in business.  Its limited functional and geographical scale may not have gained Deli
Dollars strong regulatory support, partly due to for-profit issuance.  
Figure 6.20: Deli Dollars Scale vs. National RF Tolerance Quadrants 






















   
Figure 6.20 shows Deli Dollars between Quadrants A and B, indicating a very small scale
but marginally tolerated currency.  Deli Dollars were thus, referring back to Table 6.13, an
example of a very small scale currency sponsored by a market based institution, yet were
only marginally tolerated by US national RFs.  This shows that it is not scale nor even
connection to  market  based  institutions  which grant  toleration  from the US regulatory
system.  While there are limitations to this data due to the small sample size, this loyalty
currency was one of exceptionally few to have been accepted as a community currency.
That small scale apparently did allow a degree of community control of the local economy
through the Deli Dollar until its withdrawal.  Yet pressure to make a profit for the deli
could  have  limited  user  decision-making  in  internal  processes.   As  Ardron (2006)
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contends, however, such a currency can still function as a means of increased community
participation in currency decision-making.
6.3.4 Conclusions on Scale, National Regulatory Frameworks and SMG 
This section analysed scale and national RF interaction as they influence SMG.  First, a
summary  of  the  previous  comparisons  of  scale  against  national  RF  tolerance  for  all
currencies discusses total sums and Quadrants into which they fell.  These are then brought
together in a broader analysis.  To summarise comparisons for Scale with RF Toleration,
sums for each currency indicate their interaction as shown in Table 6.18. 
 
Table 6.18: Sums of Scale and RF Interaction Scores
US Dollar H. E. Dollar Time Dollar Deli Dollar
Percentage  of
SPC 0 0.4 1 1
Toleration  by
RFs
1 .65 .8 .5
Scale  /  RF
Interaction  Total
Sum
1 1.05 1.8 1.5
The US Dollar’s SPC percentage score of 0 initially appears inversely related to the RF
Tolerance score of 1, its combined scale and RF tolerance interaction sum being the lowest
for any currency.  Humboldt Exchange Dollar scores also appear closely coupled although
toward the centre rather than extremes, with scale at .4 and RF Tolerance at 0.65 totalling
1.05, from a possible maximum score of 2.  Time Dollars scale and RF Toleration sum by
contrast is 1.8, the highest scale to national RF interaction sum, implies a high potential
level of SMG.  While the scale and RF Toleration sum for Time Dollars is the closest for
any currency, possibly be due to  its  emphasis on SoV, overall  there appears to  be no
correlation  between  scale  and  RF  Tolerance.   Deli  Dollar’s  high  sum  of  1.5  again
illustrates this lack of correlation as a full SPC despite marginal toleration from national
RFs.  
These sums for all of the currencies appear to show a trend of less toleration for local
MoEs and greater toleration by RFs for SoV based currencies, which do not compete with
the US Dollar for circulation.  Scale does not appear to be affected by lack of toleration
and RFs do not appear to grant more tolerance to smaller scale currencies, as the cases of
Humboldt Exchange Dollars and Deli Dollars demonstrate, with their differing scales, yet
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similar toleration by RFs.  While the scale of non-national currencies appears to be held
down by the  need  to  avoid  competition  with  the  US Dollar,  national  RFs seem only
marginally  affected  by  currency  scale.   Nevertheless,  currency  institutional  scale
determines the level of stakeholder participation in decision-making, therefore it  seems
important that national RFs should be sensitive to this concern since national RFs wield
significant influence on currency institutional SMG.  
Figure 6.21: Scale vs. RF Tolerance Quadrants for All Currencies 
Figure 6.21 shows the US Dollar in Quadrant D near Humboldt Exchange Dollars which
also falls in Quadrant D, indicating medium to large institutional scale and medium to high
tolerance  by national  RFs.   Time Dollars  by contrast  fall  into  Quadrant  A as  a  well-
tolerated SPC, alongside the Deli Dollar which paradoxically fell between Quadrants A
and B, indicating a very small scale but only marginally tolerated currency.  As with the
sums,  the  scattering  of  Quadrants  indicates  the  complexity  of  interacting  factors
determining SMG.  Small  geographical circulation alone is  not  enough to ensure good
toleration from national RFs, but partnership through either complementing functions or
linking of circulation with the national currency is necessary to obtain good RF tolerance.
This shows that national RFs can limit potential levels of SMG, particularly for circulating
exchange  currencies,  by  requiring  compromises  which  may  decrease  the  level  of
stakeholder participation in currency institutional decision-making.  
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At this  point  it  is  useful  to  bring together implications  from this analysis.   Overall,  it
appears that national RFs exercise a greater level of influence over scale in the case of
most  currencies  than  scale  can  exert  over  those  national  level  institutions.   The  one
exception is the US Dollar, which has an enormous scale covering the domestic USA as
well as much of the world.  This special status appears to gives the scale of the US Dollar a
somewhat heavier, yet not decisive, influence on Congressional decisions as they oversee
the US Dollar than does the scale of small currencies over those same RFs.  Despite its
atypically large scale, the US Dollar has shared traits in common with other currencies
studied here.  
The three remaining currencies are medium to very small in scale, which may explain why
they have  been  able  to  exert  little  influence  over  national  RF  responses.   For  these
currencies it appears that national RFs have far more influence than vice versa.  Partially,
as in the case of Humboldt Exchange Dollars, this is exercised by directly inhibiting the
circulatory scale of the currency, as with reporting requirements for extra-state circulating
notes, and indirectly by requiring convertibility to the US Dollar.  Deli Dollars notes in
contrast were not convertible to US Dollars hence this currency’s minimal RF toleration
shows  that  cooperation  with  the  national  currency  is  essential.   Time  Dollars  lack
circulating media altogether, which may inhibit their scale, yet this lack also ensures that
the currency fully complements the US Dollar.  On the one hand, primarily SoV currencies
may  be  more  difficult  to  regulate,  reducing  influence  from  outside  such  currency
institutions, but on the other hand, minimal attention from national RFs could conceivably
inhibit  currency viability,  which  is  a  potential  drawback  as  a  vehicle  for  stakeholder
empowerment.
In  summary,  small   to  medium  scale  currencies  may  facilitate  greater  stakeholder
empowerment  but  are  also  heavily  affected  by  national  RFs,  requiring  compromise
between community needs and national level priorities.  The optimal level of SMG calls
for both small scale and careful consideration of national RFs.  In this vein, Time Dollars
compromise  of  complementing national  currency functionality with  a  function  applied
locally could facilitate the greatest level of currency SMG.  The upcoming section will
examine  SMG  scores  for  each  currency combining  all  three  factors  of  national  RFs,
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Participatory Internal Decision-making at the institutional level, and scale to show how all
three of these factors come together to shape SMG.
6.4 Comparisons with All SMG Factors
Previous analyses took only two of the three components of SMG (RFs, internal, scale)
into consideration at one time.  First explored were national RFs as they influence internal
processes  and  institutional  adaptation  to  RFs.   Then  scale  and  Participatory  Internal
Decision-making (PID) were compared across currencies, showing that these two factors
tend to have the same effective weight, leading internal processes to evolve to compensate
for scale.  Finally, examining RFs against scale showed that national level RFs tend to
outweigh scale in small to medium scale currency institutions, while at larger levels scale
can  have  a  significant  impact  on  governance  decisions.   This  section  considers  more
complex  combinations,  examining  results  for  all  three  governance  factors  together:
tolerance by RFs, PID, and scale where previous chapters have taken factors into account
only as one affected another.  First, three way comparisons of the various sums of SMG by
previously reviewed pairs are explored to see how the paired factors work all together.
Then, Quadrant plots will be used to examine the full extent of relationships previously
only explored in two dimensions.  Finally, overall comparisons of all the trends will be
completed via sums to determine which combinations achieve highest SMG scores.








Tolerance by RFs 1 0.65 0.8 0.5
Participatory Internal Decision-making 0 1 1 0.3
Percentage of SPC 0 0.4 1 1
SMG 1 2.05 2.8 1.8
Toleration of a currency by national RFs will determine the legal viability of that currency.
National RF toleration however may also come at the price of reduced local control over
the currency.  National RF Tolerance sums for non-national currencies, as shown in Table
6.19 and Figure 6.22, tend to be highest when PID is higher, while scale appears not to be a
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decisive factor.  PID sums on the other hand, seem highest when RF Tolerance is high,
with scale again appearing not to be a decisive factor.
Figure 6.22: All PID vs. National RF Tolerance Quadrants




































Smaller  scale  currency institutions,  due  to  their  greater  vulnerability to  currency user
action, are scored higher than large scale money, which allows currency users less direct
effective control.  Scale appears to vary based on currency backing, since the two largest
scale  currencies (The US Dollar  and Humboldt  Exchange Dollars)  are  fiat  currencies,
while  the  SPCs  were  backed  by  time  or  by  commodities.   Conditions  under  which
currencies can maintain SPC status remains unclear, since the relationships between scale,
RF Tolerance and PID is variable.  Overall, Figure 6.22  implies that high tolerance by RFs
combined with high PID allows the highest degree of SMG regardless of scale.  National
RFs, PID and scale sums imply that governance, both external and internal to currency
institutions,  wields  the  greatest  influence  over  SMG.   Figure  6.23  below  appears  to
confirm this finding, since both Time Dollars Humboldt Exchange Dollars share the high
PID quadrants, despite their rather different RF Toleration levels.  Further, Figure 6.24
illustrates how even the very smallest of scale does not gain greater RF favour.  Hence it is
external  and  internal  governance,  rather  than  function  or  geographical  range,  which
appears to drive the ability of a currency to empower stakeholders.
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Figure 6.23: All PID vs. Scale Quadrants
Participatory Internal Decision-


























Figure 6.24: All Scale vs. RF Tolerance Quadrants 
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Previous Quadrants show all three governance factors as they come together by currency.
Quadrant A in Figures 6.22, 6.23, and 6.24, shows the highest level of SMG.  Quadrant C
by contrast shows the lowest SMG.  Most currencies tend to move from one Quadrant
when analysing two factors, to a different quadrant when looking at different factors.  This
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implies that the overall level of SMG can be affected significantly by combinations of
different factors.  The only currency which is consistently in the same quadrant is Time
Dollars,  which is  also  the only currency always in Quadrant  A.  Humboldt  Exchange
Dollars  moves  between  Quadrant  A,  in  Figure  6.22,  Quadrant  B  in  Figure  6.23,  and
Quadrant  D in  Figure  6.24.   When  analysed by the  factors  of  PID and RF tolerance,
Humboldt Exchange Dollars fall in Quadrant A, while from the perspective of PID and
scale they fall in Quadrant B.  Viewed from the perspective of scale and RF tolerance
Humboldt Exchange Dollars fall in Quadrant D.  Deli Dollars also moves dramatically,
between Quadrants  A and B in  Figure 6.24,  Quadrants  C and D  in  Figure 6.22,  and
Quadrant D in Figure 6.23.  The US Dollar by contrast moves between Quadrants C in
Figure 6.23, the lowest SMG scoring quadrant, and Quadrant D, a mid-range quadrant, in
both remaining figures.
The  movement  of  these  currencies  shows  that  different  factors  influence  currency
institutional  governance  input  sharply.   The  fact  that  the  only  stable  currency,  Time
Dollars, is one which emphasises a relatively unique function indicates that complementary
function and small scale sacrifices the flexibility of a MoE, but allows greater stakeholder
choice.
Bringing previous analyses together, it can now be determined when the highest level of
SMG occurs.  To understand those comparisons, each currency in relation to the function
of money and type of institution sponsoring the currency must be taken in to consideration.
For example, Time Dollars emphasise the SoV function of money.  It appears that this
choice of monetary function, in conjunction with the decisive role of high tolerance by
RFs, allows Time Dollars greater SMG.  One of the key implications of this is that non-
profit sponsorship and PID are most  important in  conjunction with external RFs.  The
significance  of  these  differences  is  that  putting  a  greater  emphasis  on  one  set  of
interactions can lead to different results, as shown with the case of Humboldt Exchange
Dollars and Time Dollars in Figures 6.22 and 6.23, which are both community sponsored,
but have different levels of linkage to the national currency.  This influences SMG heavily
for these currencies.  The highest degree of SMG results from the combinations of high RF
tolerance and high PID.  Therefore optimal combinations of RF Tolerance, PID and scale
will involve community sponsored currency institutions like Time Banks, which are able to
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avoid competing with the functions filled by the US Dollar, yielding highest SMG, but
without the flexibility of printed notes15.    
The main conclusion drawn here from these three way comparisons of SMG factors is that
community-based currencies, since they are well-tolerated by national RFs and have high
levels of PID allow the highest degrees of SMG.  Figure 6.24 implies that national RFs
encourage community-based institutions.  Quadrant comparisons show the variability of
most currencies when compared from different perspectives.  Combined analysis points to
distinctions made by national RFs in conjunction with PID as the key factor influencing
SMG.  Taken all  together,  these findings  speak to  the  “fierce urgency” mentioned by
President Obama, particularly at this time of global crisis, of empowering all stakeholders
to  the  greatest  extent  possible.   Concluding  thoughts  on  these  findings  follow  in  the
upcoming and final chapter of this thesis.   
15 Interestingly, Antonio Gramsci´s thoughts on hegemony and alliances, though well beyond the scope of this
thesis, seem to be corroborated by these findings, since CCs which ally themselves with the dominant
national currency are indeed more successful, and simultaneously help to support the dominance of the
national currency.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion and Final Reflections 
This study aimed to contribute conceptually and empirically to the body of literature that
investigates monetary governance.  It answered three inter-related research questions: 
 How can  the  potential  for  stakeholder  influence  over  monetary governance be
theoretically explored?
 How  can  the  potential  for  stakeholder  influence  over  monetary governance be
empirically explored, particularly across different types of currency institutions?
 Which combination of governance arrangements and currency functions allow for
enhanced ‘Shared Monetary Governance’ (SMG)? 
Answering  these  research  questions  was  achieved  by  focusing  on  those  aspects  of
monetary governance that  hinder  or  facilitate  stakeholder  access  to  relevant  decision-
making processes.   In particular,  the  study conceptually and  empirically explored  (by
means of a comparative investigation of four currencies) the relationship between external
and  internal  stakeholders’  influence  across  different  monetary  functional-geographical
scales (local through supra-national).  The criteria used were: levels of RF consistency,
transparency, accountability and public participation.  Follow-on questions regarding the
role of institutional sponsorship which were presented at the end of Chapter 3 are also
discussed shortly.
This  chapter  concludes  the  thesis  by  offering  final  reflections  on  the  findings,  the
limitations of the study and potential directions for future research.  It is organised in three
parts.   The first  provides a short  overview of  the thesis and summarises the empirical
findings and key contributions.  The second part concentrates on limitations of the thesis
and possible  directions  of  future  research.   Finally, the  third  part  offers  a  number  of
broader  reflections  on  the  usefulness  and  relevance  of  findings  to  current  discussions
regarding  monetary  governance,  some  of  which  were  inspired  by  the  still  unfolding
financial crisis.    
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7.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions
Chapter  2  reviewed  literature  concerning  understanding  money,  its  scale  and  various
approaches  to  monetary  governance.   This  chapter  identified  a  number  of  serious
limitations with previous approaches and posed the research questions mentioned above
while  highlighting  the  need  for  a  modified  conceptual  and  analytical  framework  for
exploring the potential of currencies for participatory monetary decision-making.  
Chapter  3  put  forward  a  new  conceptual  framework  of  ‘Shared  Monetary
Governance’ (SMG), to theoretically capture the interactions between external governance,
internal  governance and  scale  as  they affect  the  sharing  of  monetary decision-making
power.   The  SMG framework  emphasises  the  complexity  of  competing  influences  in
governing  currency  institutions.   It  applies  open  governance  concepts  to  monetary
institutional processes as they are affected by external, internal and scale related factors.
Open governance requires consistent  governing frameworks, formal processes to create
transparent  and  accountable  space  for  participation,  and  scales  small  enough  to
operationalise  those principles.   Applied to  money this  entails  the governance of three
institutional  processes,  namely  seigniorage,  issuance  and  backing  decision-making.
Seigniorage revenues are an important derivative of the currency creation process which
also  feed  directly  back  into  currency  issuance functionality  and  decision-making.
Furthermore, deciding how and with whom to share revenues directly empowers currency
institutions.   Issuance, of  course,  is  the key process which initiates  use  of a  currency.
Monetary  governance  should  facilitate  transparent  and  accountable  shared  issuance
decision-making  processes  for  all  stakeholders,  taking  into  account  the  need  to
complement  rather  than  compete  with  national  currencies.   Since  choice  of  backing
controls the value and behaviour of a currency, backing is a key factor in controlling access
to  and  circulation  of  the  currency.   Community-sponsored  complementary  currencies
appear to provide the most accessible implementation of shared choice of backing.  Indeed,
the SMG theoretical framework allows us to explore how cooperation between national
and community level monetary institutions improves currency institutional accessibility.
This supports the work of Bowring (1998) who advocated community-based currencies
(Time Dollars in particular) as a means of democratising both money and knowledge, thus
139
enhancing  transparency and  accountability  through  participatory  institutional  decision-
making processes.
The  SMG theoretical  framework  was  empirically applied  by means  of  a  comparative
analytical framework (explained in Chapter 4) and results were presented in Chapters 5
and  6.   These  chapters  explored  the  impact  of  national  Regulatory  Framework  (RF)
tolerance, internal power sharing, and scale on the SMG of four currencies in the USA.  In
particular, the consistency of US national RFs was measured in terms of how they treat
those  currency  institutions,  while  transparency,  accountability  and  participation,  key
components of Participatory Internal Decision-making (PID), were measured via shared
decision-making processes as  applied  to  seigniorage, issuance,  and choice  of  backing.
Scale was measured by counting the number of monetary functions filled by a currency,
and by classifying the circulatory range of  the currency.  The index created using this
methodology provided a means of quantifying the various factors of currency institutional
governance  to  produce  an  indicator  showing  how  effectively  any currency  institution
facilitates the sharing of monetary governance.  While the methodology introduced in this
thesis does not account for several informal factors in currency decision-making processes,
and can provide only an approximation of the combined effects of currency scale on those
governance  processes,  it  does  facilitate  understanding  how  -  by  emphasising  certain
functions  of money at  different geographical ranges – various currencies  can facilitate
increased decision-making access for all monetary stakeholders.
The follow-on questions posed at the end of Chapter 3 attempted to shed more light on two
areas of inquiry:
questions: 
• To what extent, if any, does institutional sponsorship affect levels of  RF Toleration,
PID, scale, and in turn, overall SMG?   
• To what extent, if any, does scale determine the degree of SMG, and do the smallest
scale currencies necessarily have the highest levels of SMG?
Answering these more specific questions first required comparing RF Tolerance, PID, and
scale for each currency, as  was done  in  Chapter  5.   Those  comparisons  revealed that
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contrary to preliminary expectations, community-based institutional sponsorship does not
guarantee national RF tolerance, and more surprisingly, business sponsorship also did not
gain RF favour.   Furthermore,  although community sponsored currencies  tend to  have
higher  PID  levels,  findings  showed  community-based  institutions  can  have  less  RF
toleration, as Humboldt Exchange Dollars shared with Deli Dollars, despite the Humboldt
Exchange Dollars  institutional  linkage with  the US Dollar.   Hence neither  community
sponsorship  nor  small  scale,  nor  even  deliberate  linkage  to  the  national  currency
automatically lead to  RF Toleration.   Similarly,  there was also no correlation between
institutional sponsorship and scale, as the unexpectedly large scale of Humboldt Exchange
Dollars,  contrasted against  the SPC Deli  Dollars,  confirms.   Hence the  commonalities
between these  two  very different  non-national  currencies  were more  striking  than  the
differences between them.
Answering the questions posed in Chapter 3 regarding effects on SMG of all these jostling
influences required further analysis, which was carried out in Chapter 6.  The inter-related
effects  of  institutional  sponsorship  on  various  monetary  governance  influences  were
analysed  together  in  different  combinations,  highlighting  relationships  between  those
factors.  Numerical scores and visual representations of each juxtaposed set of influences
by individual  currency and  as  a  group  were  therefore  compared.   Again,  somewhat
unexpectedly, national RF Tolerance appeared to outweigh the effects of small scale, with
the US Dollar scoring a higher level of SMG than the community-sponsored SPC Deli
Dollars.  Nevertheless, the relatively marginal RF Toleration and relatively large scale of
Humboldt Exchange Dollars brings into focus its similarity to Deli Dollars, particularly
against the backdrop of Tables 6.12,  where they shared nearly identical  PID and Scale
Interaction sums.   Indeed, as Table 6.19 showed,  they also  shared quite  similar  SMG
levels.  However, despite the participatory advantage that small scale gave to Deli Dollars,
as Table 6.18 shows, it is institutional sponsorship, combined with external (national) RF
Tolerance, rather than small scale alone, which determines overall SMG. 
Hence, while scale does have a demonstrable impact on decision-making, tolerance for
currency institutions by national RFs and Participatory Internal Decision-making were the
most  important  factors  in  SMG  outcomes.   Although  sponsoring  institutions  which
complemented national monetary functions achieved higher SMG scores, US national RFs
did not appear to favour business sponsored currencies over community-based currencies,
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nor  to  deliberately inhibit  circulation  of  non-national  currencies.   Indeed, the  case  of
Humboldt  Exchange  Dollars  showed  that  even  a  medium  scale  currency  can  share
significant governance power, while Deli Dollars showed that market-based institutions
can also sponsor a currency which empowers the local community.  
Thus, thinking within the framework of Shared Monetary Governance has wider reach than
simply  focusing  on  the  economic  aspects  of  a  community-based  currency.   By  re-
politicizing  the  decision-making  aspects  of  money  creation,  currencies  can  empower
stakeholders  through  multi-level  institutional  feedback,  encouraging  empowerment  in
other  areas.  This  feedback  has  a  wide  range  of  socio-economic  applications,  as  the
Japanese  governmental  (2007)  interest  in  community-based  currencies  indicates.
Comparisons across more currencies and national RFs will show how far these findings are
broadly  generalisable,  allowing  money  to  be  evaluated  and  used  from  a  stakeholder
empowerment perspective.  These issues are explored further below. 
7.2 Limitations of the Study and Future Research
Scope  limitations  of  this  thesis,  insufficient  theoretical  frameworks,  as  well  as
methodological impediments directly impacted upon the scope of the study presented in
this  thesis  (see  also  Hutchinson,  2002).   The  scope of  this  thesis  limited  the  overall
investigation to that which was manageable given the time, space and budget constraints of
the  study.   The  need  to  construct  a  new  approach  arises  from  the  lack  of  a  united
perspective joining open governance perspectives with those that focus on the economic
benefits and functions of money.  These separate perspectives required merging in order to
construct the SMG theoretical framework, thus meeting the need for a holistic approach
called for by Hutchinson (2002).  This framework had to be capable of informing the
search for a type of money most effective in sharing both formal decision-making power
and simultaneously fulfilling  the  various  functions  of  money in  a  manner  that  allows
participatory  access  to  monetary  decision-making  from  a  currency  user  perspective.
Implementing  a  study  of  this  new  paradigmatic  framework  presented  significant
methodological challenges, which also limited what could be accomplished given project
resources. 
142
7.2.1 Limitations of the study
More specifically, the lack of a wide literature discussing  participatory decision-making
for  currency-specific topics,  namely the  seigniorage,  issuance  and  backing of  a  given
currency, made it necessary to apply a synthesis of  existing literatures.  This synthesis
combined  literature  ranging  from  participatory  governance  to  that  of  conventional
economics in order to map out a set of literatures applicable to this study (see Table 2.4).
This  limitation  in  the  literature  also  extends  to  the  lack  of  compatible  paradigm  and
accompanying theoretical  framework,  which  the  previously mentioned  literatures  were
therefore  used  to  create.  While  participatory  budgeting  is  discussed  as  a  case  of
participatory democracy, and consensus-based decision-making is applied to small-scale
institutions,  these  literatures  do  not  take  into  account  the  problems  associated  with
currency creation, such as the interaction between monetary decisions and the functions of
money.  The literature which does deal with such effects, on the other hand, treats the
making  of  these  decisions  by  politically-independent  experts  as  a  given.   Hence  the
paradigms of open governance and monetary decisions are artificially separated into almost
mutually exclusive approaches.  This study reviewed a wide range of literature in order to
synthesise a new more inclusive approach.  
The  theoretical  framework  for  this  new  paradigm,  referred  to  as  Shared  Monetary
Governance, was also limited both by the lack of literature regarding participatory financial
decisions,  and  also  by the  very newness of  the  concept  of  applying open  governance
principles to what is normally the exclusive domain of banking experts.  Shared Monetary
Governance as a theoretical construct needs a wider literature with which to engage which
discusses the  ability of  the key external  and internal  decision-makers in  any currency-
issuing organisation to share that decision-making power with the users of the currency.
This  literature on  the  whole  simply does  not  exist,  and what does exist  lacks  general
accessibility.  Although not all currency users have the resources, be it education, financial
experience,  time,  or  other  resources,  to  make-up  part  of  a  currency institutional  core
decision-making group, they all  emphatically do have the right to a voice in monetary
governance.   Some  discussions  of  complementary  currency,  as  well  as  those  of
participatory budgeting do  raise these concerns, but  not  within  the  specific  context  of
currency decisions as they impact the functions and users of money.  
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Combining  the  power  of  external  and  internal decision-makers  with  the  effects  on
currency function raises the question of how to include non-decision-making users, who
constitute the majority of users of any money.  The Influence of external regulation on
internal currency decisions interacts strongly with the functions of money, which impact
all users,  yet these three-way interactions are under-theorised and under-studied.   This
study proposes Shared Monetary Governance as a potential  framework within which to
begin the process of applying open governance principles evenly to all of the processes and
users of money, yet is limited by the lack of dialogue and lack of compatible frameworks.  
Methodologically, this study required constructing a concrete means of measuring the level
of Shared Monetary Governance offered by any given currency.  While various similar
studies,  such  as  the  measure  of  independence  for  any given  central  bank,  attempt  to
accomplish similar goals, no methodology exists which takes into account the interactive
nature of the various factors in currency decision-making.  The methodology presented in
this study created a single index that facilitates a greater understanding of the complexities
and possibilities for greater decision-making participation in any given currency institution
by all users of that currency.  The small number of currency institutions available for study
presented a significant methodological challenge, as did the need to synthesise the scale of
each currency institution from the factors of functions of money and geographical range.
No  existing  methodology  allowed  for  such  hybrid  measurement  within  indicators.
Inevitably,  this  hybrid  methodology  is  limited  by  the  complexity  of  the  interacting
influences  that  it  attempts  to  ‘quantify’.   Again,  larger  sets  of  cases,  involving  more
currencies,  could provide greater understanding of the underlying processes influencing
monetary governance.  Nonetheless, despite the limitations to this methodology and the
theoretical framework it  operationalises,  this  contribution is  important  as  a first,  albeit
tentative attempt to empirically ‘capture’ the potential for open governance in the case of
money. 
7.2.2 Future research
As observed earlier, the small number of cases investigated in this study was one major
limitation.  This is another direction for future research.  Expanding the study to several
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countries,  using  data  for  currencies  within  each  country will  allow  better  comparison
across  different national Regulatory Frameworks, and across different currencies within
each nation.  A feasible extension of the study was envisaged to include England, Wales,
and Ireland.  Comparisons  across these countries  are expected to  be facilitated by the
shared  central  government  of  the  United  Kingdom,  whilst  bearing  in  mind  that  the
devolved governments of each country may involve different policy regimes, necessitating
different RF measurements for each country.  Currencies that could be investigated across
the UK include the British Pound Sterling, the Totnes Pound in England, LETS in Wales,
Westport Reeks in Ireland, Time Banks UK and one or more privately issued currencies in
each country.  
Other potential  avenues of  future investigations  include expanding the methodology to
allow for informal barriers  to participation for both decision-making and non-decision-
making currency users, as well as potentially including more external regulatory influences
beyond national legal frameworks.  For instance, the policies of major businesses toward
the issuance and acceptance of complementary currencies can have a significant impact on
the  decisions  around  those  currencies  in  local  communities.   Indeed,  Gomez  (2008)
describes Argentine CCs forming linkages between major local businesses and their crucial
suppliers, illustrating the influence of business decisions, although external to the currency
institution, on currency governance.  Such methodological changes would require more
resources to carry out investigation, but would allow the formation of a more complete
picture of the influential factors in sharing the governance of money among all money
users. 
 
7.3 Final Reflections on Global Monetary Governance 
This thesis merges the paradigm of monetary governance with monetary function, both of
which are necessary and integral to a monetary system.  Money, as opposed to markets or
the environment, though Glover (1999) rightly decries its neglect, is focused on here as a
key component which drives economic systems.  Governance participation is a stakeholder
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right, which while denied by inaccessible monetary institutions,  may be partly redressed
through SMG.
7.3.1 Broader Theoretical and Policy Implications of Participation and
Institutional Scale 
Governance  of  money  and  access  to  monetary  decision-making  are  important  social
concerns  enmeshed  in  a  wider  social  context.   Some  of  these  concerns  include
commodification and monetisation as companions to embeddedness and of economic, and
as  Bowring  (1998)  points  out,  intellectual  participation.   Economic  justice  and
embeddedness  have  been  contrasted  with  commodification  by  Polanyi  (1944),  Thrift
(2006), Williams (2003) and others.  Although embeddedness and de-commodification are
related  to  governance,  neither  guarantees shared  decision-making  among stakeholders.
Paid  work,  by William’s  (2003)  definition,  is  commodified,  therefore,  work paid  in  a
hypothetically fully embedded currency -  not  available as a Polanyian (1944) fictitious
commodity -  remains  commodified,  merely within  a  more  socially rather  than  market
embedded  context.   Nevertheless,  that  embeddedness  does  not  assure  participation  in
decision-making for currency users.  Finally, money is not necessary for commodification,
as gift economies demonstrate.  Therefore these important concerns, though not dealt with
directly in this study, certainly merit future consideration.
Open political and economic governance is characterised by transparent and accountable
participatory processes, which price inflation, currency exchange and housing speculation
affect in undemocratic ways.  Likewise, issuance of credit and money via loans, wages and
salaries are almost entirely left to unaccountable and frequently non-transparent credit and
employment markets.  SMG provides a measure which could facilitate stakeholder access
to this conjunction of decision-making and functional monetary institutional processes.
7.3.2 National Regulatory Framework Tolerance toward Local Currency
Institutions and the Current Financial Crisis  
The impact of US national Regulatory Frameworks (RFs) on the three Complementary
Currency (CC) institutions  studied highlights Bohman's (1997) contention regarding the
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ability of  national  monetary RFs  to  control  local  governance agendas.   The  proposed
conceptual  framework of  Shared  Monetary Governance (SMG) explores  the  ability of
currency institutions  to  facilitate decision-making access  for  all monetary stakeholders,
beginning at the local level.  Local economic development paradigms, as Seyfang and Sen
pointed out earlier, lead back to connections with the larger economic and social world of
international finance.  The importance of Shared Monetary Governance lies in the potential
for  CC  (especially  community-based)  institutions  to  facilitate  transparency  and
accountability through  stakeholder  access  to  monetary decision-making,  particularly in
light of the impact of the on-going Credit Crisis (see Monbiot, 2009).   If national RFs
destabilise or are biased against CCs, then their full potential as tools for dealing with the
problems to which they are applied will not be available.  
These findings suggest that emphasising individual monetary functions such as SoV at the
local  level (which allow CCs to avoid competition with the national currency) seem to
produce more harmonious relationships with US national RFs.  Such cooperation between
different currencies (national, CCs) facilitates both participatory governance and functional
economic participation.  On the other hand, currencies which emphasise the UoA and MoE
functions of money without further cooperative moulding of internal institutional processes
may limit opportunities for cooperation with national RFs.  Stiglitz (2003) asserts that the
stability of international finance is shaped by institutional governance, yet internationally
and nationally monetary stability varies by region, making one-size-fits-all monetary policy
inappropriate, as Mohamad (1999) recounts.  Competing MoE and SoV stability concerns
return  to  the  governance  components  of  issuance  and backing,  though as  a  means  of
stabilising the monetary system, Monbiot’s (2009) suggestion of competing currencies is
by no means new.  The independence of national money creation has not kept national
money  stable,  as  the  ongoing  global  financial  crisis  demonstrates.   Indeed,  the  very
complexity of creation and issuance of national currencies serves to deter users of national
money,  as  does  the  doctrine  of  central  bank  independence,  from  accessing  national
monetary decision-making.
Knowing  how  well  institutions  share  decision-making  could  help  stabilise  monetary
governance when different level institutions are in conflict over priorities.  Dodd’s (1994)
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concern  over  the  destabilising  potential  of  international  financial  networks  could  be
addressed in part  through cooperation between national  and community-level monetary
institutions.   Differences between  goals,  priorities,  interests,  and  influence  among the
bodies which regulate monetary policy at the international level is likely to lead to conflicts
both within those bodies and also between those bodies and other actors dependent upon
them  for  support.   Furthermore,  top-down  monetary  governance  is  non-inclusive,
structurally increasing the resistance to full stakeholder access.  Knowing what level of
power-sharing  is  taking  place  within  currency  institutions  provides  stakeholders  with
greater  opportunities  for  involvement  in  monetary  priority  setting.   Furthermore,  as
international concerns can take different shape from concerns at regional levels, potential
for conflict between monetary regulators at different levels seems nearly unavoidable.   A
move toward greater SMG through more support for local currencies could thus help re-
establish greater monetary and social stability.
7.3.3 Transparency and Accountability through Participatory Internal
Decision-making
Calls  for  currency competition  attempt  to  address  monetary  functionality  but  neglect
institutional  governance,  as  Mendoza  (2002)  acknowledges  while  pointing  out  that
issuance of many national currencies is deliberately non-transparent.  Indeed, community-
based currency advocates like Linton (1994), Glover (nd), Boyle (2000) and Cahn (2006)
assert  that  most  national  currencies lack transparency, accountability and participation.
However,  proposals  for  competing privately issued currencies (Hayek,  1976)  also  lack
these elements, since currency competition alone may increase financial system stability,
but neglects crucial decision-making elements. 
Stakeholder control over and access to economic processes implies the need for publicly
transparent  and  accountable  monetary  governance.   In  this  context,  international  and
national RFs  are  one side of  the governance coin,  with both national and local  level
currency institutions being the other side.  Closed external governance (regulatory, market)
forces  are  juxtaposed  against  potentially  more  open  currency institutions  with  varying
levels  of  stakeholder  inclusion.   Stakeholders  can  choose  to  support  more  accessible
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monetary institutions when they know how effectively those institutions  share decision-
making power. 
Against  this  background,  a  key  contribution  of  this  thesis  is  that  it  introduced  and
empirically tested a means of measuring shared monetary decision-making which, in turn,
can  facilitate  changes  to  monetary  RFs,  thus  potentially  allowing  higher  levels  of
stakeholder participation in monetary governance. Where CCs,  particularly community-
sponsored  CCs,  survive  as  functionally  viable  forms  of  money  and  use  inclusive
governance practices, they can and should be used to empower more stakeholders through
increased decision-making access. 
7.3.4 Policy Recommendations and Conclusion
Fung (2001) suggests creating links between institutions at various levels.  In light of the
findings in this study, a similarly linked three-tiered financial system arises as a logical
policy  recommendation  that  could  potentially  allow  all  monetary  stakeholders  a
significantly  increased  level  of  access  to  monetary  decision-making.   First,  each
community having its own community-based MoE currency as well as multiple community
Time Banks would allow more direct input from currency users, and more direct control
over local economies.  Those community currencies may need to be regionally connected
to the national currency or to the currencies of neighbouring communities, allowing greater
flexibility  for  local  communities  while  coordinating  financial  concerns  across  several
regions.   At a second level,  national currencies can continue to allow independent  but
connected financial structure across national and international boundaries.  At a third level,
the creation of a truly international currency, separate from any domestically used national
currency, would provide international money users with a neutral and coordinated financial
system for travel and international business needs.
Participation  in  currency  decision-making  is  important  from  several  standpoints:
economic, social and ethical.  From an economic perspective, the more participation in
decision-making and hence buy-in, a currency institution has, the more circulation, and the
more  support  from users  of  that  currency.  From a social  point  of  view,  recalling the
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“Constitutional  Consensus”  mentioned  previously  by  Huber,  sharing  the  benefits  of
common resources, including money, increases the overall social good by being consistent
in adhering to that consensus.  Readers will also recall Zelizer´s contention that money is a
social construction.  As such, money therefore belongs within the social sphere, and thus
also the political.  In a democratic society, this intertwining of the economic with the social
and political must acknowledge the inherent right to meaningful economic as well as social
and political participation in decisions which affect society.  Clearly, money deeply affects
both society as a whole, and members of society individually.  Ethically, Sen´s previously
cited assertion that communities have a right to control their own development requires
that  communities  be allowed to participate meaningfully in  monetary decision-making.
Shared  Monetary Governance,  by providing a  measure of  such  participation,  hopes  to
increase  that  buy-in and  social  good  which  is  not  only  the  consensus  in  democratic
















IN Currency is legal tender 1 y
Is the currency accepted for tax payment? 95% y
 
encouraged to be accepted or available credits/tax
breaks, incentives awarded 90% some many states
 is the currency Overseen by a central bank 80% y
 
Currency governance  structural  forms,  procedures
or office hours mandated? 70% some some
 
Are earnings in the currency reportable to benefit,
tax or other agencies (by requirement)? 60% y y y
 
Is  the  look  and  feel  of  notes  regulated  or
prohibited? 50% y y n/a y
Is circulation of the currency restricted? 45% some n/a y
Must  backing,  exchangeability,  convertibility  or
value be pegged to national money? 40% y n/a y
 
Are  benefits  recipients  (dole/welfare,  disability,
etc.) penalised for using this currency? 30% some y
 
Are  the  processes  which  apply  to  this  currency
inconsistent in law or application? 20%
initiall
y
 Is this currency overseen as a financial security? 10% y
OUT  This currency is outlawed 0
RF Toleration percentage 1 0.65 0.8 0.5
Processing:  More y above 50%: more Tolerated; More y
below = less Tolerated
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Appendix 2: PID Data Scoring 
Internal Governance Score
Shared Seigniorage  
seigniorage revenues reinvested as shareholder dividends or profit 1
Seigniorage revenues split with National Treasury 2
seigniorage revenues shared between currency holders 3
seigniorage revenues donated to non-local charity 4




Shared Issuance Decision-making  
Issued by Private Firm or Individual without public consultation 1
Issued by National, supranational or international Governmental Authority 2
Issued by publicly chosen or elected Local Authority 3
Issued  via  elected  management  committee  of  Community, Civil  Society  Group  or  local
business 4
Issued via open walk-in vote of community or Civil Society Group 5
Shared Issuance tally:
(In cases of coercive issuance, Total Participatory Internal Decision-making Score = -1)
I.
total
Shared Choice of Backing  
Fiat currency with no user decision-making participation or representation 1
Fiat currency with limited user decision-making participation 2
Backed by commodit(ies)y, no user decision-making participation or representation 3
Backed by cash or commodities, limited user decision-making participation 4
Backed  by  both  commodity and  cash  redemption choice  with  full  user  decision-making
participation 5
Shared Choice of Backing tally:
B.
total
Coercively Issued: Automatic OUT and score of “-1”
Fully
OUT




Total PID score 45
Percentage 'IN' the set of PID Currencies:
(Higher scores indicate more participatory governance) 100%
 1 to 6 are 0.0 or Fully OUT of the set
7 to 11:  7 = 10%,  8 = 30%,  9 = 50%,  10 = 70%,  and 11= 90%
12 to 45 are 1.0 or Fully IN the PID set
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Appendix 3: Sum Tables




Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Lowest
Possible
Score
RF Toler. 1 1 .65 .7 0
PID 1 0 1 -.3 -1
Gov. Total 2 1 1.65 .4 -1




Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Lowest
Possible
Score
% SPC 1 1 .8 .7 0
PID 1 0 1 -.3 -1
Internal  vs.
Scale Total
2 1 1.8 .4 -1




Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Lowest
Possible
Score
RF Tolerat. 1 1 .65 .7 0
% SPC 1 0 1 .3 0
External  vs.
Scale Total
2 1 1.65 1 0




Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Lowest
Possible
Score
RF  Tol. 1 1 .65 .7 0
PID 1 0 -.2 .3 -1




3 1 1.65 1 -1
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Appendix 4: Quadrant Figure Tables 












A quadrant Currencies with maximum of BOTH elements
B quadrant: Currencies with minimal or absent vertical element BUT with maximum or considerable
horizontal element
C quadrant: Currencies with minimum or absence of BOTH elements
D quadrant: Currencies with maximum of vertical element but with minimal or absent horizontal element 
Table A4.2: Tolerance by Regulatory Frameworks, Participatory Internal Decision-making
comparison quadrants
Tolerated  but  NOT
much PID
 “Both tolerated              and
PID”
Neither  tolerated  nor
PID
PID but NOT well tolerated 
Similarly  to  the  summations,  Table  A5.3  compares  PID  and  scale  for  each  currency  PID  for  the  X
component, and using scale as the Y:
Table A4.3: Internal governance vs. Scale
SPC  but  NOT  much
PID
 “Both SPC and PID”
Neither SPC nor PID PID but NOT SPC 
Table A5.4 uses SPC % as the X coordinate and Regulatory Framework toleration as Y:
Table A4.4: external RF tolerance vs. scale
Externally  Tolerated
but NOT SPC
 “Both tolerated and SPC”
Neither  tolerated  nor
SPC
Tolerated  by  external
regulatory   governance  by
NOT SPC 
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Appendix 5: Alternative Table Views











Users affected by money as
direct stakeholders with no
currency institutional
decision-making power


















Users affected by money but
























Influence of currency users








Toleration by National Regulatory
Frameworks for non-national
currencies




(by directly affected stakeholders)
Currency Scale as percentage of
SPC
Currency Users (no decision-making
input) affected by the functions of
money at various geographical scales
(by directly affected stakeholders)
Appendix 5 Addendum: Venn Diagrams (Alternative Table
Complements)
Internal Currency Decision-makers vs. Users  
        Money users with decision-making authority.
       Money Users with no decision-making authority.
Stakeholders (Indirect vs. Direct Stakeholders)
       Indirect Institutional Stakeholders 
       Direct Currency Institutional Stakeholders 
Stakeholders with Decision-making Authority vs. Without Authority
       Indirect Institutional Stakeholders (because they
are external to the currency institution, but have
decision-making authority over the currency) 
         Direct (internal)  Currency Institutional
Stakeholders with decision-making authority
          Direct (internal) Currency Institutional
Stakeholders with no authority (i.e. Users)
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